

Refereed article

Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil — Islamic Education and Local Traditions in Afghanistan

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Summary

This paper explores the role of higher education in the ongoing value discourse about local traditions and interpretations of Islamic orthodoxy in Eastern Afghanistan. It focuses on the educational trajectories of Afghan students, graduates and teachers of Islamic academic subjects, which often start across the border in Pakistan. Biographical data suggest that students attain a more differentiated understanding of both their religion and of society on their way up from Islamic school (*madrassa*) to university. The combination of a traditional and modern education leads many of them to change their perspective on certain traditions, ones which in their eyes contradict Islamic principles — most of which are related specifically to the treatment of women. However, to translate these ideas into the local context of Eastern Afghanistan has proven difficult, since certain social values and hierarchies constrain their further spread. Nevertheless, the combination of religious and secular education provides students of Islamic subjects with both practical and intellectual resources that they can draw upon in discourses about local traditions. Beside the emerging trend in the region of linking traditional and modern education, the paper shows the significance that transnationalism and migration continue to have for the educational system of Afghanistan.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Pakistan, tradition, Islam, migration, education, shari'a

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Introduction

After several decades of war and accompanying turmoil in Afghanistan, education provision in the country has slowly been recovering since the international intervention there in 2002 — albeit under somewhat different conditions as compared to previous times. The emphasizing of a Muslim identity ever since the era of *jihād* against the Soviet invasion in the early 1980s has contributed to an ongoing reconfiguration of values among Afghans in the direction of Islam. While for many Afghan migrants living in Pakistan, that country's Islamic schools (*madrasas*) were mere recruiting stations for *jihād*, for others these institutions represented only the first — but nevertheless important — cornerstone of their religious formation, being followed by the attendance of colleges and universities. Here, Islamic education in the form of academic subjects like *Sharī'a* or Islamic Studies imparted quite a different approach toward religion, which was largely detached from the local context of Eastern Afghanistan. This in turn facilitated a more differentiated view on their own society, from an Islamic perspective.

Indeed, the accounts of such students and graduates suggest an increase in the of discourse on values taking place, which mainly involves debate between the two competing value systems of *pakhtō* (or *pashtūnwālī*) and Islam. Many of these academics challenge the conglomerate of Pashtun traditions that are interwoven with vague religious justifications for them, with these individuals eventually deeming certain customs to actually be improper in religious terms (*nā-rawā dōdūna*). Notably, most of the social critique is directed toward the treatment of women — such as the payment of bride price (*walwar*), the banning of girls from attending school, or giving brides as compensation in feuds (*bad, swāra*).

Following the fall of the Taliban government and the subsequent waves of return migration and repatriation occurring after 2002, Afghans with a religious and secular education coming back from Pakistan have become the driving force behind the development of the education sector in their native country. This in turn has contributed to the spread of their ideas well beyond the country's universities. But transferring such ways of thinking from the campus into Afghan (rural) society has turned out to be a rather difficult task: it requires students or graduates of Islamic subjects translating their knowledge acquired at universities and colleges in Afghanistan or Pakistan into the language and symbols of local contexts — wherein certain social conventions and tribal values continue to dominate.

This article examines specifically the (re-)negotiation of values and traditions in the context of religious education among Pashtuns in Eastern Afghanistan, as well as its further outreach to peripheral geographical areas (*atrāf*). It focuses on students of Islamic subjects (Islamic Studies or Jurisprudence), and on their understanding of their own society. While being aware of certain Islamic values and principles, these individuals are as well part of Pashtun society — wherein Islamic scholarship is well appreciated, but where “improper” (*nā-rawā*) traditions are, however, also still being

practiced for a number of different reasons. The interactions between students and their academic as well as private environments in Afghanistan and Pakistan can thus be viewed as the arenas wherein different — and sometimes conflicting — values are currently being negotiated, specifically between the ideals of Islamic orthopraxy and the imperatives of social convention. It should be noted, however, that the aim of the study is not to reveal discrepancies between Pashtun culture and religion, but rather to examine the ways in which all cultures may be reevaluated by means of exposure to certain value systems.

First, I will briefly discuss the methodological approach used in this study and explain why it focuses specifically on religious students in Eastern Afghanistan. I will then elaborate on the connections that exist between transnational migration and religious education in general. Illuminating this backdrop will help us to grasp a better understanding of the typical patterns in the educational trajectories of these religious students.

In the second part of the paper, I will then turn to the discourse unfolding between orthodox Islamic practice and longstanding Pashtun traditions. I will then elaborate on the importance of honor and status in Pashtun society, before turning to some key issues that are reflected by my interview respondents. Through the examination of marriage practices, both the Islamic perspective as well as local imperatives become apparent — showing specifically therein the centrality of communal cohesion, and accompanying social pressure, as forces both preserving moral values and simultaneously hampering social and religious change. at the same time preserving local values.

Finally, I will argue that the gradual convergence of religious and secular forms of education that is visible in the biographies of the students concerned may still be having an effect on the spread of Islamic principles, most notably through bestowing the latter with increased legitimacy among members of Pashtun society.

Methodological approach

The research here focuses on the interaction between the two different value systems toward which Pashtuns are most oriented. As members of their society and “experts” on Islamic orthodoxy,¹ students and graduates of Islamic subjects such as *Sharī’a*, Islamic Culture (*Saqāfat-e Islāmī*), or Basics of Religion (*Usūluddīn*)² may be

1 With reference to Asad (1986), I regard orthodoxy as a distinctive relationship to the foundational texts of Islam — one that claims normative authority over practice. Therefore, it should be understood as a subjective interpretation among the interviewed students of what may be regarded as religiously correct.

