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Editorial

Politics of Memory in Korea

Hannes B. Mosler

Memory politics, or the politics of memory, is about "who wants whom to remember what, and why" (Confino 1997: 1393). This struggle over memory is, besides directly writing and teaching history in publications and educational institutions, fought by way of (repetitive) performative acts at the site of statues, monuments, and memorials taking the form of rituals — such as holding commemorative speeches, worshipping, and mourning. Of course, "[the] remaking of the past is not the monopoly of modernity" (Kim 2010: 578), and thus political remembrance does not exhaust itself in those macropolitical commemorations referring to Korea's contemporary history alone. It can also be found in activities maintaining traditions, in practices of historiography, and in everyday culture — which extends much further into the past. Against this backdrop, this special issue draws together five papers that explore multiple different forms of political remembrance in Korea over the centuries, at diverse memory sites, and regarding various ways of performing them.

Eun-Jeung Lee and Soon-woo Chung, in their article "The Meaning and Role of Sacrificial Rituals in Traditional Korean Educational Institutions," provide a fascinating account of the sacrificial rituals in Confucian academies (*sowŏn*) during the Chosŏn period, and their highly political meaning for contemporaries. From the sixteenth century onward *sowŏn* spread throughout the countryside, and thus together with the Confucian schools (*hyanggyo*) and family shrines belonged to the regional structures that constituted an integral part of the overall network of Confucian institutions — with the *sŏnggyungwan*, the kingdom's highest educational institution located in the capital, at its center. While their main activities included studying neo-Confucian classics and archiving as well as publishing books, the conducting of sacrificial rituals was crucial in respect to the function of securing social order and hierarchy and for establishing a model of moral authority within the local community. In other words, these ceremonies were used to bolster the neo-Confucian elite in their moral superiority and thus to cement their right to control the secular political authorities.

Lee and Chung explain the mechanisms at work through these rituals among other things by referring to the importance of inheriting and honoring *tot'ong* (道統; the orthodox lineage of *to*) through repetitive performance. This is a typical example of

tapping into the authoritative source of the past and the merits of the honorable dead, and thereby acquiring symbolic power and political legitimacy in the present day. The authors reveal how the authoritative (re)interpretation of the past also bestows legitimacy in the here and now. It is against this backdrop that Lee and Chung convincingly disentangle the highly regulated ritual protocols (*ŭigwe* 儀軌). Those who were in the position to determine how the rituals were to be conducted could allocate more (and less) important roles to those participating in these performances. In this way, Lee and Chung are not only able to make sense of the, at times, brutal conflict between Confucian factions but also to provide us with yet another piece in the puzzle regarding one of the core functions of political remembrance. It is one that not only seems, to a certain degree, to be universal, but also timeless: namely the imbuing of society with a certain ideology tied to the honored dead, as a way to "renew and strengthen the legitimacy of the political and social order".

Consolidating scholar-officials' political and social legitimacy on the periphery was part of a struggle for power that could amount to a certain extent to the bringing of one's faction into the fold at the center. As in many other traditional societies, kings during the Chosŏn period, too, were under the steady threat of being challenged, and thus continuously had to exert their authority in order to maintain their position. While more than a few resorted to violence to subdue contenders and to secure the throne, King Chŏngjo at the end of the eighteenth century is a noteworthy example of a Chosŏn ruler who availed himself of the discursive strategy of reconstructing collective memory to rehabilitate his father, Crown Prince Sado — and thereby secure his own legitimacy as well.

This interesting case of applied political remembrance is what Florian Pölking examines in his article "Remembrance in the Making: The King's Father and the Construction of Collective Memories of Crown Prince Sado in Late Eighteenth-Century Korea." He shows how this politics of memory by the king was a means to construct a specific collective remembrance, namely so as to overcome the ongoing factional disputes by reconciling public and personal memory. Pölking reveals how Chŏngjo, carefully navigating the political landscape as well as the Confucian principles of his time, managed to succeed in this project — representing a kind of domestic public diplomacy — by establishing a variety of both tangible as well as abstract sites of memory. Based on the analysis of various historical sources, in particular a number of ritual protocols, the author shows how these sites were entangled — and furthermore, for Chŏngjo's contemporaries, invested with specific meaning. Pölking presents in intriguing detail this example of rearranging memories of the past and the symbolic authority of the dead to pointedly leverage present-day power structures.

Another compelling fact related to this case is that, a century later, King Kojong would capitalize on this manipulated memory of Crown Prince Sado's status, namely by elevating King Changdo to Emperor Changdo so as to legitimize his own coronation as emperor. Pölking does not investigate this further in his paper, but his

in-depth study of Chŏngjo's memory politics provides us regardless with instructive insight into the workings of such projects of collective-memory creation irrespective of time and place. In this regard it is telling that, as Pölking makes the reader aware, the procession of 1795 (i.e. Chŏngjo's Royal Parade) — which itself had originally been a means of rewriting political memory — was in 2016 revived in the form of a large-scale reenactment commissioned by local-government authorities. In this way, the already-manufactured remembrance stemming from the eighteenth century was taken as an original event — one on which yet another creation of political remembrance was later built.

Similar memory cascades that reach from the past into the present are revealed in the analysis of Kim Haegyŏng's political poetology by Marion Eggert, in her article "The Politics of Remembrance and the Remembrance of Politics in Yisang's Poetry." Here, however, the focus lies on pointing at who wanted whom to not (!) remember what, and why. Kim Haegyŏng (1910–1937), alias Yisang, was a poet living during the Japanese occupation period, and an individual who in Korean literary historiography has mostly been acknowledged for his poetic aesthetics; his poetic politics have been mostly neglected — or at least underdeveloped — meanwhile. Starting from this visible void in the literary remembrance of Yisang, Eggert embarks on an archeological expedition to unearth his oeuvre's under-remembered political side by reading not only between his poems' lines but also behind them.

The analysis focuses on a set of three of his first poems, written in Korean, that later turn out to be identified by Eggert as no less than Yisang's political poetology. She calls this set his "declaration of war on, or at least of independence from, colonial subjugation" (Eggert 61) — that is, his coming out as a highly subversive political poet. Carefully skimming layer by layer from the texts of "Flowering Tree," "Such a Poem," and "1933, 6, 1," the powerful statements that were veiled in modernist aesthetic rhetoric suddenly one by one start to appear from the mist, and soon stand clearly before the mind's eye of the reader. Yisang in these poems remembers — and, according to Eggert's concise interpretation, wants the reader to remember — what was lost to Japanese aggression, and at the same does not let Korean national poetry escape from a certain responsibility for having hitherto been too passive in resisting that imperial aggression.

This is where Eggert sees the reason lying for why the political Yisang was submerged under the fancy and sophisticated avant-garde poet Yisang: this part of his oeuvre was too political to be remembered. She convincingly argues that the bohemian Yisang was too appealing when it came to decorating the literary history of that otherwise sparsely populated period of avant-garde Korean poetry, as Eggert calls it, which led to the almost exclusive focus on his poetic aesthetics. In other words, the hitherto half-hearted remembrance of Ysang's political poetry is based on an intentional strategy of depoliticization — and thus represents yet another fascinating example of highly political remembrance.

Following these three articles that examine instances of rather hidden memory politics, ones that in part hark back centuries, the remaining two contributions to this special issue investigate cases that are, contrariwise, more openly political. In my own paper "Contentious Memory Politics in South Korea: The Seoul National Cemetery," I explore the characteristics of the Seoul National Cemetery (SNC) as a memory site used to reproduce the official state narrative in South Korea's more recent history. A place for mostly — though not exclusively — commemorating the Korean War's dead, the SNC was mainly used to promote an anti-communist Cold War storyline. Hence, it has been a useful go-to site for conservative forces seeking to maintain hegemony in the ideological discourse forming part of the "remembrance war" with progressives in South Korea's increasingly liberal and pluralistic society.

In the article, I shed light on the discrepancies regarding who and what are remembered, how they are remembered, and why they are remembered. These differences are represented in the contradictory acts of the dead commemorated at the site, in tensions in the symbolic vocabulary and architectural design of the cemetery, and in competing clusters of the deeds of those who are buried both there and in other cemeteries. While these mnemotopical inconsistencies are expressions of the country's history of upheaval, I argue that in the context of political remembrance conflict increasingly challenges the traditional monolithic narrative. Thus, it provides opportunities for challenging the status quo of political memory, and for rectifying political remembrance so as to facilitate a more critical and constructive coping with the past. This in line with overall developments in South Korea's political remembrance discourse, whereby dominant memory narratives since democratization have been increasingly "contested, subverted, and supplanted by other memories" (Phillips 2004: 2).

This is quite different in North Korea, where forcing people into line regarding whom, what, and why to remember is strongly controlled by state authorities so as to suppress critiques of and challenges to the hegemonic discourse of the country's leadership. How this means of state-sanctioned remembrance works is investigated by Eric Ballbach in his article "National Loss and the Politics of Mourning in North Korea." Herein he examines political remembrance specifically by analyzing the politics of mourning in North Korea following the experiencing of the loss of the country's two leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Building on theoretical considerations regarding the concepts of "pastoral power" as well as of a "theater state," the study analyzes performances, symbols, and rituals connected to the loss both of the founder of the state and nation Kim Il Sung and of his successor Kim Jong Il.

By so doing, the article provides a fresh perspective for thinking about national loss — and the ways of remembering linked to it — both as inherently political and at the same time as constitutive of social relations. In order to approach the politics of mourning in North Korea, a deeper understanding of the relationship between the individual and the leader(s), as well as of the subsequent process of subjectivation,

is required. As such, Ballbach's study draws on the concept of "the sociopolitical organism" and the notion of "political life and the nontemporality of loss," as these understandings help explain a set of particular aspects linked to the politics of mourning in the country.

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Refereed article

The Meaning and Role of Sacrificial Rituals in Traditional Korean Educational Institutions

Eun-Jeung Lee and Soon-woo Chung

Summary

In Korea during the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910) Confucian scholars were able to construct a political and social order and culture around the symbolic space of the Confucian private academy (*sŏwŏn*) by relying on a tradition of iterative ritual performances. These designated each member of society with a proper social role and universal grammar. The function of the rituals at Confucian private academies was that of a social signifier within the construction of a social contract peculiar to Chosŏn society. The academies spread, which began in the sixteenth century in areas outside the capital, produced a "Confucianization" of traditional rituals, and thence the indoctrination with Confucian morals at the local level. This kind of transformation of society had been the aim of the Chosŏn rulers right from the dynasty's foundation in 1392. However, the driving force behind this transformation was not the center, but local scholars. They wanted to enhance their own social and political dominance and privileges through the creation of symbolic ritual spaces under their control, including the invention of a tradition of local sages/scholars to be enshrined and revered at the *sŏwŏn*.

Keywords: Confucian academies, ritual, Chosŏn society, education

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Introduction

From ancient times on, Korea absorbed Chinese culture and built on it its own cultural traditions. This can be seen most clearly in Confucian culture, which forms the core of traditional Korean culture. When exactly Confucian writings and thought, which had become the ideological basis of state formation during the Han dynasty in China (206 BC–AD 220), first came to Korea is not known (Park 2011: 19).[1] However, in Chinese and Korean historical texts (Annals) it is mentioned (without further detail being given) that a public educational institution called *t'aehak* was established along with Chinese examples in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula in the 4th century AD — that is, in Koguyrŏ during the period of the Three Kingdoms (1st century BC–AD 668). Aside from this institution, private village schools called *kyŏngdang* are also mentioned in the Chinese texts. There it is said that students practiced archery and horseback riding, learned Chinese characters, and read classical Confucian texts like *Lunyu* and books on the history of China (*Jiu Tangshu,* Vol. 199*, Dongyi, Gaoli*).

The dynasties that followed the Three Kingdoms — United Silla (668–935), Koryŏ (918–1392), and Chosŏn (1392–1910), whose domain comprised the whole of the Korean Peninsula — all possessed a countrywide system of public educational institutions. The top echelon was occupied by university-like institutions attached to the court, respectively named *kukhak* (Silla), *kukchagam* (Koryŏ), and *sŏnggyungwan* (Chosŏn). Their main task was the preparation of students for the entrance examinations for public office. Much emphasis was put herein on Confucian classical texts.

The emergence and the spread of *sŏwŏn*, private Confucian academies, from the middle of the sixteenth century involved a significant change in the educational landscape of Chosŏn society (*Chosŏn Sillok, Sŏnjo sujŏngbon* 28/7/1#3).[2] These academies were founded by Confucian scholars, often in rather remote places outside the capital. Their purpose was not the preparation for the state examination, but instead the study of Neo-Confucian thought as such. In this, the *sŏwŏn* were markedly different from the public educational institutions: the *sŏnggyungwan* at the center and the *hyanggyo* in the provincial capitals and counties. Even though the purpose was different, at least formally the main activities at the public and the new private institutions were the same: namely (1) studying Neo-Confucian classics; (2) archiving and publishing books; and, (3) conducting sacrificial rituals (*sŏkchŏn*) (Choi 1975: 131ff).

In this contribution we concentrate on the third function of the *sŏwŏn*. The sacrificial rituals were an effective means to generate and recreate a high degree of

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1   Excavations in North Korea have unearthed text passages of *Lunyu* written on bamboo slips.
2   After the establishment of the first *sŏwŏn* — called Paegundong (built 1543), and located in P'unggi in the southeastern region of Korea — private Confucian academies grew so fast that one could say 50 years later that there were hardly any villages left that did not have such an institution.

homogeneity among scholars, their way of thinking, as well as within the goals and the character of the education as they developed at each of those academies. The performance of sacrificial rituals guaranteed the legitimacy of the local academic community and their doctrines. Apart from that, the rituals were also a means for these premodern intellectuals to dominate the surrounding local societies. Thus, sacrificial rituals were an essential part of premodern education as they secured social order and hierarchy and established a model of moral authority within the community through repetitive acts.

As existing research has shown, it was precisely via the conducting of the sacrificial rituals by the *sŏwŏn* that the ruling elite indoctrinated society with Confucian morals (Chŏng 1997, 1980). In other words, these rituals bound village society to the Confucian order of the state and put it under the authority of the *sŏwŏn*. This is quite a unique phenomenon, one that cannot be found in other countries sharing the Confucian tradition. It is precisely the intersection between the social and religious aspects of East Asian societies that allows us to define crucial points of divergence between particular Confucian cultures. A case study on local adjustment to and appropriation of a seemingly universal Confucian institution is offered by examining the Confucian academies that spread all over East Asia. The heterogeneous nature of this process has been described in detail in the recent literature (Glomb et al. 2020).

The shared ritual heritage that derived from the Chinese classics was applied in remarkably diverse social contexts and, needless to say, with too many different motivations and results. It was the social structure of traditional Korean society that was the crucial determinant for the adaptation of the universal Confucian discourse (Deuchler 2015). Unlike in China — where education was, at least theoretically, open to everybody and served as the road to the state examinations — or in Japan — where there were no state examinations, and elite status was the prerequisite for education — the Korean situation was unique. It followed the Chinese model of open education and state examination, but blended it with a discriminatory approach toward non-elite students and even toward some members of the elites too — secondary sons (Deuchler 1988: 121ff). Korean educational institutions in relation to their environment were predestined to be in a constant process of negotiating the boundary between the chosen elites and other social groups. In this, the ritual texts of Chinese antiquity became a highly efficient tool to redefine and transform actual Korean social and intellectual discourse. This reflects a peculiar characteristic of Korea's traditional state and society. In spite of its uniqueness, research on the sacrificial rituals of the *sŏwŏn* remains scarce (Chŏng 1998: 39ff; Kwŏn 2001: 41ff; Kim 2013: 9ff; Gehlmann 2020: 252ff; Glomb 2020: 319ff).

What will be examined here is why and how sacrificial rituals could play such an important role in Korean society. We will first look into the significance of ritualized ceremonies as a practical expression of Confucian rites. Then, the differences in the social functions between the sacrificial rituals at the *sŏwŏn* and the ones at the

sŏnggyungwan and the *hyanggyo* will be examined. It will be shown that the ceremonies associated with the sacrificial rituals were the means used by the *sŏwŏn* to disseminate knowledge about Confucian rites among village communities. Simultaneously, it will become clear that the strict implementation of the rituals also served to legitimize the *sŏwŏn* actors and their favored social order. The intrinsic function of the sacrificial rituals can, therefore, only be comprehended in this social context.

Sacrificial rituals as practices of Confucian rites

The historical roots of the concept of "rites" (*li/ye* 禮)[3] in Confucianism go back to ancient China, namely to the Zhou dynasty (1076 BC–771 BC). The authority of the Zhou was based on the blood relations between its kin members. The principle of fealty among kinsmen was identified with that of loyalty to the state. The obedience and obeisance of a son to his father and of the young to the old within the family was explained in the analogy of the obedience and obeisance of a subject to the king. The obeisance of the son to his father became the principal virtue of a nobleman. Relatives, too, were obliged to treat other family members in the same way. The relations between husband and wife and among brothers were governed by the same principle as well.[4]

When the Zhou established their reign, they used *li* to impose a new social order and to consolidate power. Therefore, *li* are considered to be at the root of the Chinese state, though *li* initially were a matter for the aristocracy alone. The "common people" (*min* 民) did not have to follow *li* (Gassmann 2000: 348ff). They were governed instead through punishments and laws.

The historic Confucius lived in a period when the feudal order of Zhou was nearing its end. Confucius observed the decline and crisis of conventional morality, and was convinced that it was his task to reconstitute the, from his point of view, indispensability of the traditional ethos by means of *li*. Not only Confucius but also other great masters like Mencius and Xunzi believed that *li* were the basic principle for civilizing human life and society. Following *li* helps human beings to perfect their thinking and their acts. In this sense, *li* are seen in Confucianism as a criterion for humaneness. They are the core of human existence, and encompass the whole realm of human life.

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3   Chinese characters are used both in China and Korea. Yet their phonetic reading is different. In this text, typically the Korean reading is used. When both readings are mentioned, the form of citation Chinese/Korean is used.

4   The importance of these principles for the maintenance of the rule of the Zhou is amply documented in *Zhoushu*.

Using Chinese characters, *li* is written 禮. Initially, the term indicated specific rituals that were performed in order to obtain favors from the gods. This character is composed of two parts. The left-hand side's radical 示 means etymologically "Heaven's omens that inform the living of impending good or ill." The right-hand side's radical 豊 symbolizes a sacrificial vessel meanwhile. That means that *li* in ancient China were a religious act indicating a relationship between god and man.[5] For this reason it is said in *Liji*, which is an essential book of Confucian rites, that *li* know five rules — and that the most important among them is *jisi/chesa*, the one on ritual ceremonies (*Liji: Qu Li* I, 8). Thus, sacrificial rituals form the core of Confucian rites.

Sacrificial rituals, as they were practiced by the *sŏwŏn*, were part of Confucian rites too. In this, the *sŏwŏn* followed the rules written down in chapter 8 of *Liji*. There it says that *sŏkchŏn* for great kings and scholars ought to be conducted when a new school is established. In fact theses rituals, just like in China, were not only conducted at the time of the establishment of a school but also on a regular basis thereafter. In the case of the *sŏwŏn*, the *sŏkchŏn* rites followed the example set by the *sŏnggyungwan* and the *hyanggyo*. Joseph Needham (1978) was very much impressed by the *sŏkchŏn* rite he observed in China. In the second volume of his *Science and Civilization in China* he writes:

> The cult of Confucius thus became what it remained through the centuries, a hero worship, celebrated everywhere but with a special ceremony at the sage's tomb-temple in Shantung, and a symbol of the power and prestige of a non-hereditary social group, the literati, in the framework of society. […] Still, to this day, once a year, on the Sage's traditional birthday, the officials and scholars of the district assemble between midnight and dawn, there to make the thai-lao sacrifice (an ox, a sheep and a pig), to read liturgical essays and listen to speeches. Music and a solemn ritual dance were part of the ceremony until contemporary times. (Needham 1978: 31f.)

As can be read in the Chinese and Korean Annals, in AD 717 a portrait of Confucius and his 72 disciples was taken to Korea (United Silla) and hung up in the *t'aehak* (*Samguk sagi,* Vol. 8, *Silla: Sŏngsŏkwang*, 16th year). The Silla rulers, who were actually Buddhists, nevertheless made Confucius a sort of patron saint of their newly created "public system of learning" (*kukhak/t'aehak*) and even sought to underpin these efforts by conducting the corresponding sacrificial rituals in the way they were practiced in Tang China. There are good reasons to suspect that the Silla kings participated in these *sŏkchŏn* rituals at the "literary temple" (*munmyo*) and then listened to the lecture by a *kukhak* scholar. Whatever the concrete circumstances may have been, the rituals conducted at that time are mentioned in the *Samguk Sagi*, a historical record finished in 1145.

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5   According to *Shouwen jiezi*, *li* means "the way to serve the spirits and secure blessings." *Shuowen jieyi*, 1A, 4b, cited in Wilson 2001: 15.

During the Koryŏ dynasty, which was still Buddhist-dominated, following the example of Song in China a portrait of Confucius and his 72 disciples was installed in the *munmyo* of the new capital (modern-day Kaesong). The sacrificial rituals were conducted too. In 1022 and 1116 Silla scholars were added as Confucian scholars in this literary temple.[6]

In 1398 — that is, six years after the establishment of Chosŏn dynasty, which was explicitly based on Confucian thought — a new *munmyo* (situated within the already-mentioned *sŏnggyungwan*) was built in the new capital Hanyang (Seoul). Since then and up to the present, the *sŏkchŏn* rites have been conducted twice a year (in spring and autumn) at this literary temple (*Chosŏn sillok*, *T'aejo sillok* 7/6/3#3). Aside from the *sŏkchŏn* rites, which were conducted officially and publicly at the literary temple, there existed also private sacrificial rituals at "private shrines" (*sau*), which were conducted to honor those who had brought major merit to the country — for example in the handling of natural disasters or in defending the nation. The construction of such shrines dedicated to individual persons had already begun in the Three Kingdoms period. Family shrines, which can still be seen in many parts of Korea today, first appeared in the thirteenth century with the introduction of Neo-Confucianism (Choi 1975).

Ritualistic ceremonies and ritual space

The *munmyo* is a separate shrine within the precincts of the *sŏnggyungwan* and of the *hyanggyo*. Within the *munmyo* there are tablets with the names of Confucius, his 72 disciples, and of certain Korean scholars, all written in Chinese characters. Within the grounds of the *sŏwŏn* there were shrines too. The tablet inside them (initially there was only one) bore, however, the name of a local scholar who had led a virtuous and meritorious life and was held in high esteem. Sacrificial rituals were performed to honor these individuals. Yi Yi (1534–1586), one of the most renowned Korean Confucian philosophers, once wrote that the main reason for the establishment of the *sŏwŏn* was the desire of local scholars to have a shrine where they could honor a worthy and exemplary scholar from within their own community and induce its members to emulate that person's virtuous life (*Yulgok chŏnsŏ*: Vol. 13, Tobong sŏwŏn-gi, 044, 276c).

The *sŏnggyungwan*, the *hyanggyo*, and the *sŏwŏn* all had a ritual and an educational function. Correspondingly, they had a ritual space and one for learning too. Although there were certain differences in the spatial arrangements in the *sŏnggyungwan* and the *hyanggyo*, the ritual space was of higher importance and more exclusive. Whereas the space for learning is an open one, the sacrificial space is one of

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6   The philosopher Ch'oe Ch'i-wŏn (857–?) and the writer Sŏlch'ong (655–?) of the late Unified Silla period. Ch'oe had passed the Tang imperial examination and risen to high office before returning to Silla, where he made several attempts to reform the government bureaucracy. Sŏlch'ong was the first scholar to develop a transcription system for Chinese characters (*idu*).

exclusivity that can only be accessed by certain persons and for specific rituals and procedures.

The construction of the *sŏwŏn* was adapted to the conditions of the terrain that they were built on. Therefore, in some cases, the space for learning is located above the ritual space. However, as can be seen in the floor plans of the *sŏwŏn*, the learning spaces are always located in the front part, while the ritual spaces are in the rear (Lee 1998).

The learning space symbolizes the world of *xue*/*hak* 學 ("to study, to learn"), and the ritual space the one of *dao*/*to* 道 ("the way"). How these two worlds relate to each other is the core concern of Confucian philosophy. On this issue Yi Hwang (1501–1570) and Yi Yi, Chosŏn society's most influential Confucian philosophers, were involved in a fervid, prolonged, and famous debate (Hwang 2003: 203ff). For Yi Yi, *hak* and *to* were inseparable. They needed each other to be complete (*Yulgok chŏnsŏ*: Vol 5., 20). Yi Hwang, in contrast, believed that *hak* and *to* belonged to different worlds. The ritual and the learning space were two fundamentally different ones, and needed to be kept apart. Accordingly, there was no need to have a ritual space in the *sŏwŏn* (*T'oegyejip*: Vol. 42, Isan sŏwŏngi).

Yi Hwang's attitude does not mean that he did not appreciate the value of sacrificial rituals. For him, teaching and studying belonged to the "lower world", while ritual space was the world of the metaphysical *to*, which one could never reach through *hak* (*T'oegyejip*: Vol. 14, 32). This is not the place to go deeper into the debate between these two scholars. It should only be noted here that their perceptions of these two spaces did not have a noticeable impact on the layout of the *sŏwŏn*. What one can observe instead is that the ritual function of the *sŏwŏn*, whose number increased exponentially from the middle of the seventeenth century, over time gained a clear upper hand over their educational one.

These later developments stand in a certain contrast to the initial efforts of the Chosŏn Confucian scholars to construct the educational space as a nodal point of the community, and indeed of their own existence. This space needed to be sanctified through sacrificial rituals. Every activity related to the shrine was ritualized. For instance, building a shrine would start by holding a ritual for the god of earth and end with a ceremony to place the spirit tablet with the name of the person to be honored inside the building. Through the ceremonies, the educational institution gained moral authority from society (Chŏng 1998). The school space, built in an elaborate process, became a signifier, one that encompassed the complex semantic system of Confucianism. Simultaneously, by performing these rituals the Confucian scholars of Chosŏn society asserted their academic authenticity and authority.

Why were sacrificial rituals so important in Chosŏn society? One important reason is related to the orthodox lineage of *to*, 道統, in the Korean "*tot'ong*."[7] *Tot'ong* is

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7   Zhu Xi (1130–1200) put *tot'ong* at the center of his interpretation of Confucianism. He introduced the concept in his introduction to *Zhongyong*, which initially was a short chapter of *Liji*, the book of

also related to the legacy of academic legitimacy, as it was considered to be of higher value than *ch'it'ong* 治統 — the secular legacy of the lineage of sovereign power.[8] Thus the scholars who conducted ritual ceremonies for the sages of their *sŏwŏn* would implicitly pretend that those sages had followed the same *tot'ong* as they themselves had. Hence these ceremonies were used to corroborate their moral superiority and their right to control the secular political authorities.

At the center of *tot'ong* there were the teachings of Master Zhu Xi, a Confucian philosopher of twelfth-century China who was one of the founders of what later became known as Neo-Confucianism. This school of thought became the dominant ideology in the Chosŏn era. Only the writings of Master Zhu had canonical status. Only scholars that had followed his teachings could be considered for enshrinement. As a result, the government and the scholar-officials thoroughly and systematically repressed Buddhism, Taoism, and the ideology of utilitarianism (*Sambongjip*, Vol. 9).[9] The philosophical schools of Wang Yangming and of utilitarianism were barred. Also, geomancy, Taoistic yin-yang thought, and the "Five Elements" theory, in which the peasants and the general public took great interest, were officially banned too.

By their strict adherence to Neo-Confucianism, the scholar-officials of the sixteenth century were able to monopolize access to government offices and to acquire far-reaching social powers through their control of educational institutions and literary production. They also wielded hegemonic power in the interpretation and implementation of *tot'ong*, and ruled over the rural communities by occupying and apportioning among them government functions and privileges. The *sŏwŏn* allowed them to ascertain their moral authority by celebrating and honoring scholars who had followed *tot'ong* in an exemplary manner. This ideological construct of the moral superiority of the scholarly class was the basis of the civil administration during the Chosŏn dynasty. In this construct, the *sŏwŏn* assumed the role of controlling and supervising the desires and aspirations of wider society (Chŏng 1998).

The sacrificial rituals performed at the *sŏwŏn* formed a symbolic system within Korean Confucian culture and functioned as a nodal point, one in which the will and the interests of members of society came together. The literary temple of the *sŏnggyungwan* in the capital was designed as the hub of the world, around which all Confucian behavioral rules revolved. The *hyanggyo*, the *sŏwŏn*, and eventually the

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rites. It later gained prominence in the Song Confucian renaissance. Zhu Xi made *Zhongyong* part of the so-called Four Books, and thus made it one of the first book to be studied within the compulsory Confucian curriculum. It remained in this position until Western education was introduced in China and Korea centuries later. The initial short and concise text was subject to numerous commentaries — with the most crucial one written by Zhu himself.

8   *Chosŏn sillok* (*T'aejong sillok* 14/7/11#4) says: "Even Confucius was no king, he is the teacher of all kings. Therefore everybody [even King T'aejong] has to bow before him."