2 The nomenclature for Islamic Studies often differs between universities. In Afghan ones, studies in *sharī’a* are mostly called Jurisprudence and Law (*Fiqh wa Qqānūn*), which differs from the subject Law in that it discusses more the Islamic sources of jurisprudence (as well as Islamic state theory). By contrast, Islamic Culture (*Saqāfat-e Islāmī*) deals with Islamic history, philosophy, mission, and in part jurisprudence. At the International Islamic University, Islamabad (IIUI), this subject is called

considered as standing at the intersection of both realms. On the one hand, they are aware of Islamic rulings regarding certain traditional practices and norms. On the other, they are part of a complex system of social relationships that compels them to follow the established conventions of their community. In other words, in these students' reflections about society and their interaction with their social environment at home in Afghanistan an ongoing discourse about values and the rightfulness of certain traditions becomes visible. Furthermore it shows how religious knowledge and performance ability gained during the different upward stages in their educational career (starting from school and *madrasa* and moving on up to college and university) may be used as resources in this discourse, so as to help assert their views.

It may be very hard or even impossible for Western researchers to gain direct access to the milieu of Islamic studies in Afghanistan, for obvious reasons: to accumulate sufficient trust in this otherwise often hostile and rather anti-Western environment takes great patience. Particularly in the beginning I was dependent on a number of Afghans studying in Islamabad, whom I first befriended in 2012. They introduced me to their fellow students, teachers, friends, and acquaintances, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This "snowball sampling" (cf. Johnson 1990; Bernard 2006) actually proved to be adequate, given the relatively small community of Pashtun university students, graduates, and professors of religion at present.³

Moreover, these initial acquaintances played an important role in the building of mutual trust with subsequent informants. During three fieldwork stays in 2013 and 2014 (twice) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, of six months duration collectively, I undertook semi-structured qualitative interviews with around 50 informants about their educational biographies, social backgrounds, religious views, and Pashtun traditions. Furthermore, I engaged in participant observation in the public environments of my informants, including in guest rooms (*hujras*), at wedding parties, in work places, on university campuses,⁴ in seminars in *Sharī'a* and in three *madrāsas*.⁵

Basics of Religion (*Usūluddīn*). In Afghan universities, meanwhile, a condensed version of *Saqāfat-e Islāmī* forms a compulsory part of any academic studies undertaken, be they of Biology, Physics, or any other subject beside, which is supposed to impart Islamic ethics and basic religious knowledge one hour per week.

3 Although I did not obtain official statistics, I estimate that the number of such (Pashtun) graduates being produced each year is around 20–40 at the IIUI and also at the Salam, Dawat, and Afghan Universities in Kabul. Additionally, there are probably less than 100 such individuals at Kabul and Nangarhar Universities, which constitute the major institutions for Islamic Studies in the Eastern Afghanistan region and in northern Pakistan. Active teachers and professors comprise only a few dozen individuals altogether, with them often even teaching at two or even three of the universities mentioned above.

4 These included most prominently the IIUI in Pakistan; in Afghanistan, the University of Kabul, Dawat University (founded by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf), Salam University (founded by members of the

Transnational lives, transnational education

Religious education and migration in Afghanistan and Pakistan

A prominent feature of the educational system in Eastern and Central Afghanistan is its interconnectivity transnationally, and particularly with Pakistan. A large portion of the lecturers at the *Shari'a* faculties of Kabul University, Nangarhar University, and at two of the major private universities in Kabul (Dawat, Salam) hold degrees from Pakistani universities, while virtually all Afghan students living in Peshawar or Islamabad were either born in Pakistan or migrated there at a young age. Since 2002 many have either returned to Afghanistan (usually to Kabul or Jalalabad) or moved back and forth between the two countries, residing in one while working in the other.

However, it is surprising that, until now, education in Afghanistan has at the most been studied as a national phenomenon, whereas its connections with cross-border migration have predominantly been associated only with *madrasas* and religious extremism (cf. Borchgrevink 2010; Dorronsoro 2012; Schetter 2012). Yet in view of the extensive waves of migration by Afghans across the border and the prolonged periods of time that they have stayed in Pakistan before finally returning to their home country, one should as well take into account other forms of religious education. As will be shown, religious and secular education are interrelated in both countries — thus existing as a phenomenon shaped and conditioned by cross-border migration.

Afghanistan and South Asia share a long history of cultural and economic exchange. Apart from cross-border trade, the frontier region has throughout the ages been permeated intensively by numerous religious ideas and movements during the last two centuries. Most prominently, a vast network of religious scholars and clerics related to the reformist Deobandi School from northern India has been leaving its imprint on the region since the late nineteenth century (cf. Metcalf 2002; Dorronsoro 2005; Haroon 2007, 2012). Rooting its teachings in *hadith* (reports of the sayings of Prophet Muhammad), the school is mainly concerned with building Islamic personalities through the strict observance of the prophetic tradition in everyday life while banning other customary practices (Metcalf 2002:4ff). In contrast to India and Pakistan, however, institutionalized religious education in Afghanistan was rare

reformist party *Jami'at-e Islah*), and the Afghan Institute (founded by former Taliban ambassador Abdul Salam Zaeef and their former foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutwakkil) in Kabul; and, to a much lesser extent, the public Nangarhar University in Jalalabad and Sheikh Zaid University in Khost.