9   Chŏng To-chŏn, who had played a decisive role in the initial formation of the Chosŏn system of rule, wrote that the prime minister had read nothing else except the Confucian classics.

family shrines too were an integral part of this design of the world. In Chosŏn society, every household, village, and clan was ideologically and so to speak physically connected with a Confucian educational institution and the shrine belonging to it (Chosŏn sillok). [10] The power structures in villages and their hierarchical order followed agnatic, patrilineal principles, and were characterized by remarkably high levels of stability (Chŏng 1999: 149ff). [11]

The Chosŏn sacrificial rituals were of three types: namely high-, middle-, and low-level rituals. The highest sacrificial rituals were conducted at the *chongmyo*, the royal shrine, the repository of the tablets of the Chosŏn kings. These ceremonies, which are still performed annually, were characterized by quite demanding and complex procedures. At the middle level, there were the sacrificial rituals at the *munmyo* of the *sŏnggyungwan*. The low-level sacrificial rituals, meanwhile, were reserved for the *hyanggyo*, the public colleges situated in the counties and prefectures that were mentioned earlier. In fact the *sŏwŏn* rituals were outside of this classification, as they were at a level below that of the *hyanggyo* (Kwŏn 2001: 56; Chang 2002: 4). [12] Apart from these public rituals, there were private sacrificial ones conducted by families for their ancestors and on the occasion of marriages, funerals, and births too (*karye*). [13]

At the *munmyo* inside the *sŏnggyungwan*, the *sŏkchŏnje* were, as noted, conducted in spring and autumn (*ch'unch'u chehyang*). In the course of this ceremony ritualized music (*munyocheryeak*) and dances (*p'alilmu*) were performed. Furthermore, a series of ritualized acts were officiated. At the literary temple of the *hyanggyo*, too, the *sŏkchŏnje* were conducted twice annually, but the offerings were much more limited and there were no music and dance performances. All of these ceremonies were important social events, and attracted many spectators.

Access to the *sŏwŏn* ceremonies themselves was restricted to persons of merit. One needed a recommendation by a member of the *sŏwŏn*, and then had to go through a selection procedure in the hands of the *sŏwŏn* officials. Among the criteria used were age (over 30) and the level of knowledge and virtuousness. [14] The successful candidates' names were then put down in the *yuwŏnrok*, the register of the persons

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10   The Chosŏn dynasty's declared aim was to teach Confucian morals to all subjects.

11   The *hyanggyo* and the *sŏwŏn* had the right to oblige local people to cooperate in the construction or modification of their premises.

12   These levels could be identified through the number of dishes used in the ceremonies too. Fruit and dried meat were put in dishes made from bamboo (*pyŏn*). For kimchi and salted fish, wooden dishes (*tu*) were used. *Pyŏn* and *tu* symbolized yin and yang. For the ritualistic ceremonies at the royal shrine (*chongmyo*) and at the *munmyo*, 12 *pyŏn* and 12 *tu* were placed on the sacrificial table. At the hyanggyo, only eight *pyŏn* and eight *tu* were used meanwhile. In *sŏwŏn* ceremonies, the number of plates varied with the rank of the revered person (between four to six of each). In Confucianism, the act of sacrificing foodstuffs or food symbolically creates harmony between yin and yang.

13   We cannot go here into the role of Confucian rituals at the family level, and only want to mention that Zhu Xi's abovementioned book is based on family rituals. See Ebrey (1991: 102ff).

14   The rituals performed in *sŏwŏn* in the Andong area are carefully documented in the Andong Folklore Museum (2009).

who were responsible for certain tasks within the *sŏwŏn*. Only then was one allowed to participate actively in ritual ceremonies. Clearly the social standing and prestige of a person was raised by such an admission to the inner circle of the *sŏwŏn*. It was also an incentive for the scholar-officials to study Confucian teachings meticulously (Chŏng 1980: 144; Chang 2002: 3).

This "selection process" (*ch'wisa*) took place every three years. The number could vary, however normally between 15 and 20 persons were approved. The successful scholars then had to assume responsibility for the preparation of a complete ceremony. To avoid mistakes being made in the complex and highly formalized procedures, they could count on the help of "experienced scholars" (*sŭmrye*) (Andong Minsok Pangmulgwan 2009: 36).[15]

The largest ritual ceremonies of the *sŏwŏn* took place, as outlined, in spring and autumn. Each month, on the first day of the lunar calendar and on the day of the full moon, a "simplified ceremony" (*punhyangrye*/*hyangsarye*) was conducted. There were ceremonies on other occasions too. All these ceremonies were organized according to the same principles as the *sŏkchŏnje* at the public schools. In this way the ritual ceremonies at the center of Chosŏn rule permeated the whole country, and thus were practiced even in remote villages.

The *punhyangrye* was conducted at the opening of a lecture session on Neo-Confucian works (*kanghoe*). In this ceremony there were no food offerings; only incense was used. At the end of this simplified ceremony the *kanghoe* participants recited passages from books on Confucian ethics and rites in a loud voice. Only then would the actual lecture session begin. Different *sŏwŏn* may have used different texts for this recitation, yet the books normally used, like *Xiaoxue*, dealt with ethical and moral rules for the community and its members. The intention behind the joint recitation of these texts was the internalization of Confucian teachings on morals and ethics (Kim 2001: 35ff).

The ceremonies at the *sŏwŏn*, as in the case of the *sŏkchŏnje* at the *hyanggyo* too, were important social events. However, they played a more important role, as mentioned earlier, in the indoctrination of the populace as well (Chang 2002: 6). The ceremonies varied to some extent from *sŏwŏn* to *sŏwŏn*, but were in line with the principles of the *sŏkchŏnje*. For example, Tosan sŏwŏn did not conduct a *chŏnp'yerye*, a type of opening ceremony, while other *sŏwŏn* did (Andong Minsok Pangmulgwan 2009).

The precise procedures that had to be followed during all those ceremonies were laid down in great detail in books called *hŭlgi* that were preserved with great care by each *sŏwŏn* (Andong Minsok Pangmulgwan 2009: 62). The members of the *sŏwŏn* were under the obligation to precisely follow the rules and procedures and to internalize all the relevant knowledge about these rituals, and Neo-Confucian

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15   At the Tosan academy, this exercise (called *sŭmrye*) is still performed on the eve of other ceremonies.

thought. Because the *sŏwŏn* were so much part of local rural society, these Confucian sacrificial rituals became an integral part of village life (Yun 2004: 315).

Rather than dealing with metaphysical questions like life and death, these ancestral ceremonies would make a statement about the social system and the social relationship between participants. The Confucian scholars of the time did not attach much significance to the actual meaning of death. Rituals performed for their own kin and for Confucian sages or honorable scholars of their community did not differ much. The procedural aspects of these events were much more significant, as were other issues like: "Who was the master of ceremony in the ritual?"; "What kind of mourning garment should be worn?"; "What kind of food offerings should be prepared?" In this sense we should think of the rituals as significant, not as a *signifié*. This is why there was so much emphasis put on the procedural aspects. Generally speaking, rites in Chosŏn society did not signify death; instead they put the focus on the social procedures regarding death and the appropriateness of the ritual. Therefore, sacrificial rituals dealt with the social contract of the living rather than with the dead (Chŏng 1998: 47ff).

Such a view helps one to understand the fact that fierce disputes occurred on deciding, for example, the rank of the mourned person or the correctness of the rituals and rites (Yun 2004: 329ff). Controversies concerning rank were intense social disputes about whose ancestral tablet should be placed in a higher position. The actual dispute was framed as one of ethics and morality, but the essence of it was who should be bestowed the higher-ranking position. The enshrined ancestral tablets were a symbolic representation of *li*, whereas in reality tablets stood for a social contract framed as a cultural symbol.

When examining the rituals of the *munmyo* from a modern-day perspective, we often find that there had been too many tedious, seemingly unimportant, and unproductive arguments over procedures. Those olden times were characterized by exasperating discussions over whether to use a cow, a lamb, or a pig as offering. The whole scholar-official class was in conflict with one another about whether the king should make his visit to the *sŏnggyungwan* in the red court dress or with the official crown and in the royal robe, which were rather usually worn for ancestral rituals. Another prolonged dispute was over what material should be used to make ancestral tablets. It is not possible to understand the ferocity of such disputes purely in terms of the religious aspects brought forward. Rather, they need to be understood as conflicts over social signifiers within the realm of the social or political contracts of the time (Chŏng 1998: 47).

Then, what social meaning is attached to the *munmyo*, the mid-level state shrine? The essential function of a state shrine is of course political, namely the veneration of the spiritual parent of the state through sacrificial rituals organized by the latter — the enhancement of its legitimacy coming therewith. One of the first measures taken by the founder of the Chosŏn dynasty was to put an end to the aristocratic remnants of feudal society from the preceding Koryŏ dynasty. To this end the

government promoted and implemented a new interpretation of the rituals conducted at the *munmyo*. Through this scheme the government gained exclusive control over the educational institutions. Aside from the elimination of the last vestiges of feudalism, the new king had another motive too: the reorganization of the *munmyo* within the *sŏnggyungwan* was intended to make absolute and consecrate the new Neo-Confucianism state ideology. The sacrificial rituals at the *munmyo* had to validate the moral legitimacy of state power, and indeed of all those who were faithful to the genealogy of Confucian orthodoxy.

The result was a new form of autocratic rule, one that was not accepted enthusiastically by local scholars and the literati — who, furthermore, grew in number over time. As they dared not enter into open conflict, how could they express their dissatisfaction? They did so by calling into doubt the scholarly legitimacy of some of the Confucian sages enshrined in the *munmyo*. Were these scholars truly qualified for enshrinement therein? Voicing this point of disagreement was useful at their home bases too, as they preferred to enshrine different sages in their own *sŏwŏn*. In fact, at the level of the *sŏwŏn* quite a variety of social groups participated in the interpretation and management of the low-level sacrificial rituals, thus creating a certain degree of differentiation within a centralized state, with its unitary, all-pervading ideology.

In sum, one can say that Chosŏn society established a new state order based on Zhu Xi's Neo-Confucianism. It reconstructed and reoriented the *munmyo* rituals, and made — in order to stress the genealogy of Confucian orthodoxy — the reverence of Confucius the cornerstone of the new regime. Some members of the newly created scholar-official class outside the capital, whose aim was to enhance their own power bases, put forward certain (minor) criticisms of the sacrificial rituals practices at the center and posited which local sages/scholars should be venerated in the newly created *sŏwŏn*.

Conclusion

Confucian scholars are those who, through studying, recover the nature of the mind, restore the true self, and aspire to finally reach the level of sagehood. Ritual space symbolizes these aspirations. Based on the teachings of Zhu Xi, Chosŏn scholars were able to construct a political and social order and culture around the symbolic space of the *sŏwŏn* through a tradition of iterative ritual performances. The latter designated to each member of society their proper social role and social grammar. The function of the *sŏwŏn* rituals was that of a social signifier within the construction of the social contract peculiar to Chosŏn society.

The spread of the *sŏwŏn*, which began in the sixteenth century in areas outside the capital, produced a "Confucianization" of the traditional rituals and thence indoctrination with Confucian morals at the local level. This kind of transformation of society had been the aim of the Chosŏn rulers right from their dynasty's founding in 1392. Paradoxically the driving force behind this was not the center but rather

local scholars who wanted to enhance their social and political dominance and privileges through the creation of symbolic ritual spaces under their own control, including the invention of a tradition of local sages/scholars to be enshrined and revered at the *sŏwŏn*. The sacrificial rituals were, in terms of performativity, an intermediate phenomenon located between the *sŏkchŏnje* at the state shrines and the private *karye* at the family level.

Just as in the case of the ceremonies of the *munmyo* and the *hyanggyo*, the real aim of the *sŏwŏn* ceremonies was the indoctrination of the populace with Neo-Confucian thought so as to renew and strengthen the legitimacy of the political and social order. To bolster the acceptance of this order, the ritual ceremonies were organized as large and, in their elaborateness, memorable events for local villagers. To stress the extraordinary nature of these events, not only the local scholarly elite but also the governor and representatives of neighboring villages honored them by their presence.

To be selected for the preparation and conduction of these ceremonies, in particular for the task of master of ceremony, was a matter of great honor, and one reason why the local scholar-officials would to the best of their ability lead an exemplary and meritorious life. Such incentives too increased the acceptance of the hierarchical order of Confucian society under Chosŏn rule — and helped to make local scholar-officials loyal followers of the teachings of Zhu Xi and of the Chosŏn regime. At the same time, they were a kind of observable role model for the villagers — in particular in their perfect command of the ceremonial requirements and of Neo-Confucian teachings.

There is one final aspect that deserves attention. All the details to be observed in the sacrificial ceremonies — from the specificities of the sacrifices to the chosen wording — were laid down in the book of rituals. Despite these exact prescriptions, as has been described often in the literature, heated arguments on one or the other detail would often arise. One reason was that the exact meaning of the numerous details of the prescribed rites could not be explained at times through reference to the Confucian texts and their inner logic alone. There was always a possibility, in particular when circumstances changed, that ambiguities would arise — and thus spur scholarly disputes. A second reason is that the Chosŏn scholars were not free from personal ambitions, and consequently would at times in pursuance of their own career interests favor a certain interpretation of a text in order to leave either a positive impression on their examiners or demean their competitors.

Finally, the scholars often belonged to one or another competing political faction. Under such conditions a particular interpretation of a certain passage of a classical text could easily become a weapon against competing factions, and lead to much wider and deeper conflicts than one might expect in scholarly debates based on facts and reason. Thus, for example, the strict interpretation of Zhu Xi's writings and adherence to the ceremonial rules by certain scholars, or a certain group of scholars, could then be used to position themselves as the true representatives of Confucian

ideals and righteousness. Thereby they sought to validate their entitlement to certain positions of power in the central government or in the provinces.

Such cases abound in the history of Chosŏn society, and certainly contributed — together with the adaptability of and changes to its knowledge system — mightily to the perpetuation of this dynasty over 500 years. As one might note, this did not rely on military power at all. Eventually it collapsed under the impact of Western (and Japanese) imperialism and their military might. Unsurprisingly, Chosŏn society's Neo-Confucianism had no answer to such challenges.

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Refereed article

Remembrance in the Making: The King's Father and the Construction of Collective Memories of Crown Prince Sado in Late Eighteenth-Century Korea[*]

Florian Pölking

Summary

The study of collective memory, cultures of memory, collective identity, and the relationship between memory, identity, and power has gained importance in recent years. In the Korean context, a growing number of studies primarily focus on issues and phenomena of the period since the end of the Second World War. However, research on premodern Korean cultures of memory has not only revealed major insights into developments in the past, but maybe more importantly has established a connection between Koreas past and present. This study focuses on the memory of Crown Prince Sado, and particularly on its construction by his son, King Chŏngjo. From the beginning of his reign, Chŏngjo followed a specific policy to restore the reputation and status of his father with the aim of reconciling his personal and the official memory — thereby securing his own legitimacy. Carefully navigating the political landscape as well as the Confucian principles of his time, Chŏngjo managed to follow up on his policy through the establishment of a variety of tangible as well as abstract sites of memory. The article shows how these sites were entangled and invested with a specific meaning for Chŏngjo's contemporaries, but also how they are still meaningful in present-day Korea too.

Keywords: Chŏngjo, Hwasŏng, Sado, collective memory, sites of memory, ŭigwe

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Introduction

The movie *The Throne* (original Korean title: *Sado*) was one of the biggest box office hits in Korea in 2015, having attracted almost two million viewers after only six days (Chosun 2015). It ranks sixth among the highest-grossing films of 2015 with approximately 6.2 million cinema admissions and domestic gross receipts of around USD 42 million. The historical drama revolves around the life of Crown Prince Sado (1735–1762) and his fateful relationship with his father, King Yŏngjo (1694–1776, reign 1724–1776), which eventually led to the former's tragic dying in a rice chest. While the movie neglects the complicated details of the politico-ideological context, it focuses instead on the family tragedy. Based on this interpretation it obtained a number of national as well as international awards and was nominated as Korea's contribution to the 88th Academy Awards (Oscars) for best foreign-language film in 2016 (IMDB 2015; Kobiz 2015).

The movie is only one of the more recent and internationally visible outcomes of a number of different depictions of this historical event. The history of Crown Prince Sado and the circumstances of his death have been narrated in books, comics, movies, and television serials at least since the 1950s. Since the early years of the new century, meanwhile, that tale has been integrated into South Korea's politics of cultural promotion by re-narrating historical events and figures within the frame of the so-called Korean wave (*hallyu*) and its nation-building project.[1] In this regard, the "resurrection" of historical figures by pop culture — meant to serve popular taste and commercial interests — became political again, most pronounced by the Global Korea policy of president Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013). This also was not least a consequence of the usage of nationalist interpretations of Korean history that have their roots in the Japanese colonial period and in the postcolonial historiography (Joongang 2014).[2]

While the story of Sado himself has more or less continually found its way into the popular culture of South Korea, a second event would attract public attention only from the late 1990s on: the reenactment of certain elements of the culture of memory of Sado, specifically the royal procession from the capital Seoul to his tomb near the city of Suwŏn on the occasion of the 60th birthdays of both Sado and his wife, Lady Hyegyŏng (1735–1824). This procession, supposed to be the biggest of its kind in Korean history, was only reenacted from 2016 onward, 221 years after it originally took place (King Jeongjo Royal Parade 2019).[3] This roughly coincided with the repatriation of a set of "ritual protocols" (*ŭigwe*) in 2011 that contained a contemporary documentation of the events but which had been looted by French troops in 1866; they were granted recognition in the UNESCO Memory of the World

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[1] For an introductory as well as closer reading into the context of the Korean wave in its multiple dimensions, please refer to Kim Kyŏng-hyŏn and Choe Youngmin (2014) or Kim Youna (2013b).

[2] For an overview, see Choi Jong-suk (2016) or Park Chan-Seung (2007).

[3] It was reenacted on a small scale by the city of Suwŏn from 1996, and expanded together with the cities of Seoul and Hwasŏng as well as further sponsors in 2016.

Register already in 2007. [4] Furthermore in 2013 the Korean Broadcaster KBS produced a lengthy documentary on the procession based on the respective *ŭigwe*. The yearly reenactment was by far the most visible of these different references, spanning almost two full days and widely covered by national media, comprising more than 4,000 participants in historical costume, and leading to roadblocks and traffic jams along the way.

The basic focus of modern popular depictions of Sado and his remembrance thus seems to be the family tragedy. However, it is interwoven into the cultural politics of present-day Korea so as to construct a shared national identity by narrating a specific version of the country's history that Koreans can easily connect with and that at the same time can be presented internationally. This holds especially true for the sublime character and the public grandeur of the 1795 procession in its reenactment as a colorful and neatly orchestrated modern perception of the historic event that tries to position eighteenth-century Korea within the current master narrative.

In this way the usage of the original events is not so much different from the past, in that their remembrance essentially was of a politico-ideological nature at two specific instances in time. [5] Alongside the original event, the first was the project undertaken by King Chŏngjo (1752–1800, r. 1776–1800) to rehabilitate his father and thereby secure his own legitimacy by means of reconstructing the respective collective memory. To this end the king rearranged specific aspects of the culture of memory of the crown prince to position him as a legitimate ancestor, a project that was to define most of his policy and last his whole reign.

The second instance meanwhile was the proclamation of the Empire of Korea (Taehan Cheguk) in 1897. To legitimize Kojong (1852–1919, r. 1864–1907) as emperor, his genealogy had to be revised according to Korean Confucian ideology. To this end Sado was elevated to the status of Emperor, and subsequently Kojong was recast from his marginal family line as now Sado's fourth-generation direct descendant — which had not been possible without Chŏngjo's preceding politics. While these two instances are closely intertwined, this article will focus on the politics of remembrance by Chŏngjo during his reign, not least because these events seem to have had the greatest impact on our modern memory — as depicted in the phenomena mentioned above.

The argument is based on the hypothesis that the king's policy was to construct a specific collective memory of his father for his own legitimacy in the context of power politics and factional disputes, with the aim to overcome the rivalry surrounding the whole matter and to reconcile public and personal memory.

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4   For a comprehensive introduction to the genre of *ŭigwe*, please refer for example to Yi Sŏng-mi (2008), Han (2005), and Pölking (2018).

5   For a comprehensive study of a similar case, see for example Park Saeyoung (2010) on the construction of the memory of Yi Sunshin (1545–1598) by then president Park Chung Hee (1917–1979).

Chŏngjo's affection for his father and for his mother, Hyegyŏng, played a crucial role in his policymaking, and was one reason for critiques from aristocratic scholar-officials on numerous instances. However that affection translated into specific policies and political decisions according to Confucian ideological principles of Korean kingship, being intertwined with actual power politics that formed the collective memories of his father according to the needs of his own particular present. While these politics have been studied from the perspective of political power, this article will focus rather on Chŏngjo's efforts vis-à-vis the construction of "sites of memory."[6]

The paper is organized into three parts. First, it will provide an outline of the concepts of "collective memory" and "cultures of memory." While there has been an abundance of publications on a broad range of topics regarding memory in general as well as on modern Korea, the literature on premodern Korean contexts still remains rather scarce. The first part will therefore elucidate the respective concepts while focusing also on their application to late eighteenth-century Korea. The second part will then begin with an introduction to the death of Sado and the circumstances surrounding it, providing the basis for the understanding of Chŏngjo's policies. This section will then bring together the historical events — or, more specifically, the means by which the king tried to manipulate the respective collective memories of different interest groups — diachronically with recourse to the concept of collective memory. The last part will take up the results of these policies and establish links between the original events, the proclamation of the Empire of Korea in 1897, as well as circumstances today. It will show that the political implications of the history of Sado and his remembrance were still of particular importance until the end of the Chosŏn dynasty that came about with the Japanese colonial period — specifically, by 1910 at the latest.

Collective memory, cultures of memory, and Memory Studies

Research on memory and remembrance has gained increasing attention across a growing number of academic disciplines. It has come to the point where the idea of Memory Studies as an emerging interdisciplinary but independent scientific field has itself become attractive.[7] In Germany in particular, the studies of Jan and Aleida Assmann have greatly contributed to the development of Memory Studies. They gained particular importance with a new push on memory due to the looming disappearance of witnesses to Nazi Germany and the Shoa and questions revolving

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6   Among the numerous works on the topic, see Kim Kyŏng-hyŏn (2013) and Lovins (2019) for
    comparative approaches in terms of "absolutism," "enlightenment," and "early modernism." For a
    more general overview and problematization of research on late eighteenth-century Korea, see Kim
    and Macrae (2019).

7   See the introduction to Olick et al. (2011) or Dutceac Segesten and Wüstenberg (2017).

around an appropriate remembrance, the modes and functions of memory, and the existence and understanding of collective memory.[8]

This interest in Memory Studies has neither been confined to Central Europe nor to the demands of our immediate present or very recent past. Memory has also been studied regarding historical contexts reaching as far back as Egyptian antiquity and even for pre-textual cultures, not least by Jan Assmann and Tonio Hölscher (1988) among others. Memory thereby has proven, however it might be criticized, a resourceful object of inquiry not only across academic disciplines but also across time and space (Chedgzoy et al. 2018). These characteristics make it all the more important especially for Area Studies, including Korean Studies, and for the so-called *Kleine Fächer* ("small subjects"). It serves as a platform not only for deductive research and the application to seemingly disjointed case studies but also can inform and qualify the theoretical approach itself, establishing hitherto unforeseen connections and providing seminal knowledge for and connection to the so-called *Großdisziplinen* ("major subjects") — for example the Social Sciences or Political Science.

The study of memory in as well as of Korea that specifically refers to the quasi-disciplinary contexts of Memory Studies has roughly coincided with the developments observed above. Since the middle of the first decade of the new millennium onward, many related studies have been published on a broad range of topics. These developments eventually led to a special issue of the journal *Memory Studies* in 2013. However, the majority of these studies deal with issues of modern Korea, specifically the period after the liberation from Japanese colonial rule. In 2010 Kim Sun Joo wrote that "[the] remaking of the past is not the monopoly of modernity" (Kim Sun Joo 2010: 563), introducing her article on the construction of memory of a military commander during the Chosŏn dynasty, and picking up on it again in her subsequent monograph (Kim Sun Joo 2013a).[9] Only a small number of studies followed that dealt with the historical contexts to the construction of memory. This paper will therefore add to these by applying the concepts of collective memory, cultures of memory, and sites of memory to late eighteenth-century Korea.[10]

The concept of sites of memory (*lieux de mémoire*) was developed by French sociologist Pierre Nora in the 1980s. It is famously summed up by the quote: "There are *lieux de mémoire*, sites of memory, because there are no longer *milieux de memoire*, real environments of memory" (Nora 1989: 7). However, Nora based his findings on the observation that the common denominators of the French nation had vanished due to developments from the mid-nineteenth century onward, which he

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8 For a more comprehensive overview that exceeds the scope of this article, see for example Pollmann and Kuijpers (2013).

9 For the early modern European context, see for example Pollmann (2017).

10 The term *lieu de memoire* was translated differently into English. I will use sites of memory here, for this is the term that was used by Nora and Marc Roudebush in the English translation of his original French introduction to his seminal work *Les Lieux de mémoire* in 1989.

condenses into the term "acceleration" (*accélération*) — that is, the rupture of memory through an eternal present and the consequent distinction between memory and history (Nora 1989: 8).

While Nora maintains a distinction between memory and history, he neglects what Maurice Halbwachs earlier had called "social frameworks of memory" (*les cadres sociaux de la memoire*), or the social conditionality of individual memory. For Halbwachs, sites of memory belong to what he terms "tradition," distortions of memory, which surely have their importance but still belong to the realm of history (Assmann 2005: 78f). Groups still need these socially framed spaces — "objectivations" — as symbols of their identity and ledgers of their collective memory (Assmann 2018: 39).

For Nora, however, sites of memory are exactly no constituents of some collective memory of a living group. Sites of memory become symbols, placeholders, of a bygone era, one whose existence is only fragmentarily narrated in these sites — and generally according to the needs of the respective present (Assmann 2010: 309ff). According to Nora, sites of memory are and become "sites" in three senses of the word: materially, being concrete objects or abstract cuttings of a specific historical period; functionally, in that they serve a specific function of remembrance at the time of their coming into existence; and, symbolically by intentionally entailing an aura of elevation above their objective function (Nora 1989: 18f). Sites of memory thereby function as a means to bridge or better combine history and memory, as entities separate from one another.

Jan and Aleida Assmann have provided a framework of the utmost fruitfulness for the understanding of collective memory with their research on the two *modi memoranda*: "cultural memory" (*Kulturelles Gedächtnis*) and "communicative memory" (*Kommunikatives Gedächtnis*).[11] While the latter corresponds roughly to the research field of "oral history," the former is described by Jan Assmann as reference to a mythical, ancient past, decoupled from factual knowledge and defined by "remembered history" (*erinnerte Geschichte*) — which is "myth" (*Mythos*). It is manifested in the symbolic objectivations and rituals that are supposed to give sense to the present by referring to the past (Assmann 2018: 50–53). He thereby integrates the concept of sites of memory into this idea of cultural memory as one of the diverse media forms of cultural memory, next to script, pictures, or landscapes as a whole (Assmann 2018: 60f). He also relates collective memory to individual and collective identity, the "consciousness of social belonging" (Assmann 2018: 139), which connects his studies to the work on *cadres sociaux* by Halbwachs for example. It reads parallel also to Pierre Bourdieu's work on habitus and power, as well as the social construction of reality by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann.[12]

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11 This has been comprehensively summarized by the Assmanns themselves, but also for example by Astrid Erll (2017). This article follows these foundations in its analysis.

12 For an overview on these two concepts, please refer to Schwingel (2011) and Berger and Luckmann (2011).

Following his argument, individuals are part of different and diverse cultural subformations within a common culture. Their collective identity is based on common myths that provide answers to questions of social and cultural sense. These myths, manifested in rituals, do not have to be situated in an antiquity however; they can also be grounded in the recent past, and have to be circulated and thereby continually updated. With the example of the Israelites and Egypt, Assmann (2018: 130–160) reveals how identity can be influenced by changes in the cultural memory of a group. The collective memory constitutes one essential part of what Assmann (2018: 16f) calls "connective structures" (*konnektive Strukturen*). They connect the individuals of a certain group socially but particularly temporarily, and are reflexive in the sense that members of a common-memory collective reflect their shared identity in their individual commitment to the group (Assmann 2018: 133). For this purpose, sites of memory can serve as fixed points that float through time, sometimes space, and where the members of a given group can update their shared memory of a specific past that provides them sense for their respective present.

However, societies consist of a multitude of collectives; consequently collective identities and thus members of a society are at the same time members of several collective identity groups too. Astrid Erll (2017: 105f) summarizes these critiques in her own overview, relating the different approaches to collective identity to each other. The differentiation into normative and reconstructive types of collective identity, first articulated by Jürgen Straub (1998), enables her to locate the approaches and their respective meanings. While she situates Jan Assmann's approach within reconstructive types, this article would like to complement this decision with a hint to the reflexiveness within the latter scholar's concept. The mutual influence of the collective and the individual memory — and thereby identity through continuous updating, for example by means of sites of memory — not only serves reconstructive but also normative purposes, in that the dominant interpretation of memory through the specific site established by dominant actors sets binding interpretations of history and binding continuities.