- 5 The *madrasas* concerned include one founded by the international organization World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY, which has strong ties with Saudi Arabia) in Jalalabad, one in Behsud District (Nangarhar Province), and one for girls in Kabul — all officially registered, the latter two using the government curriculum.

throughout the twentieth century, being limited to a few centers like Dār al-Ulūm in Kabul or Najm al-Madāris in Jalalabad (Abdul Baqi 2008:19–20). The syllabus for the “small” degree (*waṣa dawra*) of such traditional *madrasas*, which takes nine to twelve years to complete, includes mostly religious subjects such as Jurisprudence (*fiqh*), Logic (*mantiq*), Rhetoric (*kalām*), Quranic Exegesis (*tafsīr*), Prophetic History (*sīra*), *hadīth*, and Arabic and Persian literature. Even today, there are only few *madrasas* offering the “major” degree (*lōya dawra*) that qualifies graduates to study *Sharī’a* at university (Karlsson and Mansory 2004:94–96).

These few formal *madrasas* aside, religious education in Afghanistan mostly takes place informally in the village mosque or at home. Whereas the latter form of instruction is merely based on the sharing of oral traditions regarding practical knowledge and values, until now local people have sent their children to mosque-schools in addition to public ones (if available). Here, children receive lessons in the memorization of parts of the Quran, basic reading and writing, good manners, and religious ethics (cf. Karlsson and Mansory 2004:88).

The situation first changed with the unprecedented waves of outmigration (*hijrat*, *muhājirat*)⁶ experienced from the mid-1970s onward. The causes for this exodus have been manifold: the first wave was triggered by severe drought and the Iranian oil boom. The biggest such waves, however, followed the communist coup in 1978, the ensuing Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (Monsutti 2006; Harpviken 2009), the later civil wars (1989–1996), and then the establishment of the Taliban regime (1996–2001). At peak times in the early 1990s, out of an estimated 6.3 million Afghan refugees around 3.3 million of them at some point had lived in Pakistan (UNHCR 2000:116).

In Pakistan, throughout the provinces (Balochistan, modern day Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas) adjacent to Afghanistan *madrasas* were set up for these Afghan refugees. These were formed mostly as part of the international efforts to mobilize Afghan refugees against the Soviet invasion, by stirring religious extremism. This approach was supported by General Zia ul-Haq’s Islamization policy, by Arab countries, and by the United States as well as other international actors (Dorransoro 2012:37–38). In addition, every *mujahidin* party had its own educational office from which to recruit supporters for their respective ideologies (Andeshmand 2011:151).

In these years, many Afghans thus attended either *madrasas* or a mixture of religious and modern schools. These had been established by Afghan political parties such as Hizb-e Islami (led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar), Jamiat-e Islami (led by Burhanuddin Rabbani), and Hizb-e Islami (led by Muhammad Younis Khalis). The curricula for these schools were devised by different international organizations like

6 It should be noted that the term *hijrat* has strong religious connotations, alluding to the Prophet Muhammad’s exile in Medina. In contrast, the more neutral term *muhājirat* was never once used by respondents.

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Islamic Relief Agency, Muslim Aid, or the Afghanistan Education Committee. Religious education formed a substantial part of these curricula: between six to sixteen hours per week were dedicated to the Quran, Islamic Studies (*Islāmīyāt*), and in some curricula Arabic (Samady 2001:90–91). Some parties, such as Ittihad-e Islami bara-ye Azadi-ye Afghanistan (led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf), even founded tertiary education institutions — in this case the University of Dawat and Jihad in 1985, which employed Pakistani and Arab teachers as well (Andeshmand 2011:150–159).⁷ Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001 Afghans have been able to attend regular public schools up to high school (*lycée* or *lisa*) level in Pakistan; these are, in fact, under the administration of the government of Afghanistan.

After several new waves of emigration and return, in 2013 there were still about 1.6 million registered refugees from Afghanistan living in Pakistan — that in addition to the estimated 1 million undocumented Afghan nationals living there (UNHCR 2013:2). However, as Alessandro Monsutti has pointed out, the term “refugee” conceals the fact that for many Afghans migration is an active strategy (Monsutti 2004, 2010), and one that often involves continuous circulatory movement (Koser and Martin 2011:59ff). Equally, it should be noted that many Afghans are transforming their refugee status into a positive resource, by crossing the border multiple times for reasons of economic and social gain. Thus, many still have their homes and families in refugee camps in Pakistan, while simultaneously looking for work across the border (cf. Koser 2011).

From camp to campus and into the field

The biographical narratives of Afghan religious students suggest some common elements to all of their life stories, ones which recurred in many interviews: Growing up in exile, these students attended both religious and secular schools. Many of those who planned to study *Shari’a* or Islamic Studies first visited an institute for Islamic Studies (*ma’had*),⁸ where they learned Arabic properly. They additionally had a tendency to describe their path as moving outward from a narrow to a more profound understanding of Islam, as well as the emergence of a certain degree of tolerance toward differing Islamic practices.