Aleida Assmann (2010) complements and broadens the understanding of cultural memory by differentiation between "functional memory" (*Funktionsgedächtnis*) and "storage memory" (*Speichergedächtnis*). While the first describes living memory — for example traditions, as shown in the previous paragraph — the second comprises more inclusively the "amorphous mass" of dormant memories that form the background to the functional memory and serve as a pool for new configurations of the latter — for example in the interpretation of a specific site of memory. It thereby integrates "forgetting" (*das Vergessen*) as a highly selective process, and explains the binding of selected memories to carriers — for example sites of memory and their function as agents of sense and identity. According to her argument, functional memory is "functional" in that it serves a certain purpose in the present moment of its construction for the individual as well as the collective memory — that is, it provides sense for the formation of a specific identity among its target group (Assmann 2010: 130–136). This function extends to purposes of legitimation,

delegitimation, and distinction, and in this regard is also highly political and malleable by power. Typical references are again to (religious) rituals, festivals, and national movements (Assmann 2010: 138f).

On the basis of the concept of cultural memory and with a specific focus on the aspect of sites of memory, this article will now examine the efforts of Chŏngjo to construct a specific collective memory of his father. Analyzing the chain of events that culminated in the eight-day-long visit to his father's tomb as well as in the construction of a new fortress, it will be shown how Chŏngjo strived to create an adequate memory for Sado, as father to the king. This memory served two purposes: first, the provision of sense and thereby identity for the group Chŏngjo aimed at, which basically included everybody regardless of social or political hierarchy and which eventually would secure his legitimacy; and, second, the achievement of private satisfaction with the collective, public memory of his father.

Memory of a father, memory of a king

The death of a crown prince[13]

King Yŏngjo, full of joy about the eventual birth of an heir on February 13, 1735, elevated his son at the unusual young age of only 14 months old to the status of Crown Prince in 1736. Sado passed through the capping ceremony at only eight years old in 1743, became married to Hyegyŏng in 1744, and was named regent in 1749. All steps of his development were closely watched by the court's public, and records say that he was an exceptional child in every regard — one widely praised by officials (Kim Haboush 1988: 169–172). Yŏngjo himself was the most hopeful yet critical observer of his son.

In her extensive studies Jahyun Kim Haboush has revealed how Yŏngjo's kingship was affected by a number of unfavorable circumstances: the policies of his two predecessors, his father Sukchong (1661–1720, r. 1674–1729) and his brother Kyŏngjong (1688–1724, r. 1720–1724); fierce factional fighting among the aristocratic (yangban) scholar-official elite; his personal background as the son of a concubine; and, the circumstances of his own rule — meaning the untimely death of Kyŏngjong under suspicious circumstances. From the moment of his enthronement Yŏngjo therefore aspired to what Kim Haboush (1988: especially chapters 1 and 2) termed "Confucian kingship," with the unconditional authority of morale rule by following the neo-Confucian ideal of pursuing sagehood and scrupulously adhering to respective rituals and details.

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13 The death of Sado and the context surrounding it have been widely studied in Korean as well as Western historical studies, and in Korean Studies. This article will give a short summary of the events to provide the basic background for the uninformed reader. For further reading, please refer to Kim Haboush (1988, 1996).

From early on, Yŏngjo translated these ideals into expectations of his son and consequently into the style of Sado's upbringing. He was transferred into the palace of the crown prince as soon as he obtained that role, separated from his parents, and placed under the authority of a number of palace women. His parents only visited him very rarely, and specifically his father only in the form of official visits — particularly after his capping. These meetings soon turned into tests, with Yŏngjo questioning his son about the contents of the Confucian classics and interpretations thereof. The dawning alienation of father and son became even more severe with the proclamation of Sado as regent. Instead of regarding it as a form of apprenticeship, Yŏngjo out of personal as well as political necessity soon assigned tasks to his son that he did not seem fit to fulfill at his tender age, especially not according to the king's high expectations — which, on top, were all too often either unarticulated or inadequately communicated. This led to mutual frustration, and to fierce criticism of Sado's gradually deepening insecurity and declining public performance — presumably out of terror of his father.[14]

The fact that Sado seemed to have suffered from a mental disorder added to the problem that the crown prince was not able to grasp his father's intentions and meet his expectations. According to the memoirs of Hyegyŏng, this had been known since Sado's childhood but gradually became more severe from the early 1750s onward (Kim Haboush 1996: 265). For Yŏngjo this became pertinent when Sado in 1757 began to occasionally kill his servants out of frustration and rage. For instance, he had developed what his wife called a "clothing phobia." It led to an obsession with changing his clothes numerous times a day or even before leaving his chambers, to the extent that he had to change them over and over again as soon as he discovered only the slightest flaw or endured the smallest of discomforts. In anger he killed at least one of the ladies-in-waiting who helped him dress; from that moment on, not only his servants but also his wife were in terror of his out-of-control behavior.

For the king, however, this had severe consequences in regard to Sado being his sole heir. Without going too deep into the details that led to the final decision of the king to commit Sado to die in a wooden rice chest on July 12, 1762, after eight days of confinement, the summary of it reads as follows.[15] After rumors of Sado planning regicide reached the king, the son eventually seemed no longer a sustainable heir to the throne. However, it was not feasible for Yŏngjo to just retract the regency. A member of the royal house could also not be physically punished. Thus the person had to drink a cup of poison. This in turn implied criminality, which would have led to additional punishment of the criminal's whole family. Collective punishment, however, would have led to the death of Sado's 11-year-old son, the next royal heir, and consequently to the end of the direct royal line of succession. Even if his son

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14   The literature suggests that Yŏngjo did feel for his son as a father, but was not able to communicate with him in that role or restricted himself to hoping that Sado out of filial piety would know what he wanted and felt.

15   For a comprehensive analysis, please refer to Kim Haboush (1988).

would have lived, he would then be the son of a criminal and thereby not be able to ascend to the throne.

Yŏngjo eventually solved the dilemma by commanding Sado to voluntarily enter a rice chest so that he could die without becoming judged as a criminal and so would not endanger the royal legitimacy. Sado's son was then adopted to Sado's elder half-brother, Crown Prince Hyojang (1719-1728) who had died early. This seems to have been a safety net in case Sado — and therewith his family line — was later questioned.

King Chŏngjo and his grand project

Already before he ascended the throne, Chŏngjo made a very much unparalleled request to Yŏngjo in 1775 to have certain passages deleted from the official records — most likely compromising material on Sado both as a person and crown prince. Yŏngjo agreed to this, and accordingly the existing records are incomplete (Kim Haboush 1988: 168). The construction of the memory of Sado by his son thus already had begun before Chŏngjo ascended the throne, but only as king was he able to pursue his aim with full authority. When he ascended the throne in 1776 he proclaimed in one of his first statements what would become the overarching theme of his reign, as quoted in the preface of the *Veritable Records of King Chŏngjo* (*Chŏngjo sillok*):

> "I am the grandson of the great King Yŏngjong, I am the son of Crown Prince Changhŏn, my mother is her, Lady Hyebin Hong. By order of [King] Yŏngjong I became the son of the great King Chinjong and Queen Hyosun Lady Cho."

> "[…] 英宗大王之孫，莊獻世子之子，母惠嬪洪氏。 英宗命爲 眞宗大王之子，母妃孝純王后 趙氏" (*Chôngjo sillok*: overall preface)[16]

Although he never had his lineage transferal reversed, Chŏngjo explicitly made clear that in his view he was as much the son of his biological father Sado as he was of his legal, official one.[17] Consequently, in one of his very first decisions, he began to elevate Sado's position by bestowing upon him a new posthumous name (*chonho*), and changing that of his shrine too.[18]

> "[The king] elevated the posthumous name of Crown Prince Sado and called him Changhŏn, [he] bestowed [a new name] to [his tomb] Suŭnmyo and called it Yŏnguwŏn, and the shrine [Suŭnmyo] was called Kyŏngmogung."

> „追上思悼世子尊號曰莊獻, 封垂恩墓曰永祐園, 廟曰景慕宮 […]" (*Chŏngjo sillok*: year of enthronement, 3rd month, 20th day, 1st entry).

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16 Where not stated otherwise, translations are made by the author himself.

17 For the remainder of the text I will refer to Sado as Changhŏn, except for cases when the name Sado is specifically appropriate.

18 "Shrine" refers not only to the main building that hosted the ancestral tablet but also to the whole site/compound, consisting of several buildings and being surrounded by a wall.

These changes to the original names assigned new meaning to his father as well as to the tomb and shrine. Sado had been reinstated as crown prince by Yŏngjo and given the posthumous name (*siho* 諡號) that Kim Haboush translates as "Mournful Thoughts" (Sado 思悼).[19] Yŏngjo also decided on the names of the tomb and the shrine of his son. Chŏngjo in reference to his father amended his posthumous name under a new term.

While *siho* could be used for posthumous names of a prince or princess as well as for the highest-level officials and meritorious subjects, *chonho* 尊號 only referred to kings and queens and their nuclear family. Furthermore, the term *wŏn* 園 was used in reference to the tomb of the paternal father of the king, as was *kung* 宮 for the shrine housing his ancestral tablet (Jung and Han 2013).[20] Here, the shrine site was not only renamed but also rebuilt in a style suitable to the new terminology and status. Furthermore, the shrine was situated just to the east outside the main palace; Chŏngjo visited it once a month and created the wooden signboard with the shrine's name, "Shining Admiration" (Kyŏngmogung 景慕宮) (Shin 2017: 279), himself.[21]

A great number of high-level offices as well as residences of important *yangban* families were located in the same central area of the capital, which meant that changes were very visible to the highest echelons of Chosŏn society. However, now Changhŏn — meaning "Courageous Sage" — did not receive the title of *cho* 祖 or *chong* 宗, which were reserved only for former kings. In this sense it becomes obvious how Chŏngjo while elevating the status of his biological father and in consequence also the respective ancestral rites at the same time too maintained his obligations in Confucian filial piety to his adopted father. He bestowed on him the posthumous name Chinjong one day before he renamed his biological father, in accordance with Yŏngjo's wishes (Han 2005: 360ff).[22] Additionally, although Changhŏn technically was not his father anymore, Chŏngjo ordered the Office for the Protection of Tombs (Subonggwan 守奉官) to care for the tomb, the office that was in charge of those exclusively of the royal family.[23]

According to custom, everything the king did and said was recorded by historians, who accompanied him at every turn and on all occasions. Thus Chŏngjo could be certain that all of his decisions, arguments, quasi-private musings, as well as actions were written down, put into the diverse archives, and preserved. However, one genre

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19 *Yŏngjo sillok*: 38th year, 5th month, 21st day, 2nd entry.

20 This custom was called the "*kungwŏn* system" (*kungwŏnje* 宮園制), being enforced by Yŏngjo. Kings and queens were buried in tombs termed *nŭngmyo* (陵墓), while the ancestral tablet was kept in the royal shrine Chongmyo (宗廟). Further members of the royal family were buried in tombs referred to as *myo* (墓), while the shrine for their ancestral tablets was termed *myo* (廟) (Shin 2017: 277f).

21 Numerous entries in the *Veritable Records* read: "[The king] went to the Kyŏngmo shrine to pay his respects." See for example *Chŏngjo sillok*: 6th year, 3rd month, 22nd day, 1st entry.

22 *Chŏngjo sillok*: year of enthronement, 3rd month, 20th day, 1st entry.

23 *Chŏngjo sillok*: year of enthronement, 3rd month, 19th day, 6th entry.

stood out from this abundance of official recordings: that of *ŭigwe*. These records
were more than just the mere documentation of court events. *Ŭigwe* were only
published for a very limited range of events and rituals that were all directly related
to royal legitimation, for example royal weddings, funerals, or the production of the
sillok. While they saw the meticulous documentation of all important information on
these rituals, in order to be used as models for future generations, their creation itself
was a central part of these legitimation rituals. Being the only official documentary
genre including graphic depictions and pictures next to text, their production was not
only time-consuming but also very expensive. Furthermore, they were produced
immediately after the respective events and from time to time presented as presents
to meritorious officials.[24]

A number of *ŭigwe* document the events of the year 1776. The "*Ŭigwe* of the office
for the elevation of the posthumous name and the bestowment of the tomb title *wŏn*
to Crown Prince Changhŏn" (*Changhŏn seja sangsi pongwŏn togam ŭigwe*),
published in 1776, and the "*Ŭigwe* of the office for the posthumous proclamation of
King Chinjong" (*Chinjong ch'usung togam ŭigwe*), published in 1777, contain
information on the context and processes of the naming of Chinjong, Chŏngjo's
adopted father, and of Crown Prince Changhŏn. The "*Ŭigwe* of the office for the
renovation of the Kyŏngmo shrine" (*Kyŏngmogung kaegŏn togam ŭigwe*) records
the information on all aspects of the transformation of the shrine into a building more
suitable to the biological father of a king. It particularly provides a map of the shrine
site, showing its different buildings together with a description of their names and
sizes. Finally, the "*Ŭigwe* of the office for the construction of musical instruments
for the Kyŏngmo shrine" (*Kyŏngmogung akki chosŏngch'ŏng ŭigwe*) records the
making of new musical instruments, as well as of utensils and garments that were
used for the diverse rituals that had to be performed as part of the various steps to
elevate the position of Changhŏn (Han 2005: 365ff). These actions and records
represented the first distinct steps in the reorganization of the memory of Crown
Prince Changhŏn within the official realm. The amendment of names, the
consequent elevation of status of both the historical figure as well as the related sites,
and the recording in the *ŭigwe* genre as canonized knowledge imprinted a specific
meaning on the crown prince and his legacy that conform closely to our
understanding of sites of memory.[25]

The next major step in Chŏngjo's project would follow in 1784, with the publication
of the "*Ŭigwe* of the Kyŏngmo shrine" (*Kyŏngmogung ŭigwe*). This *ŭigwe*
comprised records of all construction activities, the reorganization of artefacts

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24 These characteristics distinguish *ŭigwe* for example from the *sillok*, which are the official annals of
    a given reign and were only produced by the respective successors. However the documents
    underlying the *ŭigwe* were destroyed after their publication, as was also habit for the *sillok*
    (Vermeersch 2019: 214ff).

25 How and to what degree books were held in high esteem by the Chosŏn state, individuals, and also
    commerce has been most convincingly analyzed by Boudewijn Walraven in terms of "a cult of the
    book" (2007).

contained in the shrine, as well as of the rituals conducted from 1776 onward in regard to the enhancement of Changhŏn's position. Rather than single publications on each event, this was thus a detailed summary of the past eight years of different ones that were now brought together in comprehensive form — standing as proof of the new status of Changhŏn. Additionally, the first of the three volumes consists of a wide range of graphical depictions organized into chapters that for example read as follows in the table of contents: "Illustrated descriptions of this whole shrine site" (*pon'gung chŏn-tosŏl* 本宮全圖說); "Illustrated descriptions of the ritual utensils for the reception of the ancestral tablet and the image of the deceased" (*pongan ŭimul tosŏl* 奉安儀物圖說); "Illustrated descriptions of seals and cabinets" (*injang tosŏl* 印欌圖說); "Illustrated descriptions of how to set up food offerings" (*sŏlch'an tosŏl* 設饌圖說); and, "Illustrated descriptions of ritual utensils" (*chegi tosŏl* 祭器圖說). These examples already provide a glimpse into the abundance of information that the *ŭigwe* contain. Not only can we find objects that were used in the rituals performed at the site; the *ŭigwe* also provide evidence that certain objects were stored and displayed on-site that were not part of traditional Confucian ancestral rites, but in this context had a very different, personal meaning.

Two wooden cabinets with four shelves each were produced for the purpose of displaying these artefacts not in storage but directly in the main hall of the shrine (*chŏngdang* 正當), specifically referred to as a "seal cabinet" (*injang* 印欌) when to the left of the ancestral tablet and as a "book cabinet" (*ch'aekchang* 冊欌) when to the right thereof. The seal cabinet contained four jade seals: "the seal of the royal crown prince" (*wangseja in* 王世子印), which was used for the proclamation of the crown prince in 1736; "the seal of Crown Prince Sado" (*Sado seja-ji in* 思悼世子之印), which was used by Yŏngjo after the death of his son for the respective edict; "the seal of Crown Prince Sado Changhŏn" (*Sado Changhŏn seja-ji in* 思悼莊獻世子之印), which was used by Chŏngjo when he bestowed upon his father a new posthumous name in 1776; and, "the seal of Sado Changhŏn, Ribbon-Bound Virtue and Heartfelt Celebration" (*Sado sudŏk ton'gŏng Changhŏn-ji in* 思悼綏德敦慶莊獻世子之印), which was made when Chŏngjo bestowed two two-character additional celebratory names on his father on the occasion of the birth of his first son. This was custom for crown princes, however.

The book cabinet on the other side contained writings central to the memory of Changhŏn. On the first shelf was put the scroll with the edict of the proclamation of the crown prince (*kyomyŏngch'uk* 教命軸) from 1736. A wooden storage box for the scroll, decorated with detailed ornamentation of flowers and phoenixes, was set on the second shelf meanwhile. The third shelf contained the so-called bamboo investiture book (*ch'aekbong chukch'aek* 冊封竹冊), customarily made of bamboo slips. According to tradition the king in these books stated the reasons for his decision, and in the end requested the respective person to accept the title offered to him or her. Finally, another decorated wooden box for the investiture book was also

hosted in the cabinet. The *ŭigwe* further suggests that Chŏngjo added a bamboo-slip book written by himself when he renamed his father "Changhŏn" (*Kyŏngmogung ŭigwe*: 25–38). All objects were thus intimately entangled with Changhŏn's life, death, and official memory coined by his son.

The *ŭigwe* on the original construction of Changhŏn's tomb and shrine seem, as well as his funeral, to be silent about these objects; so are the *sillok*. Since he had been reinstated after his death, Sado received the funeral of a crown prince — proven not least by the records and the colorful "depictions of the ceremonial order of groups" (*panch'ado* 班次圖) in the *ŭigwe* (*Sado seja yejang togam ŭigwe*: 1st book, 217–242). They show the long procession together with all the elements proper for the occasion.

However, nothing can be found in the *sillok* that suggests that Yŏngjo ever visited the shrine again. He seems to have sent his grandson, later King Chŏngjo, from time to time to do so, but avoided going himself (*Yŏngjo sillok*: 41st year, 9th month, 26th day, 1st entry). Chŏngjo — who had witnessed the death of his father as a boy — thus was accustomed to visit the shrine and uphold the memory of his father as well as of events. The objects displayed now, however, were mostly private memory at a public site thereof. The shrine was visible to the public from the outside; it was entered frequently by the king together with his sometimes more, sometimes less in number entourage members — for example officials or relatives, and certainly never completely alone. But entrance to the main hall was restricted only to him. Though its doors were open and the people accompanying him were able to look inside, Chŏngjo might have been the only one overseeing the complete interior of the hall and be able to evoke memories by means of the displayed memorabilia.

The rites and related processions, however, were observable by a wider public. That particularly included officialdom, as owners of political power. Their participation not only in the occasional visits to the shrine but in the whole process of the elevation of Changhŏn made them actors in the construction and continuation of a specific memory. This was even more the case for the opponents of Chŏngjo's politics of remembrance. While Yŏngjo managed to calm the fierce factionalism within the scholar-official clans, particularly among the *yangban*, two new factions developed over the events of Sado's death — ones that cut across the old factional frontlines.[26] In general, the so-called Intransigents (*pyŏkp'a* 僻派), mostly members of the Old Doctrine faction, comprised officials who opposed the crown prince and his actions and were sympathetic to the decision of Yŏngjo. On the other hand, the so-called Expedients (*sip'a* 時派), in general members of the Southerners faction, felt

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26 In simplified terms, two factions were of importance in that period. The Old Doctrine faction (*noron* 老論), generally strictly conservative, held most of the high offices and had maintained power from the late seventeenth century onward despite Yŏngjo's policy of impartiality. The Southerners faction (*namin* 南人), relatively progressive, had retreated to the countryside after the lost power struggle and only occupied middle and minor positions in the bureaucracy. For a more detailed account, see for example Setton (1992).

sympathetic toward the crown prince, opposed the decision of the king, and mostly came from the *namin* faction. [27] They first were mentioned under these denominations in two memorials of 1788, just after Chŏngjo nominated one official from each of the major factions to make up the three state councilors. [28] The factions' exact composition, however, is still under discussion, and it seems that membership was fluid and changed over time. In Chŏngjo's striving to amend the power structures in favor of his chosen policies, 1788 was a crucial year for his attempts to ameliorate the accompanying factional strife (Kim Paek-chol 2019).

The notorious factionalism was reason not only for concern regarding punishment of the Intransigents by Chŏngjo upon accession to the throne but also the basis for criticism of his politics vis-à-vis the memory of Changhŏn. They already had argued against his status as crown prince just in the way Yŏngjo had envisaged. However Chŏngjo punished only very few of his critics, even though he was forced to strip some of them of their titles posthumously or send them into exile regardless of factional affiliation.

One of the most prominent cases might have been the punishment of Hong Inhan 洪麟漢 (1722–1776), the brother of his maternal grandfather Hong Ponghan 洪鳳漢 (1773–1778). While the Hong family positioned itself as supporter of Sado, only Hong Inhan took the side of the Intransigents. Nevertheless, he held the highest offices until Yŏngjo declared his grandson crown prince in 1775. Upon his critique of the decision and the legitimacy of the crown prince, Hong Inhan was expelled from office in the same year, exiled, and later put to death in 1776 after Chŏngjo's ascension to the throne (Cho 2009; *Yŏngjo sillok*, 51st year, 11th month, 20th day (1775), 1st entry; *Yŏngjo sillok*, 51st year, 12th month, 6th day (1775), 3rd entry).

However, Chŏngjo's decisions did not lead to massive bloodshed — as had been the case so often before. To the contrary, he kept many of the critical officials in office and did not favor the Expedients — that is, he tried to continue and even extend his grandfather's policy of impartiality (*t'angp'yŏng* 蕩平) (Lovins 2019: 27f). But this did not lead to the disappearance of opposition. The famous "Joint Memorial of the Scholars of Kyŏngsang Province" might suffice at this point as an example (*Chŏngjo sillok*, 16th year, 4th month, 27rd day (1792), 5th entry). It was an answer to an earlier memorial by Yu Songhan 柳星漢 (1750–1794), an official of the censorate belonging to the Northerners faction. His memorial was formulated as advice on the shortcomings of Chŏngjo's studies, but was understood by a great number of scholars as disguised defamation and an accusation of amoral conduct in not following the examples of the Confucian principles represented by the ancient sages

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27 The terms "Intransigents" and "Expedients" are taken from Lovins (2019).

28 On the nomination, see: *Chŏngjo sillok*, 12th year, 2nd month, 11th day (1788), 5th entry. On the first appearance of the denominations *sip'a* and *pyokp'a*, see: *Chŏngjo sillok*, 12th year, 4th month, 23rd day (1788), 2nd entry.

Yao 堯 and Shun 舜 (*Chŏngjo sillok*, 16th year, 4th month, 18rd day (1792), 3rd entry).

The scholars managed to argue for Chŏngjo as the legitimate heir to Yŏngjo, and the righteousness of his memory of Sado, in light of the Confucian principle of "the mandate of heaven" while positioning themselves as proponents of this policy and at the same time framing Yu Songhan as an amoral traitor. Although they demanded his punishment and possible execution, the king did not abide and let him and his family live (Cho 2009). The memory of Changhŏn thus was not constructed by negotiation. He was remembered officially according to the private memory of Chŏngjo, who wished — but was unable — to elevate him to the same level as his adopted father Chinjong.

If Chŏngjo could not put his "two fathers" on the same level officially, he at least could gradually give Changhŏn increased attention and thereby a greater role in the cultural memory of Chosŏn. The next step in Chŏngjo's politics of memory consequently was to continue this construction of a collective memory. He had visited his father's tomb at least once or twice a year since his enthronement (Chung 2015: 370). In 1789, however, Yŏngu tomb became unfit for purpose to Changhŏn according to geomantic criteria. The officials in charge of the evaluation listed four points related to the actual state of the site as being in need of intense renovation down to unfavorable signs:

> Your official [Pak Myŏngwŏn (朴明源)], unfamiliar and without knowledge about matters of geomancy, being the same as blindness and deafness, would like to discuss about only what everybody can easily know and see: first, the grass turf is dried up and damaged, second, the [depiction of the] green-blue dragon is broken, third, at the backside supporting structure water is fiercely floating, fourth, the masonry on the back segment is not made worthy of heaven. In this regard, that it does not conform to geomancy, that its respective conditions are incomplete, and that the topographic conditions are corrupt and degrading is what the investigation has revealed. There is one further thing, and yet it is the most sorrowful for your subjects, and that is the existence of even poisonous snakes, they live inside the site and the vicinity, they squirm and writhe in large groups, even in the T-shaped shrine building and in the brickwork they spread into every crack, alas.

> 臣素昧堪輿, 便同聾瞽, 只以人人易知易見者論之。 一, 莎草枯損也。 二, 青龍穿鑿也。 三, 後托水勢之衝激也。 四, 後節築石之非天作也。 以此觀之, 則風氣之不順, 土性之不全, 地勢之污下, 推可知也。 有一於此, 尙爲臣民之至慟, 而況蛇虺之屬, 局內近處, 蟠結成群, 至於丁字閣瓦子, 張張罅欹.
> (*Chŏngjo sillok*: 13th year, 7th month, 11th day, 1st entry)

Consequently, the king decided to relocate the tomb from Mount Paebong in the north of modern Seoul to Mount Hwa south of the capital near the village of Suwŏn, a more favorable site. For this purpose the village even had to be relocated to a mountain further north of its original location on Mount Hwa, called Mount P'aldal (*Chŏngjo sillok*: 13th year, 7th month, 15th day, 1st entry). Taking this opportunity,

the tomb was renamed the "Royal Tomb of Clear Magnificence" (Hyŏllyungwŏn 顯 隆園). This relocation was nothing particularly unfamiliar, and entailed a great number of related events that were regulated in detail within the state rituals (Lee 2013: 87ff). It was meticulously documented in three different *ŭigwe* comprising ten books, indicating its importance: "*Ŭigwe* of the office for the relocation of Yŏngu tomb" (*Yŏnguwŏn ch'ŏnbong togam*); "*Ŭigwe* of the office for the site of Hyŏllyung tomb" (*Hyŏllyungwŏn wŏnso togam ŭigwe*); and, "*Ŭigwe* for the relocation to Hyŏllyung tomb" (*Hyŏllyungwŏn ch'ŏnwŏn ŭigwe*).

In contrast to the former events, the relocation was far more visible to a broader public beyond the confinements of the palace and the aristocratic officialdom. These still were the people most involved in the process but, unlike before, the relocation of the tomb needed more resources, spread to several locations outside the capital, and involved a greater number of people — for example local craftsmen who had to construct the new buildings and surroundings. Furthermore, the king frequently travelled to both locations to conduct the necessary rituals but also to observe the work in general. These travels made him far more visible to the common people than before. This must have been especially true for the factual relocation, since he travelled from the old to the new site together with the whole procession that carried the remains and artefacts with them; it took him altogether ten days.[29]

Eight-day festival and Hwasŏng fortress

After the relocation of his father's tomb to a more favorable location, the events most memorable for officials, aristocrats, and commoners alike followed in 1795. On the occasion of the 60th birthdays of both his father and his mother in the same year, together with the 20th anniversary of his own enthronement, Chŏngjo visited the new Hyŏllyung tomb together with the latter. This was the eight days of festivities — including the two-day-long procession from Seoul to Suwŏn — occurring within Hwasŏng fortress. The likewise new fortress that was just in the middle of its construction represents the second of these two parts that can be regarded as the culmination of Chŏngjo's project.

This was the first visit for Hyegyŏng after the relocation, whereas Chŏngjo had the habit of yearly visits that in general took him about two days to complete (Kim Kyoon-Tai 2008b: 54). This particular one, however, was to be combined with a series of additional events for both his entourage — consisting of more than 1,600 people, ranging from members of the royal family to civil and military officials, soldiers, musicians, and all sorts of servants — as well as for the common and lowborn people along the way, in Suwŏn, and in the vicinity. A special temporary planning office had therefore been installed about one year before the actual event, being well-funded and staffed by several high-ranking officials.

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29 For a more detailed account of the transfer from Yŏngu tomb to Hyŏllyung tomb, see Lee (2013: 103–106).

Alongside the visit to the tomb, where a number of ancestral rites were performed by the king and his mother, other carefully orchestrated events took place in the temporary palace too. According to the schedule provided in the records, Chŏngjo on the day of his arrival in Suwŏn visited the Confucius temple, inspected the royal special military unit that he had created only in 1793 called the "Robust and Brave Garrison" (*changyongyŏng* 壯勇營), and held special examinations for civil and military posts (*pyŏlsi* 別試). On the fourth day, he visited Hyŏllyung tomb together with his mother and held military maneuvers at the fortress. The same day saw birthday festivities for Hyegyŏng; a great number of the illustrated descriptions in the *ŭigwe* are devoted to this special occasion.

The event itself, together with all preparations, are documented in the "*Ŭigwe* for the organization of the procession to the royal tomb in the year *ŭlmyo*" (*Wŏnhaeng ŭlmyo chŏngni ŭigwe*). The parallels to the events around his father's death are fairly obvious. His eight days of suffering in the rice chest are represented by the eight days of the whole festival, turning suffering into triumph. Additionally, the *ŭigwe* is comprised of eight books, the first of which contains 49 pages of *tosŏl* 圖說 together with 63 pages of *panch'ado*. Although it is only printed in black ink without color, it is regarded as one of the most magnificent of the existing *ŭigwe*. It was the first of its kind printed with movable metal types specifically cast for this occasion. It was printed in great numbers, the exact quantity of which unfortunately is unknown, and distributed to officials who participated in the events (Han 2005: 432f). It can therefore be regarded as one of the most important written mediums encapsulating the memory of Changhŏn.

The *ŭigwe* as a medium of memory was aimed at the higher stratum of society, and the scholar-officials were fully aware of the ideological meaning behind the festivities. However some of the events also reached a broader range of people, intentionally including not only high-ranking officials but also commoners and the lower social classes, and furthermore contributed to the development of a specific memory of the proceedings. This was first of all due to the overall scope of the eight-day event. All participants, together with their 800 horses and several palanquins carried by great numbers of servants, moved slowly along the road in a long, colorful line, while musicians played their instruments and the soldiers surely shouted commands every now and then.

According to the records, numerous people were watching the king and his entourage moving by, cheering and waving along the roadside. This becomes most vivid in the pictures in the *ŭigwe*, as well as in the famous eight-panel folding screen that depicts eight central scenes of the complete event.[30] Generally, crowds of spectators — many of whom he had chats and talks with — were a common scene during

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30 Unfortunately, the author was not able to obtain the copyright for showing the screen in this article. It is designated as National Treasure No. 1430 and presented online by the Cultural Heritage Administration: http://english.cha.go.kr.

Chŏngjo's frequent travels, information on which seems to have spread rapidly among the people (Yi Tae-jin 2007: 210f). Around noon on the first day, the procession had to cross the River Han. For this purpose a pontoon bridge had been built shortly before, which is supposed to have been the first and maybe only one of its kind of that length hitherto, and so it must have attracted many curious onlookers (Han 2005: 411).[31]

While most of the ancestral rites, further rituals, and festivities were only accessible to selected participants, the procession to the fortress as well as those journeys from the fortress to the tomb some kilometers to the south of it were visible to the general public. A specific event that took up the whole of the sixth day broke with rigid boundaries and reached out to the people: "the feeding of the poor," and general feasts for the population of Suwŏn besides. The king distributed rice, the main currency of the time, and other staples to almost 5,000 poor people together with additional porridge for the starving — with whom he shared a meal. According to the chapter "Participation in banquets with the elderly" (ch'amyŏn noin 參宴老人) in the ŭigwe, the king also met with several groups of elderly people from nearby, being in their 60s to 80s and altogether 384 people. He provided them with rice and alcohol, took meals with them, and held discussions (Wŏnhaeng ŭlmyo chŏngni ŭigwe: book 5).

These charitable acts for the elderly and the poor did not stop with the end of the event. As Kim Moonsik (Kim Moonsik 2008b: 66–69) points out, after the court returned to the capital the surplus of the planning office's budget was mostly handed down to the provinces and the peasants for seeds and food. While this was not uncommon in general, it was a particular practice for the king's visits to the tombs of his direct ancestors and former kings. However, Changhŏn was neither of those. Given the otherwise strict observance of the ritual canon, Chŏngjo in this way communicated his message and constructed a memory of him as a son of a king — and consequently also a new memory of his biological father. The scholar-officials were aware of these nuances in the ritual code, whereas the general public might just have accepted and welcomed it as Chŏngjo's established "politics by consensus between king and people" (Kim and Macrae 2019: 302).

Eventually, the construction of Hwasŏng fortress between 1794 and 1796 is the second part of the culmination of Chŏngjo's project for the remembrance of his father. It was built on the site of Suwŏn, and the village was integrated within the structure's walls. The temporary palace that hosted the court for the 60th birthday events of Chŏngjo's parents was built at the same time. The construction of the fortress can be regarded as singularly special in regard to diverse matters, describing which would exceed the scope of this article however.[32] As for Hwasŏng fortress

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31 Only two entries from the time of King Sejong (1397–1450, r. 1418–1450) speak of a "pontoon bridge" (chugyo 舟橋) in a report on things worth applying by the envoy Pak Sesaeng 朴瑞生, who had recently been to Japan.

32 For a more detailed account, please refer to Choi Hong-kyu (2002) or Pölking (2017).

being part of the culture of memory, as recorded in the "*Ŭigwe* for the construction of Hwasŏng fortress" (*Hwasŏng sŏngyŏk ŭigwe*), two aspects shall suffice to support the article's argument.

First, the planning and construction of the fortress were unique in that the king integrated therein traditional knowledge concerning building such a structure, improvements in design that were discussed after the Japanese invasions in the late sixteenth century, and, most strikingly, foreign ideas based on Western knowledge imported from China. This deviation from reliance on traditional knowledge alone is worth mentioning for two reasons. On the one side, it had a profound impact on the strict adherence to tradition — meaning the Confucian ideological framework. The latter had already been brought under scrutiny by Chŏngjo's political approach of impartiality, which also included the installation of the royal library Kyujanggak 奎章閣 and the integration of progressive officials who were open-minded about change — some to the extent of supporting reform and new knowledge in their attempt to overcome the shortcomings and backwardness of Korean society and politics.[33]

To this end they proposed an alternative reading of the Confucian classics that allowed them to posit reforms and to accept ideas from China — at the time regarded as being ruled by barbarians, namely the Manchu.[34] The integration not only of new knowledge but also of new actors from the Southerners faction strengthened support for the king's project, and thereby his reading of his father's life history. This became vividly clear in the joint memorial of scholars from the Southerners faction in 1792. Signed by more than 10,000 scholars, it ultimately supported Chŏngjo in his policy, giving him leverage and power to stretch the ideological limits of his kingship (Cho 2009).

Second, the application of new ideas was concretely visible in the architecture of Hwasŏng fortress — as can be seen in the very detailed *tosŏl* found in the *ŭigwe*. The fortress walls were made of brick instead of the customary stone. Brick construction was not unknown to Korea, but had never been used to this degree before. The idea to use bricks for fortress walls came from China, and was promoted by *sirhak* scholars — some of whom were very close to Chŏngjo, to the extent of being personal friends. Thus the lower parts of the walls generally were made from stone while the upper ones were made from bricks, thereby combining the two building techniques. Furthermore, new types of cranes and pulleys were constructed that were hitherto unknown to Korea and originated from Chinese sources. Manuals for their construction and usage were included in the *ŭigwe*, and they must have been something to marvel at for citizens and the craftsmen involved — who were called to the construction site from all over the country.

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33 For a condensed overview on the Kyujanggak, please refer to Yi Tae-jin (2007: 212–219).

34 These scholars' approach to Confucian ideology is known as "practical learning" (*sirhak* 實學), a term attributed to it only in the twentieth century. For a closer reading, see Kalton (1975) or Pak (2019).

The construction was essentially finished after two and a half years instead of the predicted ten. Although the exact reasons for that are not ultimately clear, it is obvious that the construction itself must have been of enormous size and of an intensity previously unknown (Kim Kyoon-Tai 2008a: 142ff). Furthermore huge festivities (*naksŏngyŏn* 落成宴) marked the end of the construction phase, ones including both officials as well as the general population. They were not only able to take part in the feast but were also entertained with music and dance. But especially the night drills of the military units who were training torch signs and doing other practices with torches, lanterns, and fireworks must have been a spectacular sight to behold. The *ŭigwe* only give brief textual accounts of the different practices and of the officials who reported on them to the king:

> "Regarding the practices with torches, the minister for military affairs kneeled [before the king] and began to make his report."

> "演炬兵曹判書跪啓稟演炬." (*Hwasŏng sŏngyŏk ŭigwe*: 2nd book, sub-chapter
> "Ways of military training" (*chosik* 操式)).

The king, however, seems to have been very pleased not only with the drills and the respective military commanders but also with the population at large, so much so that he exempted them from a burdensome grain tax for a year.

> "For this year, the residents inside and outside the fortress shall in regard to the *hyang* tax for the military and the *huan* tax for famine relief especially be exempt from the *mo* grain tax, so that it may assist them in their hopes and good fortunes."

> "[…] 城內外居民當年餉與還特立除耗以副渠輩望幸之情 […]." (*Ilsŏngnok*:
> 21st year (1797), 1st month, 29th day).

While there is no further qualification in the *ŭigwe*, the illustrations are more revealing.[35] First of all, that of the fortress spans two pages and gives a bird's-eye view of the whole site together with topographic characteristics and the complete wall — including all towers and gates in detail, not as mere dummies. Furthermore the village of Suwŏn, more resembling a small city, as well as the palace are depicted in great detail, together with the paddy fields and further scenic features both inside and outside the fortress walls. Soldiers are lined up on the walls holding lit torches in their hands. Even a huge firework display is depicted. In sum, the illustration vividly shows the grandeur of the whole fortress; it gives an almost realistic impression of what the scenery during the practices might have looked like, and what impression it must have made on the common people. One can assume that this must have been a memory that was to last for a long time, deeply imbedded in the individual ones of the people. That memory would also have been connected to both the fortress as the guardian of the city and to the Hyŏllyung tomb of Changhŏn, as

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35 See *Hwasŏng sŏngyŏk ŭigwe*: first book, 185f. The illustration is titled "Practices with torches" (*yŏn'gŏ* 演炬).

well as to the occasion of the finishing of its construction — thus being two sites of memory amalgamated into one single point in time and space.

Findings and Remarks

Whether Chŏngjo from the beginning of his reign had an elaborate plan in mind to form the collective memory of his father by constructing the culture of memory in the way he did is not clear. The article uses the term "project" to communicate the coherent efforts to elevate the status of Sado to that of Chinjong, if not to that of the former king Yŏngjo, in both respects as father and predecessor, and to construct the collective memories of him accordingly. Hyegyŏng and other sources provide us with the information that Chŏngjo had planned to retire to Hwasŏng fortress in 1804 and abdicate to his son, who then would be able to officially exonerate Changhŏn without any alleged bias (Lovins 2019: 117f).[36] However Chŏngjo died in 1800, thus being unable to realize his vision. In this regard, the possibly second-to-last step in our historical retrospect is the construction of Hwasŏng fortress and the eight-day festival in 1795.

Nevertheless, Chŏngjo managed to continuously elevate Sado's status from the first day of his reign by changing his posthumous name and amending his shrine and tomb too. He then relocated the latter to a more favorable site, again giving it an even more honorary title. On the occasion of the 60th birthdays of his parents, Chŏngjo organized the most splendid procession in Chosŏn history known to us, certainly to his contemporaries. Eventually, Hwasŏng fortress as the guardian of the city was built — including a palace that was equipped with all the facilities necessary for an actual main palace in a capital.

These steps and the evolving accompanying policies were geared toward specific social and political groups. The *yangban* scholar-officials and other literati obviously were addressed not only by Chŏngjo's actions but maybe even more so by the records of these events. The efforts of Chŏngjo to extend the limits of Confucian ideology and tradition were visible to them not only in the manifestation through actual sites of memory, but also by the fact that they were invested with specific meaning through the record-keeping and its high esteem in Chosŏn practice. The *ŭigwe* are of prominence in this regard, since they represent a medium oscillating between mere documentation and being part of a ritual in themselves. Their often magnificent style, specifically obvious in the *ŭigwe* connected to Changhŏn, elevates them above the other, simply textual documents.

Furthermore, the process of their publication — edited directly after the respective event, printed and colorized, always connected to the legitimation of the throne, and often published in many copies that were presented to meritorious subjects — defines them as a medium for the perpetuation of a specific memory of these events

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36 Following Lovins, see also Kim Haboush (1996: 164, 205).

within the Korean culture of printing — that is, the canonizing of knowledge (Vermeersch 2019: 214). This was completely in line with the cult-like status of the book in Korea, either as private or state publication (Walraven 2007: 257ff). They thus provide a fixed point for a collective memory, and thereby for the identity creation of their target group. Such a memory is continuously updated and shared by the individuals involved, and combines ritual (in the legitimation sense) with what Stephan Feuchtwang (2010: 287ff) analyzes as "commemorative rites." In that, the memory of Changhŏn marks a specific historical event — but turns its interpretation from however the fact had been into one that was based on the needs of Chŏngjo's present as the reigning king. Manifested in the objectivations of sites of memory, it becomes history, functional memory, and the focal point for both the present and future.

However, many of the events analyzed above were visible to the public as well. The provision of grain, the meetings of the king with the elderly, the construction of the different sites, the processions (above all the one in 1795), the spectacles and fireworks: all these events were not only mere entertainment but intimately entangled with the commemoration of Changhŏn too. This entanglement might not have been very clear to the general public, as most Koreans were illiterate or simply unaware of the historical circumstances behind the events. But they did connect the king with his subjects, and thereby provided him legitimacy; this in turn reflected on the legitimacy of his construction of a specific culture of memory too. Furthermore, Chŏngjo was very keen to meet with people outside the palace during his frequent visits to the shrines and tombs of former kings and queens. He was not a distant king unknown to the people, but connected to them and their lives in a way more personal than any of his predecessors had done (Yi Tae-jin 2007: 208–212). The construction of sites of memory of Changhŏn and the visibility to his subjects thus was legitimizing of him both personally and professionally.

In examining these events, however, we can see how he achieved the goal of restoring the authority of his father while at the same time staying within the confinements of Confucian filial piety and Chosŏn law regarding his obligations to his adopted father. Neither did he bestow upon Changhŏn a rank higher than that of Chinjong nor did he elevate the shrine or tomb of the former to the same level as that of the latter. Chŏngjo managed to construct the remembrance of his father by means of establishing sites of memory within the Chosŏn culture of memory that conveyed the intended meaning, and that in the end seemed to have outweighed the importance of his adopted father.

How can the extent or effect of Chŏngjo's efforts ultimately be measured? While this is also a general question of concern to Memory Studies, one proxy might suffice at this point: diachronic sustainability. It will, however, have to be one analyzed in detail in future research. On the one hand, the memory of Crown Prince Changhŏn constructed by Chŏngjo lasted until the end of the nineteenth century. Research on the political consequences of Chŏngjo's early death has shown that a great number

of his close friends and officials, most of all members of the Expedients faction, were purged, sent into exile, or sentenced to death when the Intransigents faction seized power.[37]

However nothing of the memory of Changhŏn was reversed herewith, and while the official records of the nineteenth century are silent on him he was regardless even elevated to Emperor in 1899 and his tomb termed "Yungnŭng" 隆陵 — before this type of memory became obsolete in 1910 (Shin 2017: 280). On the other hand, as mentioned at the outset, the memory of Crown Prince Sado emerging in 1776 fell into oblivion over time, and was not to be part of functional Korean collective memory essentially until its revival in modern popular culture. The reenactment of the 1795 procession also fits into this development of creating an official narrative of the advanced Korean politics, society, and culture of the eighteenth century according to the needs of the present.

Glossary

ch'aekchang	冊欌
changyongyŏng	壯勇營
cho	祖
chong	宗
chŏngdang	正當
Chongmyo	宗廟
chonho	尊號
chugyo	舟橋
Hyŏllyungwŏn	顯隆園
injang	印欌
kung	宮
kungwŏnje	宮園制
Kyŏngmogung	宮
myo	墓
myo	廟
naksŏngyŏng	落成宴
namin	南人
noron	老論
nŭngmyo	陵墓

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37 For the political turmoil, persecution of Christians, and the period of child kings dominated by their queen's families, please refer to Baker et al. (2017), particularly to part 1.

panch'ado	班次圖
pyŏkp'a	僻派
pyŏlsi	別試
siho	諡號
sillok	實錄
sip'a	時派
sirhak	實學
Subonggwan	守奉官
t'ang'pyŏng	蕩平
Taehan Cheguk	大韓帝國
tosŏl	圖說
ŭigwe	儀軌
wŏn	園
yangban	兩班

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Refereed article

The Politics of Remembrance and the Remembrance of Politics in Yisang's Poetry

Marion Eggert

Abstract: Yisang (1910–1937), one of the most renowned and best-studied poets of Korea's colonial period, is usually remembered as a bohemian, as an intoxicated master of modernist language games. But a close reading of the poetologically charged poems with which Yisang introduced himself to his audience as a Korean-language poet in July 1933 reveals that the engagement with Korean history and identity took center place in his own view of his poetical endeavors. However, different from more simple-minded nationalist authors, Yisang recognized the double-edged quality of "history" and "nation" — constituting both a treasure and a burden. It is argued that this complication of the "love for the nation" instigated by his poetry has been one of the reasons why the political layer of Yisang's poetry has kept being forgotten — notwithstanding repeated rediscoveries — in the scholarship in recent decades. More than anything, it is his distrust of a celebratory politics of remembrance that makes a celebratory remembrance of Yisang's politics so difficult.

Keywords: politics of remembrance, Yisang, political implications in avantgarde poetry, forgetfulness in scholarship

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Introduction

"Politics of Remembrance" is a field of inquiry most often surveyed in terms of space and visual culture" monuments, parks, museums, shows. In the textual arena, emphasis is mostly placed on school textbooks. There is probably no particular need to argue for the importance of including textual studies, especially of the literary arts, among the objects of inquiry of the politics of remembrance; however, practice of this seems to be lagging behind. One reason for this may lie in the lack of specificity in the use of texts for remembrance politics: Since writing is by and large a mnemotechnic practice, each and every text may be said to in some way contribute to sorting out what may be forgotten and what is to be remembered — and if the latter, in which way.

While architecture and parks can be created for purely utilitarian purposes, thus making it possible to single out those items that are specifically meant to manipulate collective memory, the latter is far more difficult when it comes to literary texts. A politics of remembrance approach to such texts should therefore be seen not as a tool for identifying those that "treat" or incorporate a politics of remembrance, but as a method that emphasizes a specific layer of significance common to all literary texts — in the same way as, for example, a Gender Studies approach, the relevance of which does not hinge on whether a text explicitly addresses gender issues. However, as can also be seen from the precedent of Gender Studies, as long as this specific approach has not yet been established as a common feature of the interpretive toolbox, awareness of this layer of texts needs to be heightened by pointing out the topicality of cultural memory in those where this element has tended to be overlooked. This is what the present essay attempts to do with the poetry of an author who specifically lends himself to this endeavor, since the political dimension of his works may be said to be in (constant) need of (re)discovery.

Yisang scholarship: A brief history of forgetfulness

The colonial-era poet Yisang[1] (1910–1937) has long been regarded as an apolitical author. To this day, he is seen as the prototype of the avant-gardist in Korean literary history — as devoted to a rather hermetic brand of modernism, to experimentation with visual effects and sophisticated but self-referential language games. In a tradition of literary historiography that tends to subsume authors under the categories of either "engaged" or "pure" literature, Yisang is usually understood to fall on the far end of the latter side of the spectrum. Chris Hanscom's (2013) pathbreaking book *The Real Modern* has been of great help in breaking apart this ossified dichotomy

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[1] Yisang was the poet's self-chosen nom de plume (his "real" name being Kim Haegyŏng). Since "Yisang" amply puns on a number of words in the Korean language pronounced *isang*, while at the same time purporting to be a proper name (surname Yi, given name Sang), I write the name as one word while retaining the transcription Yi for the first syllable (which would in regular words be simply transcribed as "i"). For a discussion of some of the homonyms of *isang* and their relationship to Yisang, see Eggert (2005: 5–6).

and seeing "modernist" colonial writers as intellectuals who engaged in their own way with the colonial reality, rather than outright ignoring it. However, scholarship on Yisang — whom Hanscom does not turn attention to — has yet to catch up with such more context-sensitive ways of reading the colonial modernists. To be sure, attempts have been made to free Yisang's literary work from the "modernist" frame of reception — in Western languages most notably by Henry Em (1995: 52–65), who in his dissertation provides a sufficiently persuasive "nationalist" reading of Yisang's most famous short story, "Wings" ("Nalgae").

The case Em is making for reading the story on an allegorical level, which — as he argues — must have been rather obvious for the poet's contemporaneous readers, renders Yisang a far less aloof, interiority-centered writer than his later-day reception would have him be. Others have followed suit in excavating the political dimension of further prose writings by the poet (Yi Chŏngsŏk 2009). Concerning his poetry, acknowledgement of its political implications can be found here and there (e.g. Yi Chŏngsŏk 2002; Gardner 2005). Kevin Smith offers a brief overview of the respective literature, and once more argues that we need to understand Yisang's work "not as a retreat from colonial history but as nuanced engagement with it" (2016: 135). However, it is still common among contemporary readers to refrain from allowing for a "meaning outside of the text" (Sone 2016: 196) in Yisang's poetry. And even readings that do reckon with a political dimension tend to discover it on an — I would argue — overly abstract level, given the common fascination with Yisang's experimental language use and, especially, with visuality as both motif and literary practice in his poetry (Shin 2002; Kim 2018).

New poetry for the nation: A reading of Yisang's earliest Korean-language poetry

In the following pages, I will offer a more straightforward reading of a few items of Yisang's poetic art. The main textual basis is the three poems published in the journal *Kat'ollik ch'ŏngnyŏn* ("Catholic youth") in July 1933, Yisang's earliest-published poetry in the Korean language. My claim is that engagement with the colonial situation of Korea is part and parcel of the poetics laid out in these poems, with which he introduced himself as a poet to an expressly Korean-language readership. Before that, he had published Japanese-language poetry in the periodical *Chōsen-to kenchiku* (*Korea and Architecture*) under his original name Kim Haegyŏng throughout the year 1931, and some other Japanese language poems under his pen name Yisang in 1932. Even earlier, in 1930, a Korean-language novel titled "12wŏl 12il" (*December 12*) had been serialized in the magazine *Chosŏn* (published by the Government General) under the name Yisang. The pieces were all there, so to speak,

yet the Korean-language poet Yisang emerged only with this first publication in
Kat'ollik ch'ŏngnyŏn.[2]

The three poems in question are titled "Konnamu" ("Flowering Tree"), "Irŏn si"
("Such a Poem") and "1933, 6, 1" respectively. I regard neither the fact that these
three poems were published together nor the order in which they appear in the
magazine as fortuitous, but take them as constituting a poetological statement in
three parts.[3] I first offer a translation and discussion of each of these poems.

> Flowering Tree
>
> In the middle of the field there is a flowering tree All around not a single flowering
> tree As if ardently longing for the flowering tree he has in mind the flowering tree
> is ardently in bloom. The flowering tree is not able to go to the flowering tree he
> has in mind Wildly I ran off   As if doing it for the sake of one flowering tree I
> really did such strange Yisang-like mimicry

As this translation emphasizes, the last sentence "audializes"[4] the poet's nom de
plume through a homonymous adjective; in Korean, the sentence reads: "*Na-nŭn
ch'am kŭrŏn isang-sŭrŏun sungnae-rŭl naeyŏsso.*" *Isang* is obviously used here as
an adjective meaning "strange, peculiar, odd." However rather than simply saying
"*isang-han sungnae*" ("a strange mimicry"), Yisang uses the verb *sŭrŏpta*, "be like,"
for affixing the adjective (*isang*) to the following noun (*sungnae*, i.e. *hyungnae*).
With *sŭrŏpta* being normally used to create adjectives from nouns, *isang-sŭrŏpta* is
thus clearly meant to echo Yisang's own name. The mimicry is both strange and
Yisang-like; and since Yisang is not so much a person (whose name would be Kim
Haegyŏng) but a poet, the "mimicry" must refer to literary practice — mimesis, but
a strange, Yisang-like, and thus an idiosyncratic one. It is apparent then that this
poem is, at least on one level, a poetological statement.

Mimesis — the poetic act — is done "for the sake of one flowering tree," a solitary
flowering tree that the reader has witnessed "ardently" but vainly in bloom. Trees
flower in order to exchange their genetic information; in the framework of botanical
knowledge of the early twentieth century, blooming was understood as their main or
even only mode of communication. However, the flowering of the tree is not just an
answer to nature's call: the tree flowers not "because of" but "as if" longing for its
beloved other. Its flowering is thus a mimesis of its own, the representation of a

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2   A good place to corroborate these dates is Kwŏn Yŏngmin (2009: 391f.). There we also learn that
     Kim Haegyŏng used the nickname "Yisang" already at the time of his graduation from technical high
     school in 1928 (Kwŏn 2009: 391). Shin Hyŏngch'ŏl seems to be oblivious to these facts when he
     argues that "Kim Haegyŏng changed into Yisang [only in 1932]" (2002: 346). However, I concur
     with Shin (2002: 347) in his emphasizing that the 1933 poems mark a new step in Yisang's self-
     understanding as a writer.
3   I lack access to the original publication in *Kat'ollik ch'ŏngnyŏn*. Trusting the editorship of Kwŏn
     Yŏngmin (2009) and Kim Chuhyŏn (2009), who both reprint the three poems in this order, I assume
     that this is also the order in which they appeared in the magazine.
4   That is, "makes audible, brings into an auditive structure" — analogous to what "visualize" refers to
     in relation to vision.

potential — and not necessarily actual — feeling; in other words, a creative act. Yet, the act remains futile: being isolated, the flowering tree exerts its creative and communicative potential to no avail.

At this point, the lyrical I comes into play. Running off wildly, the lyrical persona transposes the longing of the tree into action, stasis into movement, and, by extension, isolation into communication. Yet, again, this action is not what it seems: the lyrical I does not act for the sake of the tree but "as if" for the sake of the tree. The "running" of the lyrical I is not suited to actually breaking the isolation of the flowering tree. At the same time, "for the sake of one flowering tree" reveals that the last line does not speak of a "mimicry" of the flowering tree; it must be of something else that is not in the text. We are here referred to "a meaning outside of the text," and enter, perhaps, the realm of speculation.

If my paraphrasing of the poem is not off the mark, however, a number of indicators point in a certain direction. The poet speaks of an isolated entity that seeks a form of communication but is unable to achieve it, and of himself as acting intensely in order to set this communication in motion. While the flowering tree is described as still standing (present tense), the I's own actions are set in the past tense; and by *isang-sŭrŏun*, the poet points to his own poetic identity. What he refers to is, then, the poetic action he already took in the past, that is, the poems he had published in *Chōsen-to kenchiku* (not necessarily only those that he published under the pen name Yisang). These early poems, some of which later appeared as part of the famous *Ogamdo* series in the Korean language, mostly already partake of the experimental nature that disturbed so greatly the Korean readers who came across *Ogamdo* in their daily newspaper.[5]

Japanese society, however, was better attuned to modernist expression, and Yisang had certainly received some of his inspiration from Japanese-language publications. Whatever it is that "mimicry" points to exactly — the poetic process at large, or the appropriation of poetic forms derived from other language communities, or both —, Yisang seems to be explaining here to his Korean-language readers what drives him to write this kind of poetry: the urge to pull himself and something beyond himself (the flowering tree) out of isolation, the urge to communicate. He also lets the readers know that this communication is artistic ("as if") and that it is about something: the flowering tree has an "Other" in mind, and the mimicry is also a mimesis. In brief, the poem attests to the poet's aspiration to create poetic art abreast with the times — and to the fact that this is not meant as art for art's sake, but as the communication of "ardent" issues.

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5   Yisang published a series of his poems under the joint title *Ogamdo* (*Crow's Eye Perspective*) in *Chosŏn chungang ilbo* between July 24 and August 8, 1934. The series was intended to run to 30 poems, but had to be cut off after number 15 due to readers' adverse reactions.

Such a Poem

While digging the earth for the sake of construction a large rock was extracted
that upon closer look made me think I had seen it before The witness-bearers
carried it away on their shoulders and seemed to have cast it off somewhere so I
went looking for it at an extremely dangerous place at the side of a main road

That night soft rain fell so the rock must have been washed clean I went to see it
next day but what malicious turn of events it was nowhere to be found Some rock
must have come and carried it away on its back With this miserable thought in
mind I wrote the following composition.

> "You whom I have loved so much I will not forget you for all my life.
> While I know that I will never attain your love I will stubbornly think
> of you. Well then remain ever so pretty"

Some rock seemed to look at me blankly I wish to just tear to pieces such a poem

Again, discussion of this poem needs to start with an explanation of puns. First, it
must be noted that, like in "Flowering Tree," the poem's language is mostly pure
Korean, with only a few Sino-Korean words. In "Flowering Tree," the latter are all
written in Chinese characters (with the exception of *saenggak-hada*, "think of, long
for," which is Koreanized to the extent that its meaning is somewhat removed from
the literal Chinese sense). The same is *almost* true for this poem, with the exception
of one-and-a-half words. The half-word is the second part of the word translated here
as "miserable," *ch'ŏryang,* commonly written 凄涼 but here appearing as 悽량. Just
as the character used by Yisang is distinguished from the "correct" character only
by its radical ("heart" instead of "ice"), using the "heart"-*ch'ŏ* carries only a fine
nuance of semantic difference. Like the compound, 悽 also means "sad, miserable"
— perhaps with the added aspect of "disquieted." If the way of writing *ch'ŏryang* is
not a mistake that occurred in the printing process, I can think of only two reasons
for it: emphasizing the "heart-mind" as the locus of the "sadness" [6] or, more
plausibly, hinting at the extreme care with which characters are chosen — or omitted
— in this poem.