Informants claimed that their minds had been broadened (“*zmunḡ nazar prākh shū*”) with every step taken from *madrassa* to university: They describe *madrassa* education as being mostly concerned with Islam in practice, values, and orthopraxy — such as the correct way of praying, alms giving, and the like, although being done without any deeper reflection on its scriptural basis (cf. Abdul Baqi 2008; Malik 1996,

7 In 1999, this university had around 2000 students, with more than 500 of them being female (Andeshmand 2011:159).

8 Although the Arabic meaning for *ma’had* would be “institute,” both of the mentioned *ma’hads* call themselves a “college” in English and *kālej* in Urdu in their online advertisements.

2013). Many informants, while praising its emphasis on a morally correct system (*akhlāqī nizām*), regarded *madrassa* education as being superficial and rather narrow-minded (*tang nazar*) for neglecting diversity and propagating the notion of one single “correct” form of Islamic behavior, such as observing “correct” Islamic dress: clean, long shirt and wide trousers (*shalwār kamīz*), prayer cap (*tōpay*), and full beard (*gīray*).

Despite economic hardship and no apparent material gains to be had (as compared to with studying Law or Business Management),⁹ many *madrassa* graduates afterward still aim for advanced religious studies. Since graduates from Pakistani universities — regardless of their actual field — are preferred in the Afghan labor market, pursuing Islamic Studies at university poses a viable option for a household to improve its economic situation. At the same time, they are also honored for working for the benefit of society and religion.

Before entering university, many students take a detour of one or two years through the “colleges” (interviewees referred to it as *ma’had*) located in Peshawar, Pakistan. One such college is Jamī’at Imām Bukhārī, founded in the 1980s by a *mujahidin* leader and follower of Ahl-e Hadīth¹⁰ from Kunar, Shaikh Jamil al-Rahman (alias Mawlawi Husain). It has a rather strict syllabus that focuses on Arabic and the English language, as well as covering a spectrum of “modern” sciences such as Biology and Physics. Very limited study space is allocated for different Islamic legal traditions (*mazāhib*) such as Hanafism or Shafi’ism. The aforementioned Imam Abu Hanifa College for Arabic Language and Islamic Studies, founded by WAMY, follows a rather open learning approach, specifically by encouraging students to acquire knowledge for themselves while also focusing less on sectarian divisions. In both of these colleges the majority of students and teachers are Pashtuns from Eastern Afghanistan, particularly from Kunar and Nangarhar.¹¹

9 Around 60 out of the 72 interviewed graduates and students (among them five females) stem from low income families; in many cases, their parents were themselves uneducated. In at least 17 cases, though, the father had already enjoyed an advanced religious education or was a cleric. Fleeing from Afghanistan during the 1980s or 1990s, their family members had mostly started small businesses as shopkeepers, truck drivers, or craftsmen. Another important source of income is labor migration: some students had a brother working in the Gulf region who contributed a large share of the family’s budget pool, which is usually administered by the female head of the household. Others sell livestock in order to raise the required funds.

10 The puritan movement Ahl-e Hadīth emerged in India during the middle of the nineteenth century and is widely considered to be close to Saudi Wahhabism. However its ideological father, (1832–1890), repudiated this view, since he claimed that Wahhabis were followers (*muqallidīn*) of the Hanbali legal tradition — whereas Ahl-e Hadīth did not follow any legal tradition (Preckel 2005). The founder of Jamī’at Imām Bukhārī, Jamil al-Rahman, was strongly supported by Saudi donors, although he called himself “Salafī” (Edwards 2002:271-272) — a term that seemed to be used by the college students interchangeably with “Wahhabi”.

11 A third popular college, the MIKullīya al-Lugha al-Arabīya (College for Arabic Language), was founded by the Arab organization Lajna al-Da’wa in the 1980s, which had alleged links to al-Qaida and offered courses in Medicine (mostly combat-related) and in Arabic. Due to its ambiguous

Between religious *madrasas* and secular universities, the two *ma'hads* in Peshawar may be considered as representing something of a compromise: while they do put emphasis on classical texts of the standard curriculum of Deobandi *madrasas* (*Dars-e Nizāmī*), such as al-Hidāya by al-Marghinani (one of the most comprehensive sources of Hanafi jurisprudence) or Tafsīr al-Jalālayn (concerning Quranic exegesis) by al-Suyuti (cf. Berkey 2007:63–64), education is also simultaneously directed less toward imparting a strict way of life as preparation for the hereafter. Instead, it addresses issues of contemporary life. The combination of modern subjects and religious education — and not least the strong focus on the Arabic language — facilitates access to a vast body of Arabic literature, and therefore an approach to Islam that exists outside of the reference frame of Pashtun culture. This in turn allows a clearer distinction to be made between religious obligation (*farz*), prophetic tradition (*sunna*), and local custom (*'urf*). University students with such a background seem to have an advantage compared to others pursuing Islamic subjects, due to their advanced skills in Arabic, the language of teaching in *Islāmiyāt* and *Sharī'a*, which sets them apart from their counterparts in Afghanistan. There, most students attend public schools (*lycee*) — these institutions do not teach Islamic subjects or Arabic to the extent that students have the ability to understand the Quran, *hadīth*, and theological texts in the original language.

Finally, after a lengthy bureaucratic process, the attestation of documents, and an entry test, Afghan migrants may then study at the IIUI, established in 1985 and run by the government of Saudi Arabia in cooperation with the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan.¹² Despite the strong Saudi influence on the university, it does not focus on a particular interpretation of Islam and is even open to non-Muslim students from all over the world. Except for Islamic Studies, with many professors thereof coming from, among other places, al-Azhar University in Cairo, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey, the teaching staff at the IIUI are usually from Pakistan.

The atmosphere on the larger of the university's two campuses is indeed international, and certainly not without impact on Afghans who have hitherto grown up exclusively among Pashtuns. Many Afghans were nothing short of shocked at first to see their fellow students from China, Malaysia, Somalia, Turkey, and elsewhere practicing their faith differently, in ways ranging from wearing different clothes and having shaved beards to the style of pray adopted. For many, it was a key experience to pray alongside Muslims of different legal orientations (*mazhab*,

ideological position, it was shut down by General Musharraf in 2001. Until that point, many had found it an efficient way to achieve high proficiency in the Arabic language.

12 The university currently hosts around 15,000 male and female students on two single-sex campuses (Higher Education Commission of Pakistan 2014).

plural *mazāhib*) such as Shafi'i, Maliki, or even Ja'fari, which all have different prayer postures.¹³

Most students recount at least one experience that they had with a foreign teacher, and how the latter's attitude had had an impact on the student's view about their own traditions. One student once observed his teacher, a renowned Egyptian *Sharī'a* professor, cleanly shaved and dressed in Western fashion jogging in a nearby park along with his only slightly covered wife. Although deeply surprised and initially offended by what he saw, respect for the religious authority of this famous expert in Quran exegesis (*tafsīr*) forced him to reflect on his own position. He eventually came to the conclusion that his impression of the correct behavior of a religious dignitary was rather based on the mores of Pashtun society than on stipulated Islamic principles.

It is therefore not surprising that many informants evaluated their educational career as being a gradual process toward them having an "open mind" (*prākh nazar*), claiming that they could tolerate differences in religious practice more easily by the end. Among the identified reasons for this denouement, informants particularly mentioned their interaction with international students and teachers as important. Coupled with this was the studying of academic subjects like Comparative Religion, which confronted them with religious diversity both within and beyond Islam. Finally, an open approach to teaching encouraged these students to read widely in their own time and to deal with foundational religious texts in Arabic, Farsi, and/or Urdu independently.

While the IIUI, with its large number of Afghan students, enjoys great popularity among them,¹⁴ many still decide to compete in the central entry exam for universities in Afghanistan, where tuition is free. In contrast to Pakistan, the cultural environment within Afghan universities is rather more homogenous. Most professors have Masters degrees from Pakistan, whereas some — mostly younger — staff hold Bachelor degrees from Afghanistan.¹⁵ The quality of teaching is considered somewhat lower by teachers coming from IIUI, which they attribute less

13 The difference between the various legal traditions becomes most visible in the posture of arms and hands assumed during prayer: Hanafis fold their arms above the navel, Hanbalis or Ahl-e Hadīth at the chest, and Ja'faris at their side.

14 Although the University of Peshawar is considerably closer geographically for most Afghans, it seems that the IIUI is far more popular. One of the major reasons for this is its reputation for offering high quality education (especially through the medium of professors from overseas); however, due to its international orientation, entry is also easier for foreign students. Other public universities in Pakistan have strict quotas for Afghans, who otherwise could just apply for a more expensive international university seat. Among religious families, the IIUI as well as Imam Abu Hanifa College are accepted as being "proper" (i.e. Islamic) institutions similar to a *madrasa*. Lastly, fees for Islamic studies, *Sharī'a*, and Arabic are significantly lower than they are as compared to for other subjects (depending on the degree, 160–200 USD per semester and an additional 30–45 USD in hostel charges per month; subjects like Economics, meanwhile, start at 310 USD per semester).

15 Up until 2007 Masters degree programs were not available at Afghan universities (Abdul Baqi 2009).

to the pedagogic qualities of teachers and rather more to the lack of proficiency in Arabic among students, outdated or insufficient literature, and the absence of a research culture (cf. Roehrs 2014).

Discussing tradition and orthopraxy

Being Pashtun Muslim — or Muslim Pashtun?

After graduation, there are currently hardly any highly skilled job opportunities¹⁶ available to Afghan degree holders — particularly in religious subjects — inside Pakistan. This is why upon the completion of their studies many of them leave for their home country, in search of work at universities, in the administration, or with private companies. They bring along with them revised religious and social views, a fact that becomes apparent in discussions with their peers and in personal interviews.

In order to better understand the environment into which students introduce their ideas, one needs to take a brief overview of one of the most characteristic — but not uncontested — features of Pashtun society. Many anthropologists have claimed the unwritten tribal codex *pashtūnwālī* to be central to the regulation of all social affairs among Pashtuns (cf. Barth 1965 [1959]; Anderson 1979; Lindholm 1982; Glatzer 2000). According to Willi Steul (1981), every aspect of this system can be traced back to the core value of honor — a principle differentiated into *nang* (achieved through altruistic behavior), *nāmūs* (expressed through one's female kin), and *ghairat* (demonstrated through correct and courteous behavior). In a society where protection by the state is absent, these concepts of honor and status represent the basic social capital of a Pashtun man and his family. Thus, he has to avoid showing any sign of weakness or immorality at all cost. As Nancy Tapper (1984) argues, honor is the basic means by which to discuss control over all resources — especially labor, land, and women. If a man loses control over his female relatives, it shows his weakness as regard to his relationship with other resources as well — so that he becomes (seen as) weaker. Despite all the essentialization regarding *pashtūnwālī*, these notions of honor as social capital may still help to explain the fear expressed in many interviews about become subject to social reproach (*pēghōr*), of being spoken about behind one's back, or, in more extreme cases, that one may be shunned or even banned from community life.