The one exceptional word, meanwhile, is found at the very beginning of the poem,
yŏksa, here translated as "construction" since this is the apparent meaning on the
semantic surface of the text. In ordinary speech, however, *yŏksa* would first be
understood as "history" until the context teaches one otherwise. Why not
disambiguate the word with the respective Chinese characters (*hanja*), given that
they are being used in the poem for completely unambiguous words like "dangerous"
(*wihŏm*)? Obviously, the ambiguity is intended. [7] The poem is consequently to be

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6   The "correct" characters for *ch'ŏryang*, connoting "coldness," would point to physicality rather than
    the intellect as the origin of that emotion.

7   One may argue that the word is already disambiguated by its verbal use (*yŏksa-hada*, "doing
    construction"), which is not possible for "history." Yet with *yŏksa* being the first word of the poem,
    one's initial thought upon reading it would inevitably be of "history."

read with the subtext "history" in mind. And, indeed, such an understanding serves as a key that unlocks comprehension of the otherwise somewhat hermetic text.

The "rock" that is unearthed "in order to do history" (or the construction of history?) must be part of this history, an entity within this history — an entity that was once known ("I had seen it before"), but had by now become hidden from view. But before anything can be done with the rediscovered "rock" it is carried away by *mokto-tŭl*, usually understood by Yisang's interpreters as *mokto-kkun*, "pole-bearers" — again in line with the surface meaning of the text, even though the *-kkun* must be interpolated for the sake of smooth reading. *Mokto* alone, however, as a Sino-Korean word would mean "witness" (which is why I have translated it as "witness-bearers"). The witnesses to the excavation discard the object of discovery. They do so at a roadside that is characterized as the "extremely dangerous" side of a "main road." Why dangerous? We do not receive any explanation, so the reason must reside in what we know: the fact that the road is a main one. The object is there for everyone to see, and that is where the danger lies. Being so exposed, the "rock" is carried away by another "rock" — another entity in history. It is unavoidable by now to see an allegorical meaning in the process: Korean identity or nationhood carried off by another nation.

Bereft of the beautiful, sturdy, but hidden object that this Korean-ness was, what is the lyrical I — the witness among witnesses — to do? What the narrated I in the poem does is write a "composition" that sounds like the stereotypical letter penned by a rejected lover. Formulaic, melancholy, and languid, this "composition" is a testimony to resignation and thus earns only the "blank" look of the "rock." It will remain utterly inconsequential. This is why "such a poem" can only be torn to pieces.

If, as I assume, this poem is the second part of Yisang's self-introduction as a Korean-language poet, the poetological implications are rich and rather obvious. What Yisang is telling his readers is that he is as deeply concerned with Korean community, identity, and nationhood as anyone else. Be it conceived of as a flowering tree or as a beautiful rock (and there are of course differences between the two: the tree, I would submit, points more to the community aspect, the rock more to "hardened" identity factors), that which has been expropriated by the colonizer is to him an object of love, longing, and consideration. However, in his eyes, writing the expectable love letter to the nation is of no use. Yisang may well have had in mind the ubiquity of unnamed "lovers" (*nim*), easily deciphered as allegories of the nation in much Korean poetry of the 1920s, be it in the works of Kim Ŏk (1893–?), Kim Sowŏl (1902–1935), or Han Yongun (1879–1944). Stating once more what everyone knows, he seems to be saying, is stale and tasteless, as well as ineffective. In his eyes, the "tradition" of anticolonial Korean-language poetry that had emerged in the 1920s needed to be revamped.

1933, 6, 1

A man who has lived for some thirty years on top of a pair of scales (a certain scientist) a man who has counted off thirty thousand or more stars (likewise) a man who has had the brass to live as a human for seventy no for twenty-four years (I)

I have on this day inserted into my autobiography an autographed death announcement After this my body dwelled no longer in such a native place Because it was too difficult witnessing with my own eyes the confiscation of my own poems

The date providing the title for this poem has not been identified by the Yisang scholarship with any specific event in the poet's life, nor is it known as carrying any special significance in Korean history. Since the three poems were published just one month later, it is probable that this was the date of the composition of the poem — or perhaps even the date the manuscript was delivered to the editors of *Kat'ollik ch'ŏngnyŏn*. At any rate, readers must have assumed then as now that the date is intricately linked to Yisang's own creative process. It thus reinforces what is easily detected in this poem anyhow: that it contains a poetological message. Or more precisely: a declaration of a poetic turn.

As an "autographed death announcement," the poem announces the end of a persona that is described in the poem's first paragraph in three steps. Concerning this point, I fully concur with the interpretation offered by Shin (2002: 346f.) that the "scientist," and the "likewise" man, are identical to the final "I." Shin argues that the three words in parentheses can be read as one phrase: "A scientist [who is] also me" (2002: 346). Even without this interpretational device, the array of nominal phrases creates the impression of a movement toward the "I" that concludes the paragraph.[8]

What are the features of this discarded "I"? The "scientist" of the first phrase may point to Yisang's technical-scientific education, but the behavior itself does not connote scientific inquiry. Living "on top of a pair of scales" rather conjures up the image of a person performing a difficult balancing act (i.e. walking a tightrope), suspended in the air between scales or standards pointing in different directions. It is a life occupied with the avoidance of tipping the scales in a way that could make one lose one's footing.

Counting off the stars may signify a tedious, stupefying occupation, as Shin Hyŏngch'ŏl (2002: 347) thinks. Even more pointedly, I would read this as referring

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8   Kwŏn Yŏngmin regards the two first phrases as references to famous scientists and associates the reference to scales with Newton's law on gravity and the star-counting with Galileo (Kwŏn 2009: 31). Given the somewhat negative nuance transmitted by "living on top of a pair of scales" and "counting off stars" this reading carries little plausibility for me. Pak Sangsun (2019: 373) identifies the star-counting scientist as Edward C. Pickering who, according to Pak, had published a catalogue of over 22,000 stars in 1924 (but note that Pickering died in 1919). Yisang may well have been aware of the star-cataloguing feat conducted at Harvard University. However, understanding of his poem does not hinge on the identity of any concrete scientist he may have had in mind.

to a loss of one's visions: the stars, signifiers of far-away dreams, are rendered objects of calculation and accounting. Finally, we have an I that at the age of twenty-four[9] is indistinguishable from an old man. The "I" to be discarded is characterized by extreme social circumspection or inhibition (living on top of the scales), by a loss of future-oriented visions, and by emaciation/emasculation.

Does all this point only to the bourgeois self that Yisang is about to part with, in order to devote himself to a bohemian, creative life (Shin 2002: 347)? There could be more to it. "Youth," it must be remembered, was one of the catchphrases of early twentieth-century Korean intellectuals hoping to safeguard the nation. "Youth" signified the ability to ingest and act upon new knowledge, and to turn the wheel of history in a new direction. The precariousness of "living on top of a pair of scales," the disillusionment of "counting off the stars," and lost vigor all remind us more of the specifically colonial rather than just of the bourgeois subject.

This more political reading of the first paragraph is reinforced by two elements in the second one. First, it is "such a native place" (*kŭrŏn kohyang*) from which the poet withdraws his body by putting his old "I" to rest. How would this fit in with the narrative of the poet freeing himself from the shackles of employee life? Rather, we may infer that "such a native place" is the home country that has been deprived of bold, assertive action, of space for motion (rather than living on top of a pair of scales), of visions for the future, and of the potential for self-development. Second, Yisang speaks of witnessing the "confiscation" (*ch'aap*) of his own poetry. The frame of reference here is not the inability to write poetry due to the boring duties of a clerk; rather, the term signifies a seizure by force of something that already exists, decidedly pointing to the realm of the political.

To the best of my knowledge, Yisang's poetry had never been censored at the point in time when this poem was published. If he speaks of witnessing "confiscation," he must be referring then to a reading of his poetry that goes against the grain of his own intended purposes, to a process of misappropriation. Considering that the poetry he had published up to this point was all in the Japanese language, it immediately suggests that what was at stake here was the language issue: that his poetry, because it was written in Japanese, was being understood as the utterance of a pacified, well-adapted colonial subject.[10] The "death announcement" concerning this well-behaved colonial subject can be read as a declaration of war on, or at least of independence from, colonial subjugation.[11]

Taken together, the three poems through which Yisang introduced himself as a Korean-language modernist poet unfurl a clearly legible poetic program. While

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9   Yisang's actual age in 1933 according to Korean reckoning.
10 Pak Sangsun (2019: 375) offers an interpretation akin to but not exactly similar to my own: he suggests that "confiscation" refers to the fact that *Chŏsen-to kenchiku* printed Yisang's poems under the rubric "Miscellanies," thus depriving them of their literary worth.
11 This is not to say that Yisang's earlier Japanese-language poetry is devoid of political connotations. On this point, see Kim Taeung (2017).

"Flowering Tree" explains the poetic impulse and motivation (as being engendered by the national predicament), the remaining two poems clarify against which options Yisang turned in his own poetic choices: "Such a Poem" dismisses the declarative nationalism rampant in the Korean-language lyrical scene as shallow, while "1933, 6, 1" deals with the danger of pure art's assimilation into the colonial system.

Yisang's poetry and the politics of remembrance/forgetfulness

It would be wrong, however, to read these poems as just a poetology *ex negativo*. They do contain a solid centerpiece: the rock unearthed while "doing construction/history." Whereas the love letter addressing the rock is ridiculed, the (somehow) loving recognition of the rock is not. Remembrance and creating memories of what it means to be Korean in a system set up to abolish precisely this memory is what is being pointed to by the poems, as the hard core of the poetic endeavor that they circumscribe. Needless to say, such remembrance is truly political in function.

Yet, the kind of memory work that Yisang is doing in his poetry is radically different from state-driven or organizational politics of remembrance. Rather than feeding into nationalism, it gnaws at the latter's foundations. The "history" or "identity" unearthed by Yisang is far removed from the heroic history or beatification of tradition that public politics of remembrance usually aim at. Through relentless introspection and acute observation, he commits to cultural memory unsettling questions rather than confident answers: questions, that is, about the relationship of the individual to a´the community into which they are born, to which they are obliged, which puts them in a position that they can neither flee from nor accept, and to which they are bound by both love and hatred. To him, "history" and "nation" are a liability at least as much as an object of loyalty.

This claim could easily be illustrated by one of the most famous specimens of Yisang's poetry, "Poem No. 2" of the *Ogamdo* series. Here the lyrical I finds itself engrossed by a never-ending series of fathers and forefathers that he can never escape, however hard he may try to "jump over" them.[12] Another example that readily comes to mind in the context of an inquiry into the politics of remembrance is the poem titled, fittingly, "Ordinary Commemoration" (*Pot'ong kinyŏm),* published in July 1934 (i.e. contemporaneously with the *Ogamdo* poems), which "commemorates" in its last line not any specific event but the fact itself of "the earth having come full circle" (*chigu-ŭi kongjŏn il chu*) — thus reducing "commemoration" to absurdity. I will give in full one example, however, that may be especially relevant because of its reverberations with "Such a Poem": the second-to-last poem of the (published) *Ogamdo* series.

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12 In this poem, the burdensomeness of history/tradition is obvious. For one among many interpretations that have pointed this out, even comparing Yisang's stance on this matter with Nietzsche's refusal of original sin, see Kim Ch'ohŭi (2006: 108).

Poem No. 14

In front of the old city wall is a meadow on the meadow I left my hat. On the city wall I tied my memory to a heavy stone and threw it off as far as I could. The sad sound of history running counter to the flight parabola. Suddenly I saw from above by the wall next to my hat a beggar standing like a village pole. The beggar under the wall is towering over me. Or he might be the specter of unified history. The depths of my hat that I had placed facing emptiness call for the desperate sky. All of a sudden the beggar lowers his shivering frame and throws a stone into my hat. I was already out of my mind. A map showing how my heart enters my skull appears before my eyes. A cold hand touches my forehead. The traces of the cold hand have been branded on my forehand and have never disappeared.

Again, "history" is intimately tied to the image of "stone."[13] Unlike the precious object that the stone of "Such a Poem" represented, though, the stone of "Poem No. 14" is a burden to be cast off. And yet, the stone can only fly a parabola, forging its way back to where it came from. The bohemian figure strolling on the city wall may free himself from his hat (formal attire), but historical memory cannot easily be discarded. Ghostlike, it continues to haunt the modern individual trying to carve out a destiny of their own (symbolized by the hat facing the infinite sky). The "beggar"-like community (note that the beggar resembles a *changsŭng*, here translated as "village pole" — the entrance marker to traditional Korean villages), which eerily creeps into the individual's sphere at any moment, does not cease to fill the empty space ideally reserved for the individual's own head (the hat) with the unasked-for burden of history. "Unified" history, however, can only serve to dissociate ("heart" entering "skull") the individual who is branded by it, beyond any choice of their own. The politics of remembrance in Yisang's poetry is, among other things, the commission to memory of the ardent need for a certain freedom to forget.

Closing remarks

Why has the political dimension of Yisang's writings so consistently been forgotten, overlooked, buried beneath mounds of ever-more sophisticated studies of his art; why have readings of Yisang privileged semiotics over semantics, creative drive over expressive drive, to such a degree that what he had to say all but disappeared behind how he said it?[14] There are two obvious answers, both of which seem to me

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13 It should be noted that the East Asian literary tradition is extremely rich in stone lore, ascribing to stones/rocks a communicative potency as well as an intimate relationship to both history and the numinous. See Eggert (1997) for an overview of the role of stones in Chinese mirabilia and travel literature. A study of stone lore in the same genres in the Korean literary tradition would yield similar findings.

14 Given my lack of expertise in the vast field of Yisang studies, I may well have overlooked important contributions. However recent English-language publications by more specialized scholars than myself, such as Sone (2016), indicate that my overall assessment may not be too far from the truth after all.

to apply. First, the politically and historically aware and expressive Yisang keeps being erased from memory since the image of the avant-garde, bohemian, modernist poet is needed so much in the writing of Korean literary history: so as to have a worthy ancestry ready for more contemporary "disengaged" literature (*sunsu munhak*), and in order to staff the respective pigeonhole in the literary history of colonial Korea.

Second, it may be less disquieting to marvel at Yisang's verbal and visual artistry than to listen to the agonies and paradoxes expressed by his poetical voice. The tribulations that his poetry exposes are especially those of colonial subjectivity, but not only so; they still haunt postcolonial society. What should national history mean to the modern individual? Is culture, is community, destiny? Are nationalism and the identification of erstwhile collaborators the best answers to the predicaments of colonial heritage in a globalized world?

Questions like these come to the fore when reading Yisang's poetry in ways that take his intellectual torments seriously. More than anything, his distrust of a celebratory politics of remembrance is what makes a celebratory remembrance of Yisang's politics so difficult. And yet, since what he has to say is still so relevant to contemporary society, his poetry cannot be simply forgotten. Like the "specter" in "Poem No. 14," the political expressiveness of Yisang's poetry will reappear only to be forgotten again, until one day the "stone" haunting his poems finally dissolves under close scrutiny.

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Refereed article

Contentious Memory Politics in South Korea: The Seoul National Cemetery

Hannes B. Mosler

Summary
This article explores the Seoul National Cemetery's (SNC) characteristics as a memory space that is used to reproduce the official state narrative of South Korea history. A place for mainly commemorating the dead of the Korean War, the SNC would be used to promote an anticommunist Cold War frame. Hence, it has been useful for conservative forces to maintain hegemony in the ideological discourse forming part of the "remembrance war" with progressives in South Korea's increasingly liberal and pluralistic society. This analysis sheds light on discrepancies regarding who and what are remembered, how they are remembered, and why they are remembered. These discrepancies are represented in the contradicting deeds of the dead commemorated at the site, tensions in the symbolic vocabulary and architectural design of the SNC, and in competing deeds of those who are buried there and at other cemeteries.

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Introduction

South Korea (henceforth Korea) is technically still at war, not only with North Korea but also with itself. After its transition to a formal democracy, a "remembrance war" (*kiŏkchŏnjaeng*; Lim 2019) gripped the country, one that has only intensified as the result of an increasingly liberalized society and successive liberal-progressive governments. The matter in dispute between progressives and conservatives is the "correct" interpretation of the past in determining the authoritative values and norms of Korea's politics, society, and economy in both the present and the future. The fierceness of the continuing hostilities between the polarized camps is due to conservatives being challenged in their traditional monopoly on historical interpretation, and thus ultimately their vested interests are at stake.

Owing to their roots in the authoritarian regimes of Presidents Rhee Syngman and Park Chung-hee, conservatives' remembrance bias has been fueled mainly by the focus on Cold War anticommunism, which is deeply engrained and reproduced in Korean society (see Chu 2017; Shin 2017; Shin and Burke 2008; Sunwoo 2014, 2018) — making it extremely resilient to progressive and common-sense challenges. After democratization, it was in particular under conservative governments that powerful actors (politicians, media figures, captains of industry, and activists) would translate this outdated narrative into reality.[1] In addition to the reproduction of the fear-mongering Cold War ideology in both old and new mass media (Mosler and Chang 2019), education curricula and school textbooks (Mosler 2014), as well as in academic and popular publications, artifacts such as the Constitution (Articles 3, 4, and 8) and the National Security Act (Kukkaboanbŏp) are often used to justify and thus support the conservative narrative (Mosler 2019).

National memorials are yet another bridgehead from which conservatives fight the trend toward "normalizing the abnormal." These have long served as framing *appareils idéologiques d'Etat* (Althusser 1970) that would help generate the one-dimensional narrative of the anticommunist state as constituting the core of Korean national identity. Among them, the Seoul National Cemetery (SNC, Kungnip Hyŏnch'ungwŏn) is one of the most representative cases because of its national importance, stemming from its founding history, centrality, and frequent referencing by influential politicians.

In the existing literature, the SNC's central role in Korea's remembrance war is investigated from various angles, including regarding its function as a memory space for the performance of cultural politics (Kim 2004), as a nodal point for historical education (Chŏng 2006; Han 2009), as a crucial source of nationalism (Podoler 2014, 2016), as a major stage for practicing a statist mortuary cult (Choi 2016; Ha 2013a), and as a site of political polarization (Ha 2013). Building on this rich groundwork, this investigation explores the SNC's characteristics as a central memory space that is used to reproduce the official state narrative of the country's

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1   For a general overview of some of these activities, see Doucette and Koo (2016).

history in order to shed light on its role in the contentious memory politics of the Republic of Korea. The article shows that while the centripetal forces that hitherto would bind the SNC's remembrance narrative to a narrow anticommunist core still exert a powerful influence, recently emerging challenges and changes indicate an incremental democratization of Korea's national memory landscape is now taking place.

The SNC as a collective memory site

Collective political memory

National cemeteries, like other national memorials, represent *lieux de memoire* (i.e. memory sites or spaces) in the material, symbolic, and functional senses of this phrase (Nora 1989: 18–19). The interplay of certain material places, symbolic objects, and sociopsychological activities produce special meanings in the "collective memory" (Halbwachs 1950). In other words, memory spaces are constituted by places where people can physically go, and communicate with each other about interpretations of the past by performing rituals — that while using symbols, such as cenotaphs and gravestones, to generate a certain narrative of collective history (Nora 1996: 14; Ha and Hyŏng 2013: 8). Thus, in addition to scripts, pictures, and landscapes, sites of memory also play important roles in generating collective memory (Assmann 2007: 59).

National cemeteries are artifacts that together with "institutionalized communication," such as speeches, recitations, and reflections, help keep alive the "cultural memory" of events in the past (Assmann 1988: 12). In this regard, in addition to the importance of the symbolic design of the infrastructure of national cemeteries, commemorative service rituals are choreographed — thus resembling educative theater, complete with stage scenery and a plausible storyline that is internalized by the performing actors as well as by the spectators. This "political cult of the dead" (Koselleck 2002: 317) depicts certain practices of relating to the dead in an instrumental way to exploit their symbolic capital for the social, economic, and political purposes of the living. Central to this powerful *mise-en-scène* is the blood with which the script was written and the bones on which the stage has been built. Because death is absolute, the departed serve as indisputable proof of what is enacted on the stage of the memory space of a cemetery.

National cemeteries are explicitly state-sanctioned cultural landscapes that serve as physical sites of collective memory in relation to the nation and the state. In other words, they serve as a means of generating a collective identity — wherein the state is referred to as the shell of the "imagined community" (Anderson 1983) of "the nation." Hence, national cemeteries can be conceptualized as "ideological state apparatuses" (Althusser 1970) — that is, as institutions that facilitate the interpellation of individuals into subjects of the nation-state by making them subjugate themselves to the norms, values, and beliefs inherent in its narrative (Ha

and Hyŏng 2013: 7–8) in a seductive process of identification with that nation (Kosellek 2002). In this way these memory sites function as nodal points in a network, ones that produce and reproduce the national hegemonic discourse. The narrative differs according to the dominance of "different social and political groups" (Koselleck 2002: 304; similar see Meyer 2008: 176–177). In other words, "[h]egemonial forces in society utilize memorialization to consolidate and legitimate their dominance, which makes memorials into an instrument of power and authority" (Azaryahu 1996: 46).

At the same time, the hegemonic discourse can also be challenged. Memory spaces or "mnemotopes" can be utilized as counternarratives (see Koselleck 2002: 289; McElya 2016; Assman and Shortt 2012: 3–5; Winter 2008: 64), and ideological state apparatuses can become sites of struggle (Althusser 1970). Such transformations can occur through alternative usages of existing memory sites or via the harnessing of alternative ones. The production of an alternative narrative of a memorial can be based on changes in values and beliefs, and it can be promoted by fissures or even by fault lines in that memorial's symbolic structure. Similarly, memorials that represent an alternative — if not competing — narrative may serve to challenge the existing hegemonic discourse.

The SNC

The national cemetery is located in Seoul's Tongjak district, south of the Han River in the foothills of Kwanak Mountain. It is one of the most central, representative, and frequented memorials in the country. More than 180,000 dead are commemorated at the SNC, around 54,000 of whom are interred there. Around 104,000 dead whose remains were never found are remembered by commemorative plates meanwhile. Some 7,000 people whose remains were found, but whose identities could not be confirmed, are buried on-site (SNC 2018: 106).

The number of people coming to the SNC to pay their respects has continued to increase, amounting to over three million visitors per year by now (SNC 2018: 92). In addition to regular commemoration ceremonies, which are mainly limited to heads of government agencies, of self-governing bodies, and of the military, there are several other occasions on which various visitors come to the SNC and pay their respects to the deceased. These include the commemoration of the establishment of a government agency or the inauguration of a new head of one, as well as days when foreign heads of government are in the capital on state visits. In addition, politicians often pay tribute at the SNC after they have been nominated for an important office or after their election to one such as governor, party floor leader, or party head.

Also, of course, private persons, families, and volunteer groups may visit the site to pay respect to their relatives on the occasion of a burial, on the anniversary of someone's death, or to honor the sacrifices of those buried there. Further visitors consist of various social groups and organizations that come to commemorate the establishment of a new entity, or the inauguration of a new head. Ceremonies and

resolution meetings of various vocational, social, and local groups and clubs are also held at the cemetery (see SNC 2018: 102–127). In addition, paying homage at the cemetery may be part of entering and graduating from educational (training) institutions, field trips, hands-on learning, or the volunteer work of trainees or students. Another occasion for visiting is for students and soldiers to establish the "right view" of the nation and foster patriotism.

Even company representatives, who pledge to ensure the harmony and unity of labor and management, use the site for honoring rituals too. Moreover, companies visit national cemeteries with new employees to make resolutions (Daejon National Cemetery 2019a). Thus, at the cemetery, paying tribute to the dead — who represent a certain identity of the nation or state — is not limited to high-ranking officials and the bereaved alone, but is commonly practiced on various occasions by a wide range of people as part of a number of different social functions and roles. What they all have in common by using the SNC for the ritual of paying respect to the nation's dead is gaining social and/or political capital, while at the same time contributing to the symbolic capital of the memory site itself too.

Like national cemeteries in other countries, the SNC, too, stands mainly for the nation's major war dead, and thus represents the symbolic holy grail of national identity and legitimacy. Because South Korea perceived and fought the Korean War (1950–1953) as one against communism and against North Korea, in the more than half a century since its establishment authoritarian ruling elites have continued to imbue the memory site with, and use it as a source of, anticommunist and anti-North Korean ideology. Despite the formal democratic transition at the end of the 1980s and three peaceful government turnovers, the dominance of the ideology of former regimes — as well as the conflicts between conservatives and progressives — still persist; they are manifest in the contestation over mnemotopes such as the SNC.

Two incidents that occurred at the SNC demonstrate the highly symbolic value of this memory space. In 1970, in an attempt to assassinate members of the Park Chung-hee government, North Korean infiltrators planted a bomb on the roof of the Memorial Gate (Hyŏnch'ungmun)[2] three days before the twentieth-anniversary commemoration of the beginning of the Korean War (*Tonga Ilbo* 1970). However the bomb exploded during installation, killing one of the North Koreans. If the terror attack had been successful, it would have had a twin impact: the bomb would have killed the core of the South Korean leadership, and it would have desecrated South Korea's most hallowed ground.

In 2005, 35 years after the incident, an official North Korea delegation visited the same place to pay respect as a result of the appeasement policy of President Kim Dae-jung, a progressive. The leader of the North Korean delegation stated that their visit was in honor of those who had sacrificed their lives for liberation, while not

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2   The Memorial Gate is one of the most important and central structures at the SNC, being where most of the events take place in which high-ranking officials participate. For more details on the architectural design, see below.

mentioning the fallen soldiers of the Korean War or others buried in the SNC (Kang and Chǒng 2005). This remarkable event prompted fierce protest by conservative forces who maintained that the SNC was a sanctuary of anticommunism (Ha 2013: 220–221), with them dismissing the visit as a mere "show" (*Chungang Ilbo* 2005). This second incident illustrates well how sensitively conservatives react to activities at the SNC that from their perspective challenge the site's innermost meaning (i.e. anticommunism) even at the cost of cautious attempts at rapprochement. Against this backdrop, the remainder of the article examines how the dominant narrative is reflected in the deeds of the dead and the architectural symbolism of the SNC, but also what tensions and contradictions can be found within the cemetery as well vis-à-vis other memory sites.

Estranged bedfellows — the different deeds of the dead

The most obvious contradictions concern the cemetery's inner tensions between the different deeds in life of the people who are buried in its grounds. The cemetery is neither purely military nor civilian; it includes the graves of both private individuals and of those who fell in combat or in the line of duty. Among them are independence fighters, patriots, and other persons of great national merit, some of whom collaborated with the Japanese occupiers and/or during the authoritarian regimes.[3] Moreover, former presidents of at least different — if not opposing — political camps are interred here too. Three different categories of the dead are commemorated at the SNC: those who fought against Japanese imperialism; those who fought against communism; and, those who led the country. Each of the groups will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Commemorating those who fought against Japanese imperialism

In 1900 Emperor Kojong built the "Altar for the Promotion of Loyalty" (Changch'ungdan) in the northeastern part of Seoul, on the slopes of Nam Mountain and specifically on the spot where the Namso outpost (*namsoyǒng*) of the Ŏyǒngch'ǒng ("special protector garrison of the king") had been located (Academy of Korean Studies 2020). The Changch'ungdan served as site to commemorate the soldiers (*mugwan*) who died fighting the Japanese assassins who killed Empress Myǒngsǒng in 1895. Subsequently other victims, including civil officials (*mun'gwan*) who had died in earlier violent conflicts with Japanese intruders (e.g. the Imo Incident 1882 and the Kapsin Coup 1884), were also enshrined here.[4] Thus, the Changch'ungdan was the prototype of a modern cemetery in Korea, one intended to "nationalize" political remembrance.

Memorial services were held every spring and autumn, but because of the increasing influence of the Japanese these events ceased in 1908. After the so-called Resident-

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3   On the matter of the historicization of collaboration with the Japanese, see de Ceuster (2001).
4   Soldiers who fought against the Tonghak Rebellion in 1894 were commemorated here.

General of Korea Itō Hirobumi was assassinated in 1909, the Japanese built a shrine to Itō on the grounds, and conducted mass memorial services to suppress Korean national identity and to instead induce identification with the Japanese Tennō.[5] Following the March First Independence Movement in 1919, the Japanese planted cherry trees and renamed the area "Changch'ung Park," changing it to a mere leisure facility to depoliticize the site. In 1932, a temple (Pangmunsa) was built on this site to again commemorate Itō, and five years later the memorial of the "Three Human Bullets" (Yukt'ansamyongsa) was added to the site to commemorate the Japanese soldiers who fell in the Shanghai Incident (*yī èrbā shìbiàn*). In 1939, the Japanese began to hold memorial services for Itō and other Japanese high-ranking officials (Yi PD 2019).[6]

After the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, the temple was destroyed and the Shilla Hotel built in its place. The ancillary buildings in the facility were destroyed during the Korean War, and only the "Commemoration Stone" of the former Changch'ungdan survived. However, as the number of soldiers who died during the course of the first year of the Korean War increased, the government gave orders to search for an appropriate site to build a larger military graveyard (*Yŏnhap Sinmun* 1950).[7] After the ceasefire agreement in 1953, the decision was finally taken to locate the new cemetery in Seoul's Tongjak area. The construction of the "National Armed Forces Cemetery" (Kukkunmyoji),[8] the SNC's first official name, exclusively for soldiers, military personnel, and their relatives began a year later.[9] In 1957, the law regulating the eligibility for interment in the military cemetery was amended to include civilians who had contributed greatly to the good of the nation (*kukkayugongja*). However the first civilian, Kim Chae-gǔn — an independence fighter during the Japanese occupation—, was not interred until 1964. A year later, the military cemetery's official name was changed to the "National Cemetery" (Kungnipmyoji).