Certainly, one should consider that the popularity and essentialization of the concept of *pashtūnwālī* in ethnographic accounts has coincided with the nationalist movement alive in Afghanistan since the 1950s, as a result of which representations of this value system seem rather static and idealized. After decades of war and

¹⁶ Afghans are barred from taking positions in Pakistan's administration or the country's public universities, despite being prime fields for graduates in Islamic subjects.

continual migration, other value systems introduced by Islamic missionaries, groups, and/or Western countries have modified or challenged this tribal code (cf. Glatzer 2000; Rzehak 2011; Ruttig 2012).

Nevertheless, even after three decades of war and conflict, courtesy and the public display of honor still play a crucial role within Pashtun society. What has been mostly excluded in anthropological accounts of its values, however, is the reference to Islamic principles. The frequent statement made by informants that Pashtun traditions and their religious principles were about 80 percent the same leads us to the central problem that these students face when trying to introduce their revised versions of Islamic orthopraxy.

Islamic evaluation of Pashtun traditions

Informants mostly acknowledged that local traditions are not Islamic, but neither are they in contradiction to the religion — and the former can therefore be kept alive. Especially the Hanafī legal tradition acknowledges such traditions, which it calls *'urf* (cf. Libson 2000; Kamali 2003; Ahmed 2007). The revisionist discourse becomes most apparent in the students' criticism of certain local practices (*dōd*, plural *dōdūna* or *riwāj*) or habits (*ādāt*, *ādatūna*), which people believe to be Islamic but that are in fact — according to these students at least — at odds with Islamic law (thus, *'urf-i fāsīd*). In general, traditions are evaluated according to Arabic-Persian terms such as *rawā* (acceptable), *nā-rawā* (indecent, unlawful), *nā-wəṛa* (unacceptable), or *nā-jā'iz* (illegal).

Indeed, this distinction between the different customs and conceptions of Islamic orthodoxy may be regarded as the basic element of the students' evaluation of their society along the scales of *sharī'a*. It becomes a means to disentangle orthodoxy from the local context of Pashtun norms and values, which in turn renders contradictory values visible. However, religiously inspired social critique is but one outcome of this ongoing appraisal. In a more general way, Pashtun norms are subordinated to Islamic principles, meaning that they have the tendency to be justified through the medium of Islam and only in a secondary way by tribal (*qawmī*) tradition.

Arguably, this could be seen as yet another process in which local traditions are being entangled with an Islamic orthodoxy claiming universal validity. The difference to previous decades would be the awareness of this relationship and an understanding of what constitutes explicitly Pashtun customs. Hanafī law here provides a diplomatic solution, one by which to sanctify and religiously acknowledge cultural particularities through the aforementioned legal concept of *'urf*. This Mohammad H. Kamali defines as “recurring practices that are acceptable to people of sound nature,” provided they do not contradict higher-ranking sources of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) such as, among others, the Quran, *hadīth*, or scholarly consensus (*ijmā'*) (Kamali 2003:272–275; Ahmed 2007:38).

Thus most informants pronounce the positive aspects of their culture, above all the imperative of hospitality (*mēlmastiyā*, *mēlmapālana*) —which includes the granting of refuge (*nānawātē*) even to one’s worst enemy. Displaying good manners toward guests are considered part of appropriate moral conduct (*akhlāq*), which is promulgated by the Islamic tradition of Quran, *hadīth*, and accounts of the life of the Prophet (*sīra*). Similarly, informants justified practices such as revenge killing (*badal*)¹⁷ on the grounds of the Islamic principle of *qiyās*. However, they stressed the necessary supporting conditions for that — such as its legal enforcement through the judiciary of an Islamic government and the limitation of punishment to only the perpetrator of the original crime, as the harming of any innocent family members would be strictly unlawful.¹⁸

On the other hand, social critique inspired by Islamic principles arises particularly in discussions about the treatment of women, such as the popular issue of bride price payment (*walwar*; cf. Tapper 1991; Tadbeer 2014). At the moment of her engagement the family of the bride may suggest a certain amount of money — and sometimes gold (*tōla*) — to be paid to her father, which is supposed to signify the preciousness of the bride on the basis of her aptitude and integrity. Bride price may be therefore seen as a means by which to express social and economic status (Tapper 1984:297). As such, if the bride price is low or even not paid at all then the involved parties must fear reproach from the community, which in turn means an assault on one’s honor — as noted, the capital for all social, political, and economic interactions.¹⁹

Respondents from the southeast of Afghanistan (for example Ghazni, Khost, Paktia) stated that the usual price sits at 10,000 USD (cf. Tadbeer 2014:126)²⁰ or 20–40 *tōla* (240–480 grams), which may force the groom to work abroad for many years and result in there being a considerable age difference between him and the bride. Alternatively, some families give their own daughter instead in a reciprocal exchange marriage (*dā shighāra nikāh*, *badal*). This, in turn, is connected to other practices that are still in widespread use in rural areas: Not only are girls often given instead of *walwar*, but they are also handed over as blood compensation after feuds between warring groups. Depending on the local customary law (*narkh*), the life of a person is worth two or three women (although payment of an equivalent amount of

17 *Badal* literally means “exchange,” which includes any kind of compensation/restitution for either a positive or negative deed. Consequently, help and support should also be returned at some point (Rzehak 2011).

18 In many cases, though, the offended group uses the opportunity presented to eliminate the most powerful member of their opposition group, in order to weaken it.

19 A common assumption in this case is that the integrity of the bride may be compromised, for example through her having illicit relations.

20 In some districts in Ghazni, Khost, Paktia, and Zabul, the tribal conventions (*jirgas*) of elders (*māshrān*) and clerics (*‘ulamā*) have lowered the maximum brideprice considerably or prohibited it altogether. In some cases, the Taliban were involved in these decisions (see, for example, UNAMA 2010; Saqem 2013; Haroon 2015).

about 15,000 USD is nowadays also common practice), while bodily injury may be compensated for with one woman (cf. Tadbeer 2014:77ff).

Notably, informants from Afghanistan's eastern provinces (Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar) stated that the tradition of brideprice payment has nearly disappeared there by now — circumstances that they attributed both to education as well as to the Islamic mission undertaken by Tablighi Jamaat, or Ahl-e Hadith. One tribal elder and respected cleric (*mawlānā*) from Kunar explained that he gave his granddaughter away for “next to nothing,” *two tōla* (780 USD), while his son equally paid only *two tōla* for his own bride as dower as prescribed in Islam (*mahr*; see below) one year later. In both cases, the payment of a lowly *mahr* was justified during the course of the wedding ceremony as the correct amount as stipulated by the Quran and emphasized by the Prophet. He held that, essentially, the custom was unlawful (*nā-rawā*), since *sharī'a* stipulates that the bride should claim form and amount of the dower (*mahr*) on her own — and that she may also keep it as her own property, even in the case of her later divorce (*talāq*).²¹

Although a basic requirement for the conclusion of marriage according to Hanafi law (cf. Kamali 1985; Tapper 1991; UNAMA 2010), in many cases *mahr* is either not paid to the bride or not paid at all in practice. It is generally held that the payment of brideprice itself was not an improper custom as long as it would directly benefit the bride, but that it should not become a condition for the arrangement of the marriage in the first place. Thus respondents expressed appreciation for the recent development among “educated” families of submitting a list of household items that the groom's side should buy for the newly established household. Thus those interviewed construed the practice as “proper custom” (*'urf saḥīḥ*), one that does not contravene the intentions behind *mahr* as stipulated by *sharī'a*.

The negotiation of *walwar* illustrates the conflict between values at the local level and Islamic orthodoxy particularly well: on the one hand, concerns about losing one's status in the community necessitate the following of the custom even though *sharī'a* prohibits it. Deviance from the practice takes various forms: as in the example of the tribal elder from Kunar given above, making direct reference to the foundational sources of Islamic theology and the demonstration of an Islamic education seemed to have prevented reproach in connection with the negation of brideprice. The second development — converting brideprice into a gift for the new household, and considering it as lawful custom — may be seen as occurring in connection with an increasing awareness of religious obligation and custom. This

21 The right to divorce (*talāq*) represents another point of criticism to many students. Though sanctioned by every Islamic legal tradition, it is a phenomenon almost completely absent in Pashtun society (for both men and women). Again, for the sake of family honor, marital conflicts must be kept out of the public domain at all costs. Someone who divorces his wife becomes a pariah and has to leave the area.

makes it possible to accommodate local traditions in the universal framework of *sharī'a*, specifically by means of *'urf*.

The importance of community and orthopraxy

While staying in a private guestroom (*hujra*) in Kabul, I witnessed a discussion between my friend, a former student of Islamic Studies at the IIUI from Kunar, and his work colleagues from Khugyani District (Nangarhar Province). He contended that female shame (*'aurat*) would not extend to the face, hands, and feet, and argued that one must use the “Arabic method”²² when studying Quranic texts — in other words, to analyze the historical context of Arab practices (*ādāt*). By citing and translating Verse 24:30–31 from the Quran,²³ he concluded that the Arabic word *juyūb* originally meant “bosom and the surrounding of the face,” thus making the wearing of the full veil (*burqa*) a local tradition (*'urf*) or habit (*'ādāt*) as opposed to a religious duty (*farz*). Nevertheless, my friend’s adversary vehemently rejected the idea, claiming that a woman’s beauty came from her eyes — which might encourage immorality (*fāsād*) if exposed in public.

This example shows that, even though students may be able to base their arguments on the taking of an analytical approach toward the Quran and *sunna*, they may still encounter strong resistance from other members of Pashtun society. This is mostly connected to the fear of the loss of values and communal order, as well as to the defense of both personal and family honor (*'izzat*, *nāmūs*; cf. Steul 1981; Tapper 1991). A striking feature of the commonly shared views of students and teachers alike is the importance of communal and social cohesion, specifically as opposed to perceived Western individualism (*dzān-dzānī*, *infirādī*). While being proud of the Pashtun ideal of hospitality or of customs like communal labor (*hashar*), they highlight the importance of preserving commonly shared values by religious means. The mosque thus becomes the central institution for sharing information and ensuring the moral (*akhlāqī*) health of the community. Informants thereby explained how behavior defying common norms provokes the existence of a hostile reaction of reproach, since deviance is considered as an assault on the community, regardless of its religious justification.