In 1970, the "Graveyard for Patriots" (Aegukchisa Myoyŏk) was constructed, a designated area within the SNC where over 200 people's remains are buried — including those of soldiers in the "Righteous Army" (Ŭibyŏngdae), as well as of those who participated in other armed struggles against the Japanese occupation. Other patriots, most of whom lived during the time of the Japanese occupation, are also buried there. In 1975, the "Altar to Heirless Patriots" (Muhuson Yŏljedan) was constructed adjacent to the Graveyard for Patriots, where memorial tablets

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5   For a general account of the occupation policy regarding Shinto worship rituals in Korea, see Kawase (2017).

6   Among the participants were Koreans, such as Yi Kwang-su, Choe Rin, and Yun Tŏk-yŏng.

7   They were reinterred at the SNC.

8   While news reports and official statements often spoke of the National Armed Forces Cemetery, the official juristic name was the "Military Cemetery" (Kunmyoji).

9   More than 400 years before the cemetery was established in 1954, the compound was the graveyard of the royal tomb (*tongjaknŭng*) of Ch'angbin Anssi (1499–1549). She was the concubine of King Chungjong (1488–1544). She gave birth to Regent Tŏkhŭng (1530–1559) and King Sŏnjo (1552–1608) (see Chŏng 2017).

commemorate 131 individuals who died fighting for their country by taking up arms against the Japanese occupation. These patriots either left behind no descendants or their remains could not be found. In 1993, the area of the SNC dedicated to people who fought against the imperial occupation was extended to right above the Graveyard for Patriots. This section was constructed to serve as the "Graveyard for Historical Figures of the Korean Provisional Government" (Imsijŏngbuyoin Myoyŏk), where the remains of 14 high-ranking members of that government are now buried.[10] In addition renowned independence fighters, such as Cho So-ang, Kim Kyu-sik, Chŏng In-bo, and Ŏm Hang-sŏp, have graves at the SNC, even though they are actually buried in North Korea (Kim HK 2019). In addition, the remains of three foreigners are interred in a specially designated plot at the SNC. English-Canadian Doctor Frank Schofield joined the independence demonstrations on March 1, 1919, which he supported and documented in photographs. The Korean-Chinese (*hwagyo*) women buried here, Kang Hye-rim and Wi Si-p'ang, joined the South Korean forces during the war meanwhile.

However, despite the emphasis on the anti-Japanese struggle, also buried in the SNC are persons who were well-known collaborators with the occupiers. These include at least 37 persons who are listed in the *Dictionary of Pro-Japanese Persons* (Ch'inilinmyŏng Sajŏn), such as Kim Paek-il, Kim Hong-jun, Paek Nak-jun, Sin Ŭng-gyun, Sin T'ae-yŏng, Yi Ŭng-jun, and Yi Chong-ch'an (Han 2017).[11] Their interment here has continued to be a matter of controversy, and requests to remove their remains from the cemetery have been made by civil organizations such as the Heritage of Korean Independency (Kwangbokhoe) — though to no avail (Chŏn 2019). Independence fighter and former member of the Provisional Government Cho Kyŏng-han refused to be buried in the SNC because of the Japanese collaborators interred there, which led to his remains' reinterment in Hyochang Park (Hyoch'ang Kongwŏn) (Yi 1993; Pak 1994).

Commemorating those who fought against communism

The second type of dead buried in the SNC includes soldiers who fell during the Yŏsun Incident (1948); they were first buried at Changch'ungdan, and then later reinterred. They died fighting against other South Korean troops who refused the official dispatch order to the island of Cheju to suppress demonstrations against the new government's atrocities. Under the latter, led by strongman Rhee Syngman, they were labeled pro–North Korean communists who tried to subvert the state. Also, police officers are buried here who died in the line of duty during the Yŏsun Incident

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10 In August 1993 the remains of five high-ranking members of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea — Pak In-sik, Sin Kyu-sik, No Paek-rin, Kim In-jŏn, and An T'ae-guk — were reinterred here from the Foreigners' Cemetery in Shanghai (*wànguó gōngmù*). Details available online at: http://snmb.mil.kr/mbshome/mbs/snmb_m/subview.jsp?id=snmb_m_040102000000.

11 Of course, they were allowed to be buried here because of the deeds they performed for the country afterward, many of which were during the Korean War.

as well as after the Korean War. Their plots are close to the "Cenotaph for the Loyalty of Police Officers" (Kyŏngch'al Ch'unghont'ap), where an inscription commemorates those among them who "maintained public peace and order and protected the lives and property of the people, and gave their lives to defend the motherland from the communist aggression of the Korean War" (cited in Podoler 2014: 126) as way of cleansing the "stains of collaboration and authoritarianism" (Podoler 2014: 126).

The largest share (51 percent) of the graves at the SNC, however, are those of soldiers who fell during the Korean War (Seoul National Cemetery 2018: 106). Soon after its establishment, the graves of many fallen soldiers who had been buried in other places around the country were moved to the SNC (*Kyŏnghyang Sinmun* 1955). In 1963, the remains of the "Korean Student Volunteer Troops from Japan" (Chaeilhakto Ŭiyonggunyongsa) who died in the Korean War while participating in the Inchon Landing were reinterred at the SNC. The second-largest group of relocated corpses belonged to South Korean soldiers who had fought for the United States in the Vietnam War. Between 1964 and 1973 more than 300,000 South Korean troops were deployed to the Southeast Asian country; more than 10,000 would be injured, 5,000 killed, and later 4,650 would be interred at the SNC (Pak 2014). Another group of fallen soldiers buried on these grounds were members of the special forces who died in the operation to quell demonstrations in Kwangju in 1980. In total, 15 soldiers were buried in 1980 at the SNC (*Maeil Kyŏngje* 1980). In Kwangju, protesters were labeled "communists" who had been incited by the opposition politician Kim Dae-jung to overthrow the government, allegedly acting on the orders of North Korea (Tonga Ilbo 1980) — which is, of course, not true (see, for example, An 2015).

Although these perpetrators are buried in the SNC, those who opposed the injustices are also buried here. For example Kim O-rang, a military commander, in 1979 refused orders during the December 12 military coup by Chun Doo-hwan; he was consequently shot (Ko and Kim 2013; Ko NM 2017). Another example is police officer An Pyŏng-ha, who refused to open fire on demonstrators in Kwangju in 1980. He was taken into custody and tortured by the military secret police, because of which he suffered afterward, dying in 1988. In 2003, he was recognized as a person of merit in the "Kwangju Democratization Movement" (Kwangju minjuyugongja). He was interred in the SNC in 2005, and in 2006 he was recognized as a "person of national merit" (*kukkayugongja*) (Im 2018). Moreover, there has been a continuous debate about whether the two former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, who were convicted after the Kwangju massacre, are eligible to be interred in the SNC. Repeatedly, progressives have called for reform of the SNC Act to bar Chun and Roh from being buried there (Pak 2019), a stance that is apparently shared by large parts of the public (Yi 2019).

Regarding enemy soldiers, however, and in particular those from North Korea, there seems to be less of a disagreement over their exclusion. Enemy corpses are clearly

distinguished by not being interred in the cemetery, which is in line with the practice of most Western cemeteries — where enemy soldiers killed are usually buried separately, because the "construction of memorials takes place through political entities that by this very act define themselves against others" (Koselleck 2002: 314). There are certain prominent exceptions though. Arlington National Cemetery in the US is one of the most representative examples of not differentiating between friend and foe in death. Not only Confederate soldiers are buried here; even enemy combatants from World War Two are also interred in the country's most prestigious cemetery as well (McMorrow 2012). [12] In Korea, however, the line separating friend and foe is clearly drawn. The Cemetery for North Korean Soldiers (Pukhan'gun Myoji) is located on the outskirts of Seoul, near the city of P'aju (Kyonggi province). It was built and has been maintained by Korean authorities according to the Geneva Agreement, which prescribes that the bodies of enemy soldiers should be respected. The remains of more than 800 North Korean soldiers are buried here (No 2019).

The presidents' graves

The third category of graves are those of former presidents of the country: Rhee Syngman (1875–1965), Park Chung-hee (1917–1979), Kim Dae-jung (1924–2009), and Kim Young-sam (1927–2015). Rhee, who ruled the country in an authoritarian fashion after the establishment of the Republic in 1948 until he was eventually forced into exile in Hawaii in 1960, was the second civilian to be buried in the SNC's grounds, in 1965. The rationales for interring Rhee included his background as an independence fighter as well as his crucial contribution to establishing an anticommunist regime. Rhee was the first president to be buried in the SNC despite the disgrace of him having been ousted by the people in 1960 because of his dictatorial regime.

While there was a controversy regarding whether Rhee was eligible to be interred there (Tonga Ilbo 1965), eventually even Park — who incited military rebellion in 1961, which he justified on the grounds of doing away with the corrupt generation of politicians that in his view extended from the First Republic under Rhee — attended the small burial ceremony that was held for his predecessor (*Kyunghyang Sinmun* 1965). Rhee's internment provided a precedent for the burial of several of his successors. Park was the first to follow in 1979. The strongman had ruled the country for two decades, before finally being assassinated by his own secret service chief.

Another 30 years later, in 2009, President Kim Dae-jung — as noted, a progressive — was the next in line. Kim was not only a political opponent of Park but also his fiercest challenger. The former nearly won a presidential election against the latter, under whose rule Kim would be the victim of several assassination attempts.

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12   While the same is true for other cemeteries such as the Houston National Cemetery and Fort Douglas Post Cemetery, it is likewise a fact that there are controversies taking place in this regard, too, even though they occur on a different level (Wolfgang 2020).

Originally, it had been planned to bury Kim in the Daejon National Cemetery (DNC) because space had become scarce in the SNC. However his family demanded a burial site in the latter, so he would be closer to the people and so that it would be easier to visit his grave. Conservative groups strongly protested the decision to bury him here, claiming that he was a communist.

In 2015 Kim Young-sam would become the fourth and final South Korean president to be buried in the SNC to date. Kim entered politics in the mid-1950s, when he became a member of parliament for the Democratic Party that opposed Rhee's authoritarian reign; as Kim Dae-jung had been too, he later was also the target of several attempted assaults and of suppression under Park's regime. Although Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam had struggled together in opposition to the authoritarian regime of Park, they later fiercely competed with one another for the presidential candidacy in 1987 — events that ultimately saw the victory of yet another military officer, Roh Tae-woo.

In summary, the three groups of dead buried at the SNC are: those who fought for national independence and against Japanese imperialism; those who fought in the Korean War and participated in the US's war in Vietnam in the name of anticommunism; and, different presidents of the Republic of Korea. The SNC honors the bodies and souls on the one hand of those who collaborated with the Japanese aggressors and on the other those who resisted authoritarian regimes that justified brutal rule with an anticommunist doctrine. Including dictators as well as democrats, the group of presidents buried at the SNC, too, is characterized by the enmity felt during their respective political lives.

In other words, while there are these clear discrepancies between the deeds of the dead when they were alive, they now lie side by side within the same highly symbolical grounds. First and foremost, the SNC stands for the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948 and for the Korean War — through which national division, and thus the Republic, was crucially consolidated. This existential meaning of the memory site is why the tensions between the different deeds of the dead and the respective contradictions have not played a salient role in the official narrative of the nation. Put differently, the fault lines running between the graves and commemorative plates have been buried under a thick narrative layer of an imagined community of fate.

Despite its remarkable, inherent contradictions, the SNC has thus continued to function as a nationally unifying memorial site. This is because of its central role in political remembrance for the nation, intricately linked to the trauma of the Korean War — as represented by the countless bodies lying in its confines, a fact hardly anyone can escape. Recently, however, conflicts over eligibility for interment in the hallow grounds have increased, and interpretational shifts in the hitherto monolithic commemoration discourse have started to emerge — thus drawing attention to the memory site's deep fault lines.

Never mind the gaps

While the deeds of the people and the justifications for being interred at the SNC are the founding and fundamental elements of the memory site, this cemetery's symbolic design and ritual practices are equally important for its meaning structure and its sociopsychological effects. In other words, the hardware is fundamental to the existence of the memory site as such, but the software and its application are essential for its intended impact. Against this backdrop, this section investigates the SNC's architectural design of memorials, the structuration of graves, and meaning ascriptions in commemoration.

Artefacts — meaningful memorial assemblage

The architecture of the SNC was modeled on Western park cemeteries, such as Arlington (Kim CY 1999; Han 2005) and the United Nations Military Cemetery in Pusan (Chŏng 2005).[13] The SNC was the first park-style graveyard in Korea (Kim 2004: 22); the idea of officially making the cemetery into a park was first announced in 1970, when the Ministry of Defense presented a respective development plan for the site (*Maeil Kyŏngje* 1970). The SNC's resemblance to Western national cemeteries, however, was already obvious from the beginning of the mid-1950s.

The first memorial built at the site was the "Cenotaph of the Unknown Soldier" (Mumyŏng Yongsat'ap; 1954) — typical of modern national cemeteries as the most "arresting emblem […] of the modern culture of nationalism" because, despite their material emptiness, they are "nonetheless saturated with ghostly *national* imaginings" (Anderson 1983: 9; italics in the original). The "Ten Human Bullets Memorial" (Yukt'an Sipyongsabi; 1955), the second one on the cemetery grounds, is less universal. The memorial commemorates the sacrifice of ten soldiers who allegedly made themselves into "human bullets" (*yukt'an*); that is, they gave up their lives in fighting the enemy in the Battle of Songak Mountain near Kaesŏng in 1949, where North Korean troops attacked South Korean posts. Some have related this form of idealized memorialization of soldiers' bravery with the "Three Human Bullets" or "Three Human Bombs" (*nikudan-san'yūshi* or *bakudan-san'yūshi*) of the Japanese military, which referred to a similar myth during the Mukden Incident of 1931 — when the imperial army staged an attack on their own forces, so as to provide a pretext for invading Manchuria (Chŏng 2006: 285).[14] Also in 1955, the "Memorial for the Unknown Student Volunteer Soldiers" (Haktŭoiyonggun

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13   It is reasonable to suggest that Rhee, who studied and lived for a long time in the US, was familiar with the concept of national cemeteries in the West — although there is no evidence that he visited Arlington or any other cemetery.

14   Decades later, in 2007, it was determined that there had never actually been an act as daring as the supposed one by the three soldiers, and the military had in fact made up the story to mobilize the armed forces and the populace to support the war cause (Nam 2019).

Mumyŏng Yongsat'ap) was built in commemoration of the more than 50,000 students who fought in the Korean War.[15]

In addition to these three early memorials, which signify the ideological core of the cemetery's narrative, the two most important and iconic commemoration facilities at the SNC are the Memorial Tower (Hyŏnch'ungt'ap)[16] and the Memorial Gate (Hyŏnch'ungmun). They were built a decade later, in 1967 and 1969 respectively, at the center of the entrance area between the Memorial of the Unknown Soldiers and the Ten Brave Warriors' Monument. They constitute the ritual centerpiece of the SNC, having the crucial function of an interface or a bridge to the rest of the compound. In other words, paying respect at this spot automatically transcends the entire cemetery and thus all its bodies and souls, irrespective of their contradictory deeds in life. Combined, these central memorials represent the physical and spiritual core of the cemetery as well as its military foundation.[17]

A central part of the honoring ritual when the president, foreign dignitaries, or other high-ranking officials visit is the burning of incense three times — originally expressing the harmony of heaven, earth, and humankind. At the SNC, this ritual is performed to thank the heroes who died protecting their homeland (DNC 2019). The incense burner that is used here has a particularly special meaning because it was made from melted identification tags worn by Korean soldiers during the Vietnam War.[18] In this way, the incense burner that was added in 1968 represents a striking detail in the orchestration of the dense martial symbolism found in the Memorial Tower.

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15 About 7,000 of them died during the war, but only the bodies of 48 were found. Their names remain unknown, however.

16 The "Memorial Tablet Enshrinement Hall" (Wip'ae Pongan'gwan), which houses the names of more than 100,000 deceased on commemorative plates — mainly soldiers whose remains could not be found.

17 Other memorials that are scattered around the cemetery northward and uphill followed later. They include the "Altar to Patriots and Patriotic Martyrs" (Ch'ungnyŏldae; 1971), the "Commemoration Stone for the Korean Student Volunteer Troops from Japan" (Chaeilhakto Ŭiyonggunyongsa Wiryŏngbi; 1973) who fell in the Korean War, the "Cenotaph for the Guerilla Fighters" (Yugyŏkpudae Chŏnjŏkkwiryŏngbi; 1977), and the "Cenotaph for the Unknown Soldiers of the Independence Army" (Tongnipkun Mumyŏngyongsa Wiryŏngt'ap; 2002). In addition to the tombs and memorials, the "Photographic Exhibition House" (Sajin Chŏnsigwan), the "Relics Exhibition House" (Yup'um chŏnsigwan), and the "Movie Theater" (Hyŏnch'unggwan) are the three main educational facilities in the park (see the lower-left side of Figure 1 below). These buildings have a complementary function in the hegemonic discourse reproduced at the SNC, which is the "traditional, though seriously contested, postcolonial nationalist narrative" (Podoler 2014: 114).

18 Hence, beside the general anticommunist spirit of the memory space, the central presence and usage of this incense burner is a further reason why official delegations from Vietnam — who have traveled to Korea frequently since diplomatic normalization between the two countries in 1992 — have not visited the SNC. Noteworthy in this respect is that the widow of the late South Vietnamese prime minister Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, who had reportedly been a friend of Park Chung-hee, would visit the latter's grave a number of times (Chŏng 2016).

Hierarchy — disciplining the living through the dead

A central characteristic of cemetery parks in Western Europe or North America is the equalization or democratization encountered in death, meaning that any rank or hierarchy while alive is leveled in the afterlife (Koselleck 2002: 291, 312–315). In the eighteenth century, cemetery parks were designed to distinguish the buried person according to their wealth. Similarly, subsequent military cemetery parks, such as Arlington, were plotted out according to race and rank. When the military was desegregated in 1947, however that policy ended in the US. At present, veterans of the same wars are usually buried together, and plots are of equal size. Leveling of status after death can be understood as a symbol of democratic equality, reflecting changes in values after World War Two.

At the SNC, however, democratization in death has never occurred. The basic design of the compound regarding the allocation and arrangement of grave sites follows traditional Korean geomancy (*p'ungsujiri*), which assumes that natural energy forces can be used by placing individuals in harmony with their surrounding environment. Accordingly, certain graves can be placed in more favorable spots; others may have a weaker energy flow meanwhile. More importantly, at the SNC the dead are discriminated between based on whether the deceased were in the military, in the bureaucracy, or were mere citizens; whether the person was a president, prime minister, or minister; and, if the person had the rank of general, officer, or was a mere foot soldier (see Table 1) graves' allocation, design, and measurements vary accordingly.

In its first decade of existence the SNC was mainly a military cemetery, so discrimination between the dead was comparably low and concerned only the form of burial and the style of grave. Probably stemming from Japanese influences[19] during the occupation (Chǒng 2006: 286; Kang 2017: 20), discrimination even after death was officially adopted during the Park military dictatorship in 1970 as a way of disciplining the living by regulating the dead. In other words, this practice was perpetuated in Korea even after it was abolished in Japan and despite the general trend toward the democratization of the dead in cemeteries elsewhere around the world. Furthermore, this internal discrimination — which some describe as "re-feudalization" (Kang 2017: 25) — has continued to be practiced until the present day.

Table 1: Regulation of Grave Size according to Rank

Object		State leader	Patriot/general	Officer	Soldier
Grave size		264 m²	26.4 m²	3.3 m²	3.3 m²
Gravestone	Size (cm)	Extra	91x36x13	76x30x13	60x24x12
	Form	Extra	Triple-layered	Single-layered	Single-layered

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19   In particular, the old-style Japanese military cemeteries before 1937 tended to differentiate even after death, namely according to military rank during life.

Ceremony stone size (cm)	Extra	65x86x20	55x72x15	45x62x15
Stone frame	Yes	Yes	No	No
Burial method	Corpse burial	Corpse burial	Ashes burial	Ashes burial
Grave shape	Mound	Mound	Flat	Flat

Source: (Chŏng et al. 2001: 42).

Since 2001 there has been an impulse toward eliminating the discriminatory regulation of the dead (Kang 2017: 34). In particular newly built cemeteries, such as second-tier national cemeteries (*hogukwŏn*), prescribe the equal treatment of the departed. Even recently constructed graveyards at the DNC practice equality in the case of soldiers who died in the Yeonpyeong Battle (2002) or in the Chonan Incident (2010). However, at the SNC the discrimination of the dead became even more pronounced in the case of those who are honored in the "Charnel House for Patriots and Soldiers" (Ch'unghondang), which took form in 2006 (Kang 2017: 34–35). For this reason, in 2013 a sensation was caused when for the first time a general — the so-called Vietnam War hero Ch'ae Myŏng-sin — was buried in the same plot as his former subordinates in an equally sized grave, because it had been his last wish (Kim KG 2013).

Ascription — displaying loyalty through commemoration

Besides the history of memorial arrangements, the evolution of the SNC's naming reveals additional insights on the integrative symbolism of the memory site — also extending to the key performance of tribute-paying. Having begun life as the earlier-mentioned Altar for the Promotion of Loyalty, its name was changed to the "Military Graveyard" (Kuk/Kunmyoji) in 1953, before being again renamed in 1965 the "National Cemetery" (Kungnip Myoji) — reflecting its scope now being extended to civilians too. The most noteworthy change, however, occurred in 1996, when the site's name was modified to the more explicit designation *kungnip hyŏnch'ungwŏn*, a "park for displaying (exceptionally) unswerving loyalty."

The origins of the term *hyŏnch'ung* ("displaying loyalty") can be traced back to the beginning of the eighteenth century, when King Sukjong built a shrine (1706) to pay tribute to the late general Yi Sun-sin who was a war hero of the resistance to the Japanese invasions at the end of the sixteenth century. A year later, he named it the "Shrine for Displaying Unswerving Loyalty" (Hyŏnch'ungsa). In other words, the current name of the national cemetery refers to an ancient designation vis-à-vis war heroism — absolute loyalty — in a conflict with external forces that threaten the country.[20]

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20 The English word "cemetery" on the other hand stems from the Greek language and means "sleeping place," which is a comparatively more subtle nomination.

As early as 1956, Hyŏnch'ung'il was introduced: "Day for Displaying Unswerving Loyalty" (June 6), or "Memorial Day."[21] On this occasion, the Ministry of Defense chose the following motto for the memorial service, thus clarifying the official meaning of Hyŏnch'ung'il:

> One, traveler, tell the free people: we obeyed the nation's order and are resting in this place. Two, souls of the fallen heroes who died protecting their homeland, rest in peace. [We] will pull together [our] thirty million [people], and unite the country by advancing to the north. Three, let us swear tomorrow's unification by advancing to the north in front of the fallen heroes! (Tonga Ilbo 1956: 4)

Some have argued that the date of Memorial Day can be traced back to the old centennial tradition of the *mangjong*[22] and other traditions of the Koryŏ era (Cho 2016: 28; Chungang Ilbo 2012; Sin 2016; Yi 2017). In contrast, others have posited that the tradition was deliberately manufactured to conceal the anticommunist state ideology intended to be the core of national identification (Chi 2003: 605; Kim 2005: 98). The official position is that Hyŏnch'ung'il coincides with a traditional anniversary on which people used to worship their ancestors and pay tribute to fallen soldiers.

Already during the Park Chung-hee era (1961-1979), twice attempts were made to change the cemetery's name to Hyŏnch'ungwŏn. In 1962, the head of the cemetery proposed such a move (Tonga Ilbo, June 6, 1960); in 1970, the Ministry of Defense submitted a related request to the government (*Maeil Kyŏngje* 1970). However, only 26 years later, the word *hyŏnch'ung* would find its way into the cemetery's title.[23] The designation as Hyŏnch'ungwŏn is thus a symbolic expression of absolute loyalty, devotion, and sacrifice to one's country — as revered values. This connects this topos from mythical ancient times to the present, and serves to integrate (i.e. blend) the civic with the military realm.

The key ritual at the SNC with which the display of loyalty is performed is "honoring," or *ch'ambae*, and it has been argued that the term originates from the Japanese language (therein pronounced *sanpai*) that was forced upon the Korean people during the imperial occupation (Yi 2010). In particular, it is held that it reflects not only the linguistic matter of an adopted term but also Japanese cultural performance in worshipping at a shrine, which Koreans were forced to do to assimilate as Tennō's subjects (Yi 2019). These arguments are put forward despite the fact that the *Standard Korean Dictionary* and researchers at the National Institute of Korean Language (NIKL; Kungnip Kugŏwŏn) deny any connection to Japanese origins (NIKL 2014, 2020). Nevertheless, this has continued to be a controversial issue especially because the last crown prince of the Korean empire (Ŭimin

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21 At first it was termed Hyŏnch'ung Kinyŏmil, being later (in 1975) changed to the present Hyŏnch'ungil.

22 While the ninth of 24 seasons of the year in the agrarian tradition of preceding kingdoms on the Korean Peninsula did exist, the tradition of the *mangjong* did not include paying homage.

23 In 2005 the SNC was given its present name: Kungnip Sŏul Hyŏnch'ungwŏn.

Hwangt'aeja), Yi Ŭn, was forced to pay tribute at the tombs of several Japanese kings (Yi 2015). Of course, it is also a delicate matter because independence fighters are buried in the SNC. Thus, regardless of whether the term stems from Japanese or not, the controversy as such is an illustrative example of the sensitivities regarding the perceptions and interpretations of this particular memory space and its performative usage.[24]

To summarize, the overall architecture of the SNC resembles the design of cemetery parks in Western countries. This is deliberately chosen, with the basic intention being to induce national identity and social integration. The acute rift between peaceful civil life and brutal war is bridged by emphasizing individual sacrifices and the nation's survival. Soldiers have fought and died for their country, the nation, and the state. This identity-building has two aspects to it. First, the soldiers' sacrifices for the collective are commemorated and honored for having given their lives so that the nation could live. Commemorating them by rituals and symbols is an effective discursive performance that continuously reproduces the idea of the nation and the state, the legitimization of which is based on the honorable deaths of the soldiers. Second, this collective identity is built around a hegemonic discourse that consists of a certain interpretation of the past connected to the politics and society of the present. The practices and symbols convey a particular story, one that is an exclusive narrative because otherwise identity-building would not be successful. Only by distinction from the "Other" can the "I" be established and maintained. Hence, it could be said that the official narrative instructs the individual citizen to accept a certain historical understanding of the state.

Also, the rupture between independence fighters and collaborators, and between resistance fighters and regime forces, is glossed over by the deep sorrow expressed for the dead and the high appreciation cited for their sacrifices for the nation. The carefully orchestrated assemblage of memorials imbued with strong symbolism serve as the *mise-en-scène* for rituals performed by state officials as well as ordinary citizens. That is, this official narrative can be understood as having the purpose of blending the militaristic and the civil, the anticommunist state ideology and the national spirit of resistance, with the aim of smoothening the edges of the fault lines between historical events and their meanings. Synergistic effects for disciplining and mobilizing contemporary society are thus produced. The tensions, contradictions, and enmities embodied in the diverse dead buried in the grounds of the SNC fade away in the presence of the nation. In other words, the phenomenon of conflating

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24   Another controversy revolves around the many cherry trees planted at the SNC, which some criticize as symbolic of Japan (Yi 2015). Others argue that such trees have been traditionally grown in Korea too, and some even contend that Japanese ones might have originally come from Korea (O 2007). While it is difficult to know the truth, this controversy is yet another issue that is, justifiably or not, raised vis-à-vis the SNC's meaning. In addition, the naming of one of the structures built in the SNC, the "Bridge of Pacifying the Nation" (Chŏnggukkyo), is said to be a remnant of particular Japanese influence because it uses the same meaning and Chinese characters that designate the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in Japan (Im 2019).

the military, civil, public, private, state, and national spheres is manifest in the prescribed purposes of the *appareils idéologiques d'Etat* and is actualized in the commemoration performances conducted at the SNC. In this way the design of this cemetery and the way the memorials there are used in rituals contribute to the concealing of the fault lines inherent in the memory site, and tend to impede a more liberal, pluralistic remembrance. Despite the hegemonic national narrative being carved in stone and cast in concrete at the SNC, challenges to it have been emerging of late — but for the most part only outside its walls, through alternative memory sites.

Competing clusters of the deeds of the dead

Beside the discussed contradictions in content and structure within the SNC, tensions can also be found between it and other cemeteries and memorials constituting "national icons" (de Ceuster 2000) within Korea's remembrance landscape. The following discussion focuses on three sets of memory sites.