Social cohesion and fear of deviant behavior appear to be strong factors obstructing the alignment of social practice with Islamic orthodoxy. Thus, the same mechanisms preserving social values in a local community hamper the dominance therein of Islamic orthodoxy. As one professor of *Sharī'a* at Nangarhar University put it, it

22 I am not sure whether this notion actually exists, or if he simply used it for lack of a better word in either Pashto or Arabic. From the following argumentation, it became clear that he meant to analyze terms stipulated in *sharī'a* according to their usage at the time of the Prophet.

23 “Say to the believers, that they cast down their eyes and guard their private parts; that is purer for them. God is aware of the things they work” (30). “And say to the believing women, that they cast down their eyes and guard their private parts, and reveal not their adornment save such as is outward; and let them cast their veils over their bosoms [...]” (31) (Translation: Arthur John Arberry).

was not fear of the state or the hand of the law that ensured communal stability in his home district in the east of the province — it is an area where the police have no control. It was, rather, the moral fabric of the community that upholds the status quo, which he found to be strongly tied to Islam. However, he blamed the prevalence of a low level of education and ignorance (*jahl, jahālat*) as being the key factors causing problems like extremism and repressive practices. Considering the strong resistance of Pashtun society to change and the complicated social hierarchies of tribal elders (*qamī māshrān*) and clerics therein, he regarded it as likely more effective to reach the younger generation and count on gradual progress.

Another professor with a Ph.D. from IIUI expressed doubt that there is any tangible effect of higher education on rural areas (*atrāf*). In his view, it is rather the institution of the *madrasa* that has an impact on broader society. The root of all social problems, he argued, lies with the separation made between religious and secular education by the British Empire, resulting in a chasm between these two poles. While *madrasas* were lacking “modern, adequate teaching methods” (*asrī, munāsib manhajūna*), rural communities still preferred them for their moral and religious education. On the other hand, according to the professor they viewed secular education —which, since the government of Hamid Karzai came to power, has included a fair amount of religious subjects — as infidelity (*kufīr*), aimed at destroying Muslim community. This again was taken by my informant to demonstrate the deep rift that exists between the two educational systems.

However, if one considers the biographies of those interviewed holding a degree in Islamic subjects, one might argue that the gap between secular and religious education is gradually fading in Afghanistan. Most of them both visited *madrasas* and public schools, while colleges particularly combine both types of instruction under the roof of one single institution. As such, success in imparting a more comprehensive and pluralistic interpretation of Islam — and thereby raising awareness of the contradictions between Islam and Pashtun culture — depends on the ability of these actors to behave as *madrasa* graduates while also sharing the knowledge that they have gained in universities.

Conclusion

I have argued in this paper that the landscape of religious education in Afghanistan has in recent years received considerable outside input as a result of return migration by those previously living in Pakistan. There, the educational infrastructure of *madrasas*, schools, colleges, and universities — with a strong emphasis on Islamic subjects —has facilitated both the imparting of religious ethics as well as a more comprehensive and analytical understanding of the Islamic faith. Biographical data indicates that, particularly at university, Afghan students hailing mostly from Pashtun families in Eastern Afghanistan are now being confronted with different cultures and religious orientations, which leads many of them to reflect deeply on

the social norms and practices that they hitherto took for granted. It seems that one important effect of this scrutiny is the subsequent ability to distinguish between religious obligation, prophetic tradition, and local custom. This in turn allows for the disentangling of the otherwise inseparable amalgamation of Pashtun norms and *sharī'a*, wherein local tradition is often confused with religious principle.

Certainly, one cannot claim that all of the impetus for the reevaluation of Pashtun traditions and norms has come through migrants. However they may be considered as a strong force especially in urban areas, where they form the majority of the teaching staff at *madrasas*, schools, and universities. are highly educated migrants. So far, migration has helped to explain the origins of social critiques inspired by Islamic principles. Moreover, among Pashtuns with this kind of formation one can observe how they evaluate their entire culture in terms of religious properness — so that Pashtun values are reinterpreted as core values in Islam. One of the most complex traditions being prominently challenged is that of marriage. Here, respondents mostly contested its involuntary nature failure to priorand, second, the payment of brideprice (*walwar*) instead of dower (*mahr*) as prescribed in Islam. Since honor (*nāmūs*) forms one of the most crucial resources for securing the (continued) support of the community, the fear of social reproach represents a powerful force preventing people from following Islamic prescriptions more closely. However, having an Islamic education seems to provide some means by which to avoid a loss of respect: First, by the demonstration of profound Islamic knowledge and, second, by the accommodation of tradition and orthodoxy through the concept of *'urf*, which allows one to keep up a tradition by aligning it with the original intentions behind *mahr* to the benefit of the bride. In other words, the explicit demonstration and application of Islamic knowledge may overcome the predicament about losing one's honor and revising traditions in a locally acceptable way — since such practice is contained within one of the two major value orientations predominant among Pashtun people.

With respect to the importance of continuing to uphold strong community cohesion and the imperative to maintain social balance through strict adherence to Pashtun traditions and norms, this process of aligning local traditions with nonlocal religious principles may be a very slow one. Nevertheless, with the gradual convergence and spread of religious and secular forms of education — in the sense specifically of schools and universities — the process might become dynamized as a result of it slowly enjoying increased legitimacy among members of Pashtun society. Stewardship of this collective was so far mostly reserved for traditional moral authorities such as the *mullā* and the tribal elder (*qawmī māshr*); but over time, significant change may be underfoot with the emergence of a new class of people who obtain moral authority through comprehensive education.

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