Statist narrative of first- and second-tier national cemeteries

As discussed above, the SNC mainly represents the anticommunist ideology dominating during the authoritarian regimes ruling after the Republic's establishment in 1948, beginning with the burial of soldiers who died during the Yŏsun Incident and the Cheju Uprising. The SNC is the most centrally located and oldest national cemetery in the country, and the most significant too — largely because it is home not only to the most presidential graves compared with other cemeteries but also to those of the most important such individuals (i.e. Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam, Park Chung-hee, and Rhee Syngman). This esteem is also reflected in the fact that the SNC is the only national cemetery that is managed not by the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs but by the Ministry of Defense. The total area of the SNC is 353 acres (1,430 square kilometers). It houses 68,752 corpses, and is thus the second-largest national cemetery in Korea after the Taejŏn National Cemetery, where 83,108 people are buried over an area stretching to 815 acres (3,300 km²).

The Cheju National Cemetery (Cheju Kungnipmyoji) was planned to open in 2022,[25] and the Yŏnch'ŏn National Cemetery (Kungnip Yŏnch'ŏn Hyŏnch'ungwŏn) in 2025. In addition to these four first-tier national cemeteries, there are five second-tier ones, which are identified as parks commemorating those defending the country (*hogukwŏn*) instead of as parks paying tribute to those displaying unswerving loyalty to the country (*hyŏnch'ungwŏn*). They are located in Yŏnch'ŏn, Imsil, I'ch'ŏn, Sanch'ŏng, and Koesan, and they have 3,000 to 50,000 graves each. The strong anticommunist and anti-North Korea ideology embedded in the narratives of these

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25   Regardless, the nature of the cemetery has not yet been clearly defined (Kim KP 2019).

mnemotopes is shared by the UN Military Cemetery in Pusan as well as by the War Memorial in Seoul.

Table 2: Major Cemeteries and Memorials in Korea

Name	Location	Year (est.)	Focus
Seoul National Cemetery (*hyŏnch'ungwŏn*)	Seoul	1954	anti-Japanese struggle anticommunism war
Taejŏn National Cemetery (*hyŏnch'ungwŏn*)	Taejŏn (Ch'ŭngch'ŏng)	1979	Comprehensive
Yŏnch'ŏn National Cemetery (*hyŏnch'ungwŏn*)	Yŏngch'ŏn (Kyŏngsangbuk)	2025	Comprehensive
Cheju National Cemetery (*kungnipmyoji*)	Cheju (Nohyŏngdong)	2022	Comprehensive
Yŏngch'ŏn National Cemetery (*hogukwŏn*)	Yŏngch'ŏn (North Kyŏngsang)	1994	Comprehensive
Imsil National Cemetery (*hogukwŏn*)	Imsil (North Chŏlla)	1995	Comprehensive
Ich'ŏn National Cemetery (*hogukwŏn*)	Ich'ŏn (Kyŏnggi)	2002	Comprehensive
Sanch'ŏng National Cemetery (*hogukwŏn*)	Sanch'ŏng (South Kyŏngsang)	2006	Comprehensive
Koesan National Cemetery (*hogukwŏn*)	Koesan (North Ch'ungch'ŏng)	2019	Comprehensive
UN Military Cemetery	Pusan	1951	Korean War
War Memorial	Seoul	1996	Korean War

Source: Author's own compilation.

Nationalistic narratives of memorials to the independence movement

Memorials to the independence movement against Japanese occupation are another cluster of mnemotopes that do not necessarily contradict the strong statist narrative of South Korean national cemeteries. Nevertheless, they represent a separate memory that is focused on the ethnic nation and its sovereignty. These include memory sites such as the Independence Memorial (Tongnip Kinyŏmgwan), the Seodaemun Prison Memorial (Sŏdaemun Hyŏngmuso Kinyŏmgwan), Hyochang Park (Hyoch'ang Kongwŏn), [26] the Kim Koo Museum and Library (Paekbŏm Kinyŏmgwan), and the Sinam National Patriotic Martyrs Park (Kungnip Sinamsŏnyŏl Kongwŏn).

Table 3: Major Independence Memorials and Cemeteries in Korea

Name	Location	Year (est.)	Focus

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26 The remains of three presidents of the Provisional Government — Yi Pong-ch'ang, Yun Pong-gil, and Paek Chŏng-gi — are interred in Hyochang Park, as are those of other important figures in the independence movement such as Kim Ku.

Independence Memorial (*kinyŏmgwan*)	Cheonan	1987	Independence Movement
Seodaemun Prison Memorial (*kinyŏmgwan*)	Seoul	1987	Independence Movement, Democratization Movement
Hyochang Park (*gongwŏn*)	Seoul	1949	Kim Gu, Independence Movement
Kim Koo Museum and Library (*kinyŏmgwan*)	Seoul	2002	Kim Gu, Independence Movement
Sinam National Patriotic Martyrs Park (*kongwŏn*)	Sinam	1955	Independence Movement

Source: Author's own compilation.

Republican narrative of memorials to the democracy movement

The third cluster of mnemotopes consists of cemeteries and memorials related to civil democracy and peace movements. The most prominent memory spaces are the three "national democracy cemeteries" (*kungnip minjumyoji*). The April 19 National Cemetery in northern Seoul and the March 15 National Cemetery in the southeastern city of Masan (Kyŏngsang province) are dedicated to those who died in the struggle against the authoritarian regime of Rhee, which led to the establishment of the democratic government of the Second Republic (1960–1961) — shortly afterward being overthrown in a military coup led by Park. The May 18 National Cemetery in the southwestern city of Kwangju (Chŏlla Province) is dedicated to those who died fighting the special forces of the regime under strongman Chun Doo-hwan, who justified dispatching troops by misrepresenting the uprising as a communist rebellion instigated by North Korean infiltrators and Kim Dae-jung.[27] Similar memorials include the Jeju 4.3 Peace Park (Cheju 4.3 P'yŏnghwagongwŏn) in Cheju, the Democracy Park (Minjugongwŏn) in Pusan (which mainly relates to the democracy movements in Pusan and Masan in 1979), and the Moran Democracy Park (Moran'gongwŏn Yŏlsamyoyŏk) in Masŏk (which is dedicated to democracy- and/or labor-movement activists).

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27 For a more detailed discussion of political remembrance related to the memory sites of the Kwangju Democracy Movement, see Mosler (2014a, 2020).

Table 4: Major Movement Cemeteries and Memorials in Korea

Name	Location	Year (est.)	Focus
4.19 National Democracy Cemetery (*minjumyoji*)	Seoul	1961	April 19 Revolution against Rhee Syngman's authoritarian regime
3.15 National Democracy Cemetery (*minjumyoji*)	Masan (Kyŏngsangnam)	1968	Democracy movement against Rhee Syngman's authoritarian regime
5.18 National Democracy Cemetery (*minjumyoji*)	Kwangju (South Chŏlla)	1993	May 18 Democracy movement against Chun Doo-hwan's authoritarian regime
Jeju 4.3 Peace Park (*p'yŏnghwagongwŏn)*	Cheju (Ponggaedong)	2008	April 3 Cheju Uprising-related
Democracy Park (*minjugongwŏn*)	Pusan (Yŏngju-2-dong)	1999	April Revolution; Pusan and Masan democracy movements
Moran Democracy Park (*yŏlsamyoyŏk*)	Masŏk (Kyŏnggi Province)	1970	Democracy- and labor-movement activists
Nogŭlli Peace Movement Park (*p'yŏnghwagongwŏn*)	Nogŭlli (Ch'ungch'ŏngdo)	2011	Civilian victims of Korean War atrocities

Source: Author's own compilation.

While these clusters of cemeteries and memorials are the most representative in Korea, they do not account for every last memory site in the country. Nevertheless competitive or contentious relationships between the three sets of memory sites are apparent, and — despite the fact that the frictions between them tend to be ameliorated by the grand national narrative — the increasingly diversifying national mnemotopography has produced certain cracks in the hitherto monolithic political-remembrance discourse.

Conclusion

This article has explored the characteristics of the SNC as a memory site to examine its function in South Korea's contentious memory politics. Building on the increasing amount of domestic literature on the SNC, this investigation has shed light on the contradictions in the merit bases on which different groups of people were interred or inurned at the national cemetery. In the beginning, the space had been a proto-military cemetery for those who fought against Japanese imperialism and for national independence. With the losses of the Korean War, those who were deployed by the newly established Republic of Korea to fight communism but never returned home were added to the cemetery as the largest occupying group, and thus the anticommunist identity of the nation naturally became the dominant narrative disseminated from its hallow grounds.

During the decades of (military) dictatorship, the SNC served as a center stage for discursively interlinking the great sacrifices of the many war dead with the ideology of anticommunism — so as to legitimize the authoritarian regimes as well as discipline the people into unconditional allegiance by nurturing nationalist and patriotic sentiments. To this end, the fundamental experience of the existence-threatening war was used as a mode of assimilating the people into one unified collective based on a negative identification. In other words, the official designation of the SNC, its symbolical architectural design, and the ritual use of the memory site was harnessed for disseminating one single and absolute narrative of national identity.

Only after democratization, with increasing freedom (of speech) and the growth of progressive forces in the country, did authoritarianism begin to lose its discourse hegemony and to suffer more and more from a legitimacy crisis. In addition, president-turned-opposition leaders such as Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung were also interred at the SNC. The multilayered nature of, and contradictions in, the nation's historical development increasingly came to the fore, as reflected in the deepening tensions within and around the SNC as a memory site. Due to its centrality in the anticommunist narrative of conservatives, the SNC remains a strategically crucial bridgehead that must be held so as not to lose grounds in other battle zones of the remembrance war — such as sporadically emerging controversies over revisionist history textbooks, (new) rightist academic publications, and reactionary media reportage. Every time the original doctrine of the SNC is perceived to be threatened, conservative forces mobilize protest to prevent further harm to what they revere as a kind of anticommunist sanctuary. Thus the SNC continues to function as a nodal point of the old, authoritarian Cold War narrative, and thus forms a key battleground in the remembrance war.

Progressive forces have slowly been breaking the anticommunist monopoly on the understanding of the Korean national past, and step by step have appropriated memory spaces such as the SNC for a more balanced form of remembrance that aims at integrating democratic society, rather than assimilating it. President Kim Dae-jung in 1999 began to officially redefine the notion of Memorial Day by expanding the scope of people to be remembered and honored, moving from the hitherto narrow focus on the Korean War dead toward including a wider range of citizens who had made outstanding contributions to the nation (Yonhapnews 1999). Successive progressive presidents such as Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in continued these efforts regarding civilizing, democratizing, and diversifying the remembrance of the dead at the SNC.

The democratization of remembrance, however, does not exhaust itself in these top-down efforts alone. It is also corroborated by the general changes in the values of society, and by bottom-up efforts by parts of civil society to account for the sacrifices suppressed and negated by the authoritarian anticommunist hegemonic discourse. One indication of this development is the growing number of democracy-movement-

related cemeteries and other alternative cemeteries and memorials on the subnational and/or civic levels.

The remembrance war that is fought via the SNC and in other parts of the country's memory landscape concerns prerogatives regarding the interpretation of the nation's history and identity. This struggle is an unavoidable process of coping with the past. As such, it is an important precondition for progressing into a better future going forward.

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National Loss and the Politics of Mourning in North Korea

Eric J. Ballbach

Summary
The main objective of the paper is to approach the politics of mourning in North Korea following the experiencing of the loss of the country's two leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Building on theoretical considerations regarding the concepts of "pastoral power" as well as the "theater state," the study analyzes some of the performances, symbols, and rituals connected to the loss of the founder of the state and nation Kim Il Sung and of his successor Kim Jong Il. By so doing, the paper provides a fresh perspective for thinking about national loss — and the ways of remembering linked to it — both as inherently political and at the same time as constitutive of social relations. In order to approach the politics of mourning in North Korea, a deeper understanding of the relationship between the individual and the leader(s), as well as of the subsequent process of subjectivation, is required. As such, the study draws on the concept of "the sociopolitical organism" and the notion of "political life and the nontemporality of loss," as these understandings help explain a set of particular aspects linked to the politics of mourning in the country.

Keywords: North Korea, Pastoral Power, National Mourning, Subject(ivation), Socio-Political Organism, Political Life

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Introduction

> To impute to loss a creative instead of a negative quality may initially seem
> counterintuitive. As a whole, loss inhabits this counterintuitive perspective. We
> might say that as soon as the question "What is lost?" is posed, it invariably slips
> into the question "What remains?" That is, loss is inseparable from what remains,
> for what is lost is known only by what remains of it, by how these remains are
> produced, read, and sustained. (Eng and Kazanjian 2003: 2)

When Kim Il Sung, the founder and first president of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), passed away unexpectedly in 1994 the
international media put forth images of a nation united in rituals of collective
mourning. Very similar images were conveyed in the aftermath of the death of Kim
Jong Il in late 2011 too. What followed the announcement nationwide by the same
female presenter who had made public the death of Kim Il Sung seven years before
was a public outpouring of grief, as witnessed first time around too. All throughout
the country, seemingly devastated and highly emotional North Koreans flocked to
the streets, to squares bearing statues, paintings, and other impressions of Kim Jong
Il and his father Kim Il Sung. Paralleled by images of distinctively North Korean
landscapes — mountain panoramas, sunsets, and black clouds — and accompanied
by choral and military music, North Korean state television displayed images of
young and old, of schoolchildren and groups of soldiers, all overcome with emotion.
Mourners were shown falling to their knees with undiluted grief, beating their chests,
flailing their hands, and stomping their feet while shouting "Father, Father."

Fitting the common representation of North Korea as an inherent "other" (e.g.
Ballbach 2016), most of the international media described the unfolding scenes as
bizarre, often depicting events as indicative of a "brainwashed society" (e.g.
Friedman 2011). The resulting discourse most commonly revolved around the
question of whether all of this was "just staged," usually neglecting the possibility
that these were cases of genuine grief. Such reports, however, tell us more about the
institutionalized framing practices of the international media than they do about the
subject matter at hand — namely what the loss of the foundational leader and of his
successor signified, what the collectivity of the mourning performances entail and
mean, and why — especially in an apparently strictly controlled society — these
public displays of emotion matter.

Understanding these aspects leads us to address what could be described as the
"politics of mourning" (e.g. Eng and Kazanjian 2003) in North Korea that follow
experiences of national loss, most notably the demise of the country's leaders. This
is without doubt a highly complex phenomenon, as the mourning of a leader
naturally signifies a moment of transition, raising questions of power, loyalty, and
succession, among many others. Addressing such issues naturally means to approach

a site that is inherently political, as the grieving and remembering of a deceased leader engages "with the ways in which memoro-politics is produced through, and predicated upon, a constant contestation regarding what matters as memorable […], who owns memory, and who or what is dispossessed of the rights and rites of memorability" (Butler 2003: 174). This gives rise to the quandary of which and whose losses will be commemorated, and how. Discussing these questions is to acknowledge that mourning is an inherent element of politics in every country, be it democratically constituted or authoritarian. But, what are the specifics of the politics of mourning in an authoritarian society like North Korea? And, what role does the individual play in the public performance of grief?

Theoretical considerations

Addressing the politics of mourning in North Korea is linked to a complex set of potential theoretical debates and perspectives. In the following, Michel Foucault's elaborations on "pastoral power" as well as the role of the subject (1987, 2007) are linked to the "theater state" concept. This was originally introduced by anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1980), before being notably reworked by Kwon and Chung (2012).

North Korea: A modern theater state?

In Political Anthropology, a theatre state is a political state directed toward the performance of drama and ritual rather than more conventional ends, such as welfare. Power in a theatre state is exercised through spectacle. Originally introduced by Geertz (1980) in reference to political practices in nineteenth-century Balinese Negara, the concept has more recently been reworked and used by Kwon and Chung (2012) to analyze North Korea's political order. According to the latter two authors, the country's leadership has turned the DPRK into a theater state: a regime that relies on the use of rituals to perpetuate the charismatic rule of the leadership. The authors point to what Weber called the "routinization of charismatic authority," arguing that charisma is an inherently unstable form of political authority (Kwon and Chung 2012: 43-63). It cannot be easily renewed or "routinized," and is further prone to decay and erosion, which means that charismatic authority usually cannot be inherited because it is invested in one leader alone (Kwon and Chung 2012: 42–45). The two authors' stress the use of theatrical spectacles and rituals to instill a sense of loyalty in the North Korean people to the Manchurian partisans, centered on Kim Il Sung himself. These rituals take many forms, be they mass parades, mass games, or theatrical plays — or funeral ceremonies and mourning rites.

Foucault's concept of pastoral power

In his writings on governmentality, Foucault takes as his starting point the historical thesis that the modern (Western) state is the result of a complex combination of "political" and "pastoral" power techniques (Foucault 1982: 12).

> Während sich Erstere von der antiken polis herleitet und um Recht, Universalität, Öffentlichkeit etc. organisiert ist, ist Letztere eine christlich-religiöse Konzeption, in deren Mittelpunkt die umfassende Führung von Menschen, die bis ins 18. Jahrhundert hinein vorherrschend war, einer spezifischen Machtform verdankt, die auf die christliche Beziehung zwischen Hirt und Herde zurückgeht: der Pastoralmacht. (Lemke 1997: 151)

Foucault (1988: 58–60, 62) argues that Christianity, with pastoral power, has developed a specific power relationship with the subject, which denotes a Christian-religious conception of the relationship between shepherd and flock. At the center of this relationship is the "government of souls," meaning the guidance of individuals with a view to eternal salvation. The starting point for this form of power relationship is the assumption that certain persons are, through their religious qualities, able to show the individual the right way to salvation in the afterlife. In this context, Foucault stresses that the shepherd takes care of his flock in an almost totalitarian way, monitoring all areas of existence. Furthermore, he not only protects the herd as a collective, but also bears responsibility for each of its individual members.

In other words, pastoral power not only targets the community as a whole but also focuses on the life of the individual. For the latter this means, on the one hand, that one must completely subordinate oneself to the (spiritual) leader and exercise obedience in constant examination of conscience. On the other hand, this presupposes a complete revelation of one's *Seelentiefen* ("depths of soul") to the shepherd (Ibid.: 62). The government of souls therefore requires the knowledge of the "inner truth" of the individual: the pastoral must know what the individual thinks, they must know their secrets and explore their soul (Ibid.: 60, 62). The guidance of the individual is therefore inextricably linked to a certain knowledge of the truth of the individual, as generated by pastoral power. The Christian pastorate accordingly developed specific methods of analysis, reflection, and guidance, ones intended to ensure knowledge of this inner truth of individuals and their (controlled) formation into subjects. As Lemke correctly notes,

> [t]he Christian pastorate works with a practice that is historically unique and can only be found in Christianity: the comprehensive and permanent *confession*. The institution of confession allows the examination of conscience and knowledge of inner secrets, which is indispensable for a "guided soul." (1997: 154, emphasis in original)

In addition to the institutionalization of confession, Christianity has established also the instance of pure obedience. According to this, obedience no longer functions as an instrument to attain certain virtues but has itself become one: one obeys in order to reach the state of obeying (Foucault 1988: 60, 62; Lemke 1997: 153–154). According to Foucault (2007: 89), in the eighteenth century this individualizing form of power was detached from ecclesiastical institutions and reorganized into the modern state. The consequence was specific objectives changing and increasing, respective institutions differentiating themselves as bearers of pastoral power and coming to specialize in varying functions. This led "to an expansion and generalization of the pastorate, which is gradually breaking away from its form of religious institutionalization" (Lemke 1997: 156). In this process of transmission, ultimately only the concern for the salvation of the soul in the hereafter was shifted to this world.

> (…) instead of a pastoral power and a political power, more or less linked to each other, more or less rival, there was an individualizing "tactic" which characterized a series of powers: those of the family, medicine, psychiatry, education, and employers. (Foucault 1982b: 784; Foucault 2007: 90)

David Campbell takes up this idea of the similar governance practices of state and church in his pioneering poststructuralist study *Writing Security*, speaking in this context of an "evangelism of fear" (1998: 49) that is "praised" by modern states. He argues that the modern state uses fears and threats for its own purposes in a similar way to the church, and that the state concept of "security" replicates the church one of "salvation."

> The state grounds its legitimacy by offering the promise of security to its citizens who, it says, would otherwise face manifold dangers. The church justifies its role by guaranteeing salvation to its followers who, it says, would otherwise be destined to an unredeemed death. Both the state and the church require considerable effort to maintain order within and around themselves, and thereby engage in an evangelism of fear to ward off internal and external threats, succumbing in the process to the temptation to treat difference as otherness. (Ibid.: 49)

Understanding the politics of mourning in North Korea: "The sociopolitical organism" and the notion of "political life"

In the following section, the politics of mourning are discussed in the context of two conceptual lenses: the notion of political life (*chŏngch'ijŏk saengmyŏng*), and especially the phenomenon of the nontemporality of loss in North Korea, and the mechanisms of power at work in the relationship between the individual and the leader(ship) — as expressed most vividly by the concept of the sociopolitical organism.

The politics of mourning and the concept of the sociopolitical organism

Approaching the politics of mourning in North Korea first requires an understanding of the relationship between the leader and the people. On the basis of the philosophical principle of "human determinism" — and in direct connection with the expansion of the personality cult around Kim Il Sung after the 1970s — the relationship between individual, collective, and leadership would be (re)formulated. The relationship between the different parts of North Korean society has since been constructed as that of a sociopolitical organism in which a triangular connection is established between the leadership (the Kim family) as the brain, the party as the nervous system, and the people as the body. This construction is important to this study in two interrelated ways: that is, to understand the special relationship between the individual and the leader as well as to grasp the ensuing power relations inherent in this people-leader bond.

Discursive attempts to instill the ethos of a superorganic family by depicting the national collective in terms of family rhetoric are not a new phenomenon. Already in 1976 South Korean anthropologist Lee Moon-Woong defined North Korea's political order in terms of a family state:

> The ties between the masses and their supreme leader are very much like kinship relations. It is therefore appropriate to call the political system of modern North Korea a family state. […] The leader's role is akin to the role of a head of household; he exercises absolute authority and is the source of all wisdom. Thus the destiny of the state resembles the fate of a family. (1976: 43)

By defining the family state increasingly in nationalist tones, the mere being a North Korean makes the subject a natural part of a higher-valued community, the collective family, with Kim Il Sung as "parental leader" (*ŏbŏi suryŏng*). It is this unique construction of simultaneously collectivizing and politicizing the individual and their subjectivity and "making familial" (i.e. organically integrating) the collectivity under the (Kim) leadership that strikes at the very heart of North Korean identity-constructions of the self in terms of the body politic. This discursive construction of the self makes the life of every citizen conceptually part of the leader's personified sovereign body. It is against this background that such slogans as *janggunnim siksol* ("We are the General's family") must be understood, as widely displayed in the domestic space of the North Korean household. As stated in the magazine *Ch'ŏllima*: "I cannot imagine how we could live without a socialist system, with its convention of the revered Marshal as a father and all of us living as one big family. Where in the whole world can you find a more benevolent system?" (2004: 49).

In this ethos of the state as a superorganic family, which is deeply embedded in the North Korean political and social discourses, Kim Il Sung — and, by extension, Kim

Jong Il and Kim Jong Un — are not simply considered political leaders; they are, moreover, revered as parental leaders among North Koreans. Even the death of Kim Il Sung did not put an end to this casting. In the North Korean discourse, Kim Il Sung's supervision over the country has continued, while actual leadership has been handed over to his designated heir, Kim Jong Il (and now, Kim Jong Un).

At the same time, the notion of the family state entails and enables a particular power relation, as becomes clear in the following quote.

> An immortal socio-political integrity is inconceivable without the existence of the socio-political community which is the integrated whole of the leader, the party and the masses. Only when an individual becomes a member of this community can he acquire immortal socio-political integrity. […] Just as a man's brain is the centre of his life, so the leader, the top brain in a socio-political community, is the centre of the life of this community. The leader is called the top brain of the socio-political organism because he is the focal point which directs the life of this organism in a unified manner. […] Loyalty to the leader and comradeship towards him are absolute and unconditional because the leader, as the top brain of the socio-political organism, represents the integrity of the community. (Kim Jong Il 1995: 16–17)

On the one hand human beings are said to be masters of their own destiny, but on the other North Korean discourses state that they require "correct guidance" to carry out their role as subjects of sociohistorical development.

> If they are to hold their position and fulfil their role as subject of history, the popular masses must be brought into contact with leadership. Only under correct leadership, would the masses, though creators of history, be able to occupy the position and perform their role as subject of socio-historical development. The link between leadership and masses is a very important question especially in the revolutionary movement, the communist movement, which is carried out by the working class and the broad masses of other people. Without correct leadership the communist movement would not advance victoriously because this movement itself is a highly conscious and organized one involving a serious class struggle. The question of leadership in this movement is precisely the question of leadership given by the party and the leader to the masses of the people. (Kim Jong Il 1982b 16–17).

Human behavior is therefore not guided by the conditions and relationships of production, but by the direct guidance of the 'brain', while the body has primarily executive functions. Even more pointedly: According to the state ideology of *Chuch'e*, it is only possible for North Koreans to recognize and develop their own original qualities through the leadership of the Kim family. This conception refers directly to the special position of the latter within the sociopolitical organism, which is the ultimate sovereign in North Korea.

In her groundbreaking anthropological study *Reading North Korea*, Sonia Ryang anchors this transition to sovereignty in the fact that the parental leader's status and perception changed dramatically from the 1970s: "During the two decades of the 1970s and 1980s, Kim Il Sung was enshrined as sovereign" (2012: 17). While he had previously been described as "Beloved Leader," North Korean sources now portrayed Kim Il Sung as "a form of existence that is untouchable, yet ubiquitous, an entity that exists for its own sake, its very nature filled with love and wisdom" (Ibid.: 17). This representation of Kim Il Sung — and, by extension, of his successors Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un — as the foundation of North Korean society also led to a redefinition of the role and identity of the subject. According to this the individual now took on a form of self-identification that was in harmony with the ideas of and about the respective leaders, and that promoted a self-perception as subordinate to the sovereign.

In this sociocultural system, individuals are evaluated on the basis of their efforts to follow and adhere to the teachings of the Kim family. The discourse gives the individual a certain idea of themselves, and subjects this understanding to a specific "truth regime." Since the Kim family functions as "master signifier" of this truth regime, as core instances denoting something as true and appropriate, as legal and desirable, the North Korean population is supposed to strive to act on the basis of these guidelines and to internalize them. Accepting these teachings and using them as the basis for one's own actions is thus supposed to be natural and ethically correct. As Ryang explains, members of North Korean society therefore identify themselves closely with the leadership around the Kim family, and "they do so by identifying themselves as the originary point of self-subjection to the sovereign" (2008: 93). Only through conscious and active political subjugation, as well as the accompanying absolute obligation of loyalty toward the leadership and the complete integration into the collective, does the individual acquire meaning through the political life given by the *suryŏng*.

The nontemporality of loss: The concept of sociopolitical life

Approaching the politics of mourning in North Korea requires us to analyze the aforementioned concept of political life. The country's ideological discourses make a fundamental distinction between biological life and what is described as political or sociopolitical life. While the former refers to "man's life as a biological organism," the latter denotes "man's life as a social being" (Kim Jong Il 1982a: 11).

> Without physical life man cannot have social and political integrity. However, it is not man's physical life itself that gives birth to his social and political integrity. Likewise, without his developed organic body his independence, creativity and consciousness would be inconceivable, but his biological characteristics themselves do not produce his social attributes. Man's social attributes can take

> shape and develop only through the process of his emergence and development as
> a social being, in other words, through the process of the historical development
> of his social activity and his social relationship. The history of social development
> is the history of development of man's independence, creativity and
> consciousness. (Kim Jong Il 1996: 9-10)

While biological life is "given" by parents through birth, political life is bestowed
by the leadership around the Kim family; while the former is finite, the latter endures
beyond biological death. Through the "gift of political life" and the wholesale
integration into the collective, the individual is redeemed and lives on in the
memories of society even after their death. But as Kwon and Chung have correctly
stated, the gift of political life in the country is a double-edged sword:

> Citizenship in North Korea includes not only the right to enjoy the gift of true
> political life given by the founding leader but also the obligation to recognize
> deeply one's personal indebtedness to this gift of life and to show this recognition
> in concrete actions through deeds of loyalty to the donor and to his house of
> dominion. (2012: 156)

The prerequisite for attaining political life is therefore the obligation of absolute
loyalty to the Kim family.

> The concept of life within the Juche ideology is based on the belief in the
> revolutionary Great Leader (*suryeong*) as the core ideal. […] The Great Leader
> […] provides the most precious element of all to the people, political life, and is
> the benefactor that allows the people to develop their political life. A man's
> parents give him physical life but the Great Leader provides his social and political
> life. […] Therefore, allegiance to the Great Leader […] who gave the most
> precious social and political life is the natural duty of all revolutionary warriors
> of the Great Leader. One can only bask in his political life when he gives his
> allegiance to the Great Leader. (Gang 1986: 37-42, quoted in: Chung 2011: 110-
> 111)

Viewed in this way, the (idealized) subjectivation described, among other places, in
the *Chuch'e* ideology is a complex process in which the individual must undergo a
deliberate act of "subjugation" in order to become a meaningful political subject (see
also, Ryang 2012). In this process, the life of every North Korean citizen becomes a
conceptual part of the sovereign (social/societal) body personified by the leader. It
is a social system in which "even one's own family members become irrelevant"
(Ryang 2012: 186), and in which the most important and exclusive social
relationship is that between the individual and the sovereign leader. Nevertheless,
the former is not completely deprived of their individuality as such; rather, as part
of the larger national collective, they are integrated into a superorganic family that
is situated above the private family: the higher-valued community of the Kim Il Sung
nation, with the Kims as parental leaders.

However while one's biological life is given, gaining political life requires specific effort on the part of the individual — and especially the constant and (self-)critical reviewing of one's relationship to the leadership. Seen from this perspective, the individual is not only passively part of a collective, but is also obliged to permanently and actively discipline their own "moral-ideological purity" (Ibid.: 186). This extreme accentuation of the relationship to the self does not, however, mean the formation of a strong individualism; rather, it results in the "disqualification of the values of private life" (Ibid.: 140–141). Self-cultivation in North Korea, and more broadly the whole process of subjectivation, is therefore not a private but instead a highly public undertaking (Ibid.: 184).

Arguably the most suitable example in this context is the institutionalized — and public — self-reflection or self-criticism within the framework of the review sessions known as *saenghwal ch'onghwa*. Within specific units (such as school classes or collectives), the North Korean population is disciplined to regularly and publicly analyze its weaknesses and misconduct and, through mutual criticism and above all self-criticism, to discover ways to improve or "purify" the self. This strategy of control via self-control is an elementary component of the North Korean exercising of power, and strongly reminiscent of the pastoral technique of confession and repentance. The obligation to accept a certain canon of obligations, to recognize certain statements (and their transcription) as permanent truth, and to accept certain (institutional) authorities (and their decisions) are not only characteristics of Christian governance, but can also consequently be identified in modern nation-states too.

The central point here is the fulfillment of the objective that by influencing the body, dominion over human consciousness is simultaneously gained — not least because regularly executed routines and disciplines transform thinking, or, as Foucault writes, even the soul. On the one hand, such institutionalized measures as public self-criticism certainly serve the purpose of disciplining. Each individual step in a process to be performed is precisely defined; each person is continuously classified and assigned their appropriate place in society. As in the Christian institutionalized technique of confession and repentance, every North Korean citizen has a duty to discipline themself and to make known their misdemeanors and "sins" through public confession, thus approaching the ideal as represented by their leaders (Ryang 2012: 185).

Viewed in this way the power technique of *saenghwal ch'onghwa,* which aims to uncover inner truth, is an institution that permits the examination of conscience and the acquisition of knowledge of inner secrets — indispensable for the guidance of souls. The steering of the individual is therefore inseparably linked to a certain knowledge of the truth of that person, which is generated, among other things, by

pastoral power. Every individual, writes Ryang, "[is] supposed to feel the presence of the sacred being in order to reveal to this great entity every shortcoming that they happen to possess, so as to attain self-improvement" (Ibid.: 185).

The difference to the Christian institution of confession is public awareness. While that Christian disciplinary technique relies on the anonymity of the confessional, *saenghwal ch'onghwa* is contrariwise dependent on an element of deliberate publicity. This observation is crucial for understanding why the politics of mourning, as an element of the self-cultivation process in North Korea, also entail a highly public element, as exemplified not least by the public mourning ceremonies for the country's deceased leaders.

Seen against the background of the concept of political life, the process of national mourning for the country's deceased leaders is not merely an expression of sorrow and grief. Rather, as political life is not bound by biological life, mourners publicly demonstrate loyalty to the deceased leaders even after and beyond their demise, and at the same time publicly assert fealty to the next generation of the Kim family too. As discussed by Judith Butler, the idea of "plural performativity" seems to have a particular important effect here — that is, "the reproduction of community or sociality itself as bodies congregate […] on the street" (2013: 175). But instead of enacting forms of resistance, the mourning practices in North Korea, as meticulously staged events, also serve the purpose of stabilizing the existing hierarchical and regulatory power regimes.

The staging of loss … and of what remains

Public mourning is a ritual that has existed in many if not most cultures across the world, from Mesopotamia in the 3rd millennium BC up until the present day. While funerary rites vary as greatly as the manifestations of grief do, in each case the performance of particular such rites has a number of important functions — both in terms of easing the grieve of those who remain behind following the experience of loss and regarding what and how that which was lost are to be remembered. In the case of the loss of national leaders — and particularly in countries governed by a distinctive personality cult — this site is inherently political. In their discussion of "public grievability," Butler and Athanasiou rightly note that

> [such] re-membering engaged with the ways in which memoro-politics is produced through, and predicated upon, a constant contestation regarding what matters as memorable, who owns memory, and who or what is dispossessed of the rights and rites of memorability. (2013: 174)

All of this makes the mourning of national leaders inherently political, and in North Korea, as a theater state, the staging of particular events linked to these practices of grieving are of vital importance. The politics of mourning in the country, it is argued

here, is therefore not only contained in psychological discourse but is also embedded in the realm of the public and the performative. In the following section a particular illustrative example of the theatrical staging of mourning following the experience of national loss in North Korea is discussed in greater detail: the related rituals and institutionalization of memory for Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il respectively.

(Public) mourning for Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il

On December 19, 2011, North Korean state media announced that Kim Jong Il had died of heart failure on his armored train at 8:30 a.m. two days earlier, while on his way to give a guidance tour (Choe and Pak 2018: 130; KCNA 2011a; Rodong Sinmun 2011a). Upon this announcement, North Koreans rushed to mourning altars in order to pay homage to their deceased leader. On December 28, much of Pyongyang's population came out onto the streets to bid farewell to Kim Jong Il during his official funeral procession. While citizens wailed, the designated hereditary heir, Kim Jong Un, was exposed to the media and walked for some time alongside the casket during the procession, symbolizing that he would now rule the country in the post-Kim Jong Il era. The entire country remained in a state of (public) mourning until the national funeral service officially ended on December 28. Tidal waves of people screaming and beating their chests often appeared in the North Korean media during these ten days of mourning.

The public grievance that was evident during the state funeral for Kim Jong Il was, however, not a new phenomenon. When Kim Il Sung died in July 1994, the people's response to the death of their state founder had looked, if anything, still more dramatic than that to the passing of their Dear Leader in December 2011. The mourning period for Kim Il Sung was also longer than that for Kim Jong Il, lasting for thirteen days rather than the ten for Kim Jong Il (Lim 2015: 1). For the people, the death of the Great Leader was unfathomable. The statement of former North Korean commando Kim Sin-jo, who was arrested in Seoul in 1968, illustrates the status of Kim Il Sung. He states that he respected Kim Il Sung more than his own parents, and that "he was the center of my thoughts and I was not able to think about myself without considering him" (quoted in: Lim 2015: 1). Reflecting the traditional Confucian rites for the dead, Kim Jong Il ordered the people to uphold a three-year mourning period for his father lasting from July 1994 to July 1997.

The passing of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il constituted major political events in the DPRK's national history. Given that the demise of a leader is a highly challenging political event in any authoritarian country governed by a personality cult, it is hardly surprising that the mourning processes following the demise of these two individuals were themselves highly political, being linked to a particular set of events, rituals, and practices. Among them, the public funeral ceremonies were arguably the most

symbolic and prolific mourning events, constituting major political spectacles. This is because the funeral processes themselves are not only strictly controlled events but also contain a number of messages for both domestic and external audiences — all of which play a crucial role in the theatrical staging of mourning for the deceased leaders.

The similarity of the mourning processes for the two individuals in question suggests a high degree of formalization, even institutionalization. For instance, ahead of the public commemoration ceremonies for both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, "National Funeral Committees" were established that then released details both on the mourning process in general and the state funeral one in specific (e.g. KCNA 2011c). These documents are revealing in a number of ways. Most generally, they disclose how the leadership expects all of the North Korean people to participate in a collective grievance for the deceased leader and cites the particular time frames for these mourning periods. Most importantly, however, the order in which the names are listed provides information about the future power of the respective persons (KCNA 2011b; Rodong Sinmun 2011b: 3). As if to wish to underscore that these are strictly national events, the statements highlight that "foreign mourning delegations will not be received" (KCNA 2011b).

During the respective funeral processions, both led by gigantic portraits of the deceased leaders, the people filled the streets of Pyongyang, publicly lamenting the loss of their national leaders. In both cases, the national loss was portrayed to be akin with the loss of the head of the family, with the people screaming "Father, Father." As Bruce Cumings points out, in traditional Korean society "attachments and the filial gratitude are so strong that Korean children feel acute guilt when parents pass away, and from this come extended and emotional mourning practices – lasting three years in the old days, for a son who lost his father." It is apparent that mourning practices in North Korea following the demise of national leaders recur to these traditions. Accordingly, "[the] drama of collective bereavement and ensuing funerary proceedings (which nominally lasted one hundred days, including the ten days of prefuneral mourning, and later were extended to three years, but which actually continue to this day) were in fact, in an important sense, a *family* affair" (Kwon and Chung 2012: 22, emphasis in original).

The public gatherings constitute powerful and performative acts of mourning in which there is simultaneously an expression of grief over the deceased parental leader and at the same time an assertion of collective loyalty to both them and future incumbents. As such, the public mourning practices held in commemoration of Kim Il Sung and later of Kim Jong Il were instances of plural performativity that seemed to have at least two important effects: First, they were meant to portray the image of the people articulating their grief, a voice at once individual and social. Second, the

reproduction of community or sociality itself, as bodies congregated and enacted forms of loyalty.

While this level of collective and, at the same time, individual mourning is important, the politics thereof in North Korea encompass another crucial aspect of sociopolitical life too: namely the question of succession that is so important in such a society. In other words, the politics of mourning in North Korea are simultaneously geared toward the remembrance of that which is lost and the highlighting of that which remains. The experience of national loss in North Korea is thus intrinsically linked also to the question of what endures, with mourning practices thus constituting a vital element in the public staging of such a country's political succession.

In a sense, these funeral ceremonies are crucial events for the North Korean state — for it is in this context that the successors are publicly tasked with carrying the legacies of the deceased into the future. Consequently, at both commemoration ceremonies held on Kim Il Sung Square in 1994 and 2011 respectively, the message of a stable transition of power within the Kim family was as important as the actual commemoration of the deceased itself. This is particularly well reflected in the commemoration speech for Kim Il Sung given by Kim Yong Nam. What began as mournful words for the deceased leader gradually shifted toward an unreserved eulogy for the new one, Kim Jong Il — as expressed, not least, by an unfurled vast red banner that read "Let us loyally uphold the ideas and leadership of the Dear Leader Kim Jong Il."

The nontemporality of loss and the public display and staging of bodies

A particular important aspect in the politics of mourning of both national leaders examined is the nontemporality of loss, arguably most significantly expressed by the decision to preserve their bodies via embalming and then to put them on public display. Following his death, Kim Il Sung's body was made available for regulated viewing within the expansive structure originally called the Kŭmsusan Presidential Hall, later renamed Kŭmsusan Memorial Palace — and, since February 2012, officially labeled Kŭmsusan Palace of the Sun. Before his demise, Kŭmsusan was the space in which Kim Il Sung lived and worked. After his death, however, the palace was turned into a central site of North Korean pilgrimage. The palace still houses Kim Il Sung's relics as he used them when he was still alive, and visiting what is deemed a "sacred site" is seen as a privilege. Every day, hundreds of North Koreans walk through the palace, forming long lines and proceeding in a slow, orderly, yet emotional fashion through the halls filled with serene music. What is noteworthy here is that this particular ritual of mourning entails a grieving approach

to the bodies of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il as if they were still alive, as if they were still with the North Korean people. The public display of both Kim Il Sung's and Kim Jong Il's embalmed bodies and the subsequent tributes paid to them by the people are thus to be regarded as a performative enactment of this state discourse, making visible the national founder in the midst of the relics as he used them while still alive. Just as the state discourse stipulates that the *suryŏng* never dies, his preserved body is also meant to portray this durability.

Similarly, shortly after the official mourning period for Kim Jong Il ended in late December 2011, North Korean state media publicly announced that his body was to be embalmed and put on public display in Kŭmsusan Memorial Palace next to that of Kim Il Sung (Choe and Pak 2018: 131). These premises underwent a revamp and change of name to become the Kŭmsusan Palace of the Sun so as "to preserve the Chairman in his lifetime appearance and to shine the Palace as the eternal sanctuary of the Sun" (Ibid.: 131). This move was paralleled by new and modified "immortality towers" erected throughout the country, ones now accompanied by such slogans as "The great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il will always be with us" and "The great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are immortal." In February 2012, the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), the National Defence Commission (NDC), and the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK adopted a joint resolution on conferring the title of "DPRK Generalissimo" on Kim Jong Il (Ibid.: 131). The WPK Fourth Conference and the Fifth Session of the 12th Supreme People's Assembly in April of the same year held him as the "eternal leader of the revolution, the eternal general secretary of the WPK, and the eternal chairman of the DPRK NDC" (Ibid.: 131).

Putting the preserved bodies of both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il on public display, Kŭmsusan Palace of the Sun has become not only the mausoleum for the Kim family but a focal point of North Korean pilgrimages (Lim 2015: 1). At the same time, however, the Palace is not only a space of mourning for these deceased leaders but also one for the pledge of fealty to their living descendants (Ibid.: 36). This point once again illustrates the power mechanisms at work in the relationship between the individual and the leader, as discussed earlier. As every individual is expected not only to be loyal but also to be close to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in order to gain (eternal) political life, their embalmed bodies are a reminder that their own political life did not end — and consequently the need to remain loyal is still in place. As Ryang puts it: "Since Kim Il Sung never dies—not only in terms of body politic but also body natural—dedication and loyalty toward him need also to remain eternal" (2012: 35).

Hence the embalmed bodies of the deceased leaders are not mere symbols of grieving, but actual and material reminders of the necessity of eternal loyalty — and

each tribute paid to their bodies constitutes a performative act further perpetuating the state discourse and the enshrining of the described power mechanisms at work. This nontemporality of loss is not limited to Kŭmsusan Palace of the Sun either, but is widely reflected in the broader state discourse. For example, this notion is also encapsulated in the countless aforementioned immortality towers found all throughout the country, being edifices that were established following the demise of Kim Il Sung and later modified after the death of Kim Jong Il to enshrine his own perpetuity too. These structures put forth the message that both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il "will forever be with us" through the constant presence they represent nationwide. It is this nontemporality of loss that helps explain, furthermore, North Korea's decision to name Kim Il Sung the "eternal president" and Kim Jong Il the "eternal leader of the party."

Conclusions

The politics of mourning in North Korea is a complex and inherently political phenomenon, as the death of a leader naturally becomes a significant element in the succession process. As such it becomes intrinsically linked with the ways in which memoro-politics are produced, how the deceased are remembered and by whom, as well as the question of who comes next. In order to successfully approach this complex phenomenon, then, a deeper understanding of the relationship between the individual and the leader(s), as well as of the subsequent process of subjectivation, is required. Drawing on the concept of the "sociopolitical organism" and the notion of "political life and the nontemporality of loss," it was shown that each of these understandings helps explain a set of particular aspects linked to the politics of mourning in North Korea.

To begin with, exploring the relationship between the individual and leader in the context of the sociopolitical organism helps us to understand the loss of the leader in North Korea as akin to the loss of the national parent. Grieving thus not only becomes a national but also at the same time an individual and social endeavor too. Moreover, the discussed process of subjectivation helps us to grasp that these events, in an authoritarian context such as this one, necessarily entails a public element. The latter is crucial to the politics of mourning in North Korea, as reflected not least in the public nature of the institutionalized both funeral and grievance rites and in the staging of the deceased's preserved bodies. The latter, however, also signifies the nontemporality of loss, for such endeavors must be seen as constituting part of efforts by the North Korean regime to overcome the impermanence of biological life — and thus to decouple the influence of the deceased leaders from their finite physical existence.

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Refereed article

Doing Discourse Research in Chinese Studies: Methodological Reflections on the Basis of Studying Green Consumption and Population Policy

Björn Alpermann and Franziska Fröhlich

Summary

As Chinese Studies and other Area Studies have become increasingly sophisticated in the methodologies they use, more in-depth discussions on researchers' discourse-analytic practices seem desirable. This article is thus a methodological reflection, coming as part of the authors' own ongoing research projects. It describes some of the characteristic ways in which discourse fields in the Chinese context are structured, as well as the underlying rules at work. Specifically, discourses in China are politically constrained through "soft steering under the shadow of hierarchy," structured in a top-down manner through the "follow the leader imperative," and bloated due to a bandwagon effect. It is argued that these specificities of the Chinese discourse context pose a challenge for researchers doing discourse research on the country. The article therefore offers examples from two research projects on green consumption and eco-motivated diets and on population policy in China so as to present the strategies that the authors have applied in their own research to deal with such challenges.

Keywords: discourse analysis; discourse research; sociology of knowledge approach to discourse analysis (SKAD); Chinese Studies; green consumption; food consumption; population policy

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Introduction: Discourse analysis in Chinese Studies

Social Science research on China, like any field of Area Studies, often has a difficult standing vis-à-vis the so-called disciplines like Sociology, Political Science, Anthropology, among others. Because Chinese studies do not possess their own set of methods but borrow from a range of disciplines, they are often seen to be less rigorous and sophisticated, when their interdisciplinarity could instead be considered an asset. In reaction to such challenges, the methodological debate within Chinese studies has intensified in recent years (Carlson et al. 2010; Guo 2013; Heimer and Thøgersen 2006).

As the methodological development within Chinese studies has continued, more and more China scholars have been attracted to employing different methods and approaches to make the most of the training they received and to become compatible with trends in "their own discipline" (O'Brien 2011: 539). Methodological plurality is, of course, desirable. In employing state-of-the-art methods to Social Science research on China, however, scholars need to pay sufficient attention to the specifics of this society in cultural, linguistic, but also political terms.

On a similar note, we see a growing body of research using discourse analysis (or at least discussing prevalent social discourses) in Chinese studies (Dippner 2016; Eberhardt 2015; Kolås 2014; Schneider 2015; Yeh 2005). Due to strict limitations of space when publishing in journals, however, questions of how discourse analysis is practically implemented are often left unanswered. Björn Alpermann (2009) has argued elsewhere that Chinese studies are in a process of methodological diversification that affects quantitative and qualitative approaches alike. In the face of the increasing methodological sophistication of their quantitatively inclined colleagues, qualitative China scholars are under growing pressure to enhance their methodological skills in order to demonstrate the rigor of their work (Berger 2015). Therefore, we see great potential in developing the use of discourse analysis in this field and encourage scholars using discourse-analytic approaches to engage in methodological reflections about their practices, their strategies of data collection, and their data analysis.

Against this backdrop, we argue that discourses in China are shaped by its unique political system and social context in ways that present specific challenges for doing discourse research. Thus, discourses in China are politically constrained through "soft steering under the shadow of hierarchy," structured in a top-down manner through the "follow the leader imperative," and bloated due to a bandwagon effect. To further illustrate these points, we describe strategies we have applied in our own research to account for the specificities of the Chinese discourse context. The article is thus a methodological reflection, coming as part of the authors' own ongoing research projects, and also an invitation to critique our approach and contribute to its improvement.

We are convinced that the discourse-analytic practice in Area Studies can benefit from such reflexive endeavors in terms of methodological sophistication and rigor. The article is therefore mainly aimed at scholars engaged in Social Science research on China. It might of course also be of interest to researchers working in other cultural contexts, as an opportunity to look at how their methodological approaches and related methods might fare elsewhere — since they may learn about the cultural contingencies of their own methods (Kruse et al. 2012).

To achieve these goals, the text is structured as follows. In the next section, we first briefly sum up the general assumptions and goals of discourse analysis. We then use the remainder of that section to describe some of the characteristic ways in which discourse fields in the Chinese context are structured, as well as the underlying rules we see at work. We suggest that these peculiarities of the Chinese discourse context pose a challenge for researchers doing discourse research on the country. The subsequent section therefore offers some fresh perspectives and presents the strategies that we have applied in our own research to deal with the challenges we identified.

The structure of discursive fields in China

A broad tradition of different approaches to doing discourse analysis exists (Keller 2013: 5 ff); they are, however, united by their common basis in social constructivism and structuralism (Ibid.: 4). Discourse-analytic approaches hypothesize that humans' relationships to the material and social worlds are mediated by collectively constructed meaning systems. The latter consist of signs which (pre)structure our perception and instruct both our interpretation of and communication about those worlds. The meaning of material and social phenomena and the human being's societal reality is thus substantially constructed in practices of sign usage. Individual signs form part of larger knowledge structures that can be reconstructed. In discourse research, scholars analyze one portion of this knowledge in its manifestation as discourse. They reconstruct the rules and patterns that order discursive statements through the application of interpretive-hermeneutic methods.

We see the specificity of discourses in China as lying chiefly with the ways in which discourse fields are structured there. China is an authoritarian one-party state. Even though its authoritarianism is fragmented, the state plays a categorically different role in structuring discourse fields in China than it does in liberal-democratic societies. The Chinese party-state's influential role consists in its outstanding capacity to shape the rules according to which discourses are produced: to incentivize the sometimes overly prolific formulation of certain discourse statements while curbing or completely precluding the formulation of others. We therefore want to sketch out some of the recurring characteristics of discourse fields in China that we observe, and to lay out some of the rules that we see at work — ones both enabling and restricting forces of discourse production. The rules we describe are of course not uniformly at work in all discourse fields, and every discourse field has its

very own logic (Keller 2011: 231); but, some rules are so binding that to not follow them means taking a significant risk.

Political constraints on discourses in China: Soft steering under the shadow of hierarchy

Discourse production in contemporary Chinese society is prolific. Volume does not equal discursive plurality, however. Controlling what people think or how they talk about certain issues continues to be of ultimate importance to upholding the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) grip on power (Holbig 2013). Therefore, the Chinese authorities expend a great amount of effort on maintaining the upper hand in public discourse fields — especially those that touch upon vital interests of the ruling CCP. Where an issue is particularly sensitive, they might even encroach on technologically mediated private communication (Qin 2017; Repnikova 2017). In a time in which the commercialization of the media and the evolution of the internet has dissolved the Party's exclusive claim to positions of legitimate speaking and pluralized access to public discourses, this control can no longer be attained by using only insipid propaganda slogans. In response, the CCP has developed much more nuanced and indirect ways to steer public opinion instead (Brady 2008).

Building on the body of work of political-steering theory (Schubert and Alpermann 2019), we propose to call this approach by the Party soft steering under the shadow of hierarchy. The concept of "soft steering" was first developed to describe a general approach to the governing of behavior, and it aptly captures how the CCP regulates the production of discourse statements. The steering is "soft" in the sense that political authorities prefer to use discursive strategies to guide the population toward desired behaviors (Arndt and Richter 2009); the looming "shadow of hierarchy" (Scharpf 2000) is always present, however. The party-state reserves for itself the option to intervene whenever a certain line of the permissible is overstepped, creating ripple effects way beyond the immediate targets (Stern and Hassid 2012). Speakers may then easily face jail or extralegal disappearance — and such cases have been significantly on the rise in recent years (Reporters Without Borders 2017).

The strength of political constraints on public utterances — how likely intervention is, and how severe repression will be — varies considerably from one issue area to the next. But it also differs across time and space, and what might be safe to say in one specific context may be quite dangerous to articulate in another (Stern and O'Brien 2011). Thus, researchers need to be attuned to these fine details of context in order to understand discourse dynamics and their implications for discourse statements in China.

Of course, discourses are never completely free from limitations enforced by more powerful discourse actors or discourse coalitions, but we argue that the Chinese party-state has a greater determination and is better organized in terms of access to resources to take on any challenges to the messages that it wants to propagate: it can use the full array of propaganda instruments at its disposal. Since this is not the place

to review the whole set of organizations and institutional arrangements involved, suffice to say that from the very elite level (Central Leading Group on Ideology and Propaganda) the reach of the Party extends downward through its Propaganda Departments on each administrative level. These Propaganda Departments, especially the central one, are very powerful players whose sole purpose is to provide guidance on what constitutes permissible public utterance and to police its limits, or to use Michael Schoenhals's expression: "to proscribe some formulations while prescribing others" (1992: 3).

Crucially, the Propaganda Departments not only react to violations but actively try to steer the public debate by disseminating certain formulae (提法 *tifa*) for issue areas deemed of key relevance — formulae that all news outlets are thereafter required to use. The use of these *tifa* has a long tradition in China, involving the highest-ranking politicians personally — and continues to do so (Repnikova 2017; Schoenhals 1992: 6). While the party-state thus creates a distinguished speaking position for itself and ensures that its own discourse statements bypass conventional media selection processes, it curtails other actors' access to such positions. The researcher needs to keep in mind that any publication that deviates from a prescribed formulation or from Propaganda Department guidelines risks censure. Prescribed formulations and official guidelines therefore have repercussions even beyond their direct application: faced with censure and potentially more severe forms of repression, many Chinese authors — both professionals and amateurs writing online — practice self-censorship.

The latter might not even be practiced by authors themselves; editing boards and publishers may make editorial or publishing decisions amounting to self-censorship in order to avoid having a publication reflect back negatively on them (Tong 2009). In the absence of more diverse views, many discursive fields have been quite amenable to official efforts at steering mainstream public opinion. Scholars and academic publications are also monitored, although given the smaller readership of scientific publications greater leeway exists in making (veiled) criticism even in politicized fields compared to in the mass media (Alpermann and Yang, 2020).

Online discourse fields are similarly structured, with the party-state using a mix of inundating discursive spaces with officially sanctioned statements and curtailing statements that are considered too dangerous. Reacting to the rise of the internet and social media, the party-state has considerably expanded its censorship and developed related technological skills to rapidly delete news or comments (including pictures) that are deemed a threat. Moreover, the practice of "guiding public opinion" (舆论引导 *yulun yindao*) has been significantly reinforced by using a great number of internet trolls — the so-called Fifty-Cent Party (五毛党 *wumaodang*), given their alleged pay per entry — among other things, to sway the public to adopt the officially preferred frames of interpretation. Irrespective of whether these interventions suffice to create the desired effect (Clark and Zhang 2017; Han 2015a; Shi-Kupfer et al. 2017), the existence of such a large — though not precisely known — number of

internet trolls greatly complicates the analysis of online material, since it is hard to distinguish state-sponsored contributors to online discussions from those who might be defending the regime out of genuine conviction (Han 2015b). Furthermore, while dissenting voices are sometimes tolerated to a remarkable extent (Shi-Kupfer et al. 2017) they will likely be silenced whenever they seem to threaten a spillover into offline protests (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013). In sum, it can be said that:

> The CCP still censors, but it also does the opposite of censorship. It floods the mass media with competing information, thereby adding uncertainty (Hassid 2008). It muddies the water so to speak. Or in systems-theoretical terms, it increases the variety from which the public must select meaning.
> (Clark and Zhang 2017: 792)

Top-down structure of discourses: Follow the leader imperative

Because of the above, discursive fields in China often display a particular top-down structure. This most strongly manifests itself in politics of course, where the existence of discipline inspection commissions, nomenklatura lists, cadre responsibility contracts, and the ever-looming threat of corruption charges all ensure that the staffing of (speaking) positions is tightly controlled by Party superiors (Edin 2003; Heilmann 2004). China scholars have long recognized the logic that lies behind the processes of policy deliberation. As Schoenhals remarks: "A survey of the history of the PRC suggests that Chinese political discourse is restricted not so much with respect to content as with respect to form" (1992: 20). Susan Greenhalgh, meanwhile, describes it in this way:

> Under the "follow the leader imperative," neither subordinate leaders nor anyone else is allowed to speak differently or think differently. The rules of the political game require that others always remain within the "speech space" of the top leader, using his words to express their thoughts. They may extract his words from their original context and stretch, rework, or even twist their meaning, but they must express their views in his formulations. In a system in which political formulations are either "correct" or "incorrect"—absolutely right or dead wrong—violation of correct language has been a serious and dangerous political offence. (2008: 51)

This explains why central documents (those issued by either the Party center or national government, or both together) have such an important role to play. They present political narratives and legitimize specific policies (Van Gerven 2019). Generally speaking, central-level policy documents all follow a set line of argumentation: First, they hail the success of previous policies. Second, they discuss areas where there are still problems or new challenges. Finally, they present the solutions to these: either new policies or a reiteration of previous ones, which at times can be hard to distinguish from one another (Alpermann and Zhan 2019). Because the party-state would never admit to having been wrong, except for in truly exceptional cases, shifts in policy stances can only be gleaned by very close reading — in fact, often "between the lines" — of official statements. In the highly

formalized language of Chinese politics even slight changes in formulations may hint at much larger modifications in implied meanings. The same is also true for political slogans intended for public consumption.

Since China is a huge country with a high level of diversity socioeconomically, demographically, and in other respects, central-level documents — for all their importance — cannot but be rather vague. As Kenneth Lieberthal concludes, "most Politburo decisions are intended to be followed in spirit rather than in letter" (1978: 77). Central-level policy documents thus leave enough room for interpretation for lower-level administrations to decide what fits their own local conditions best. Instead of stating clear requirements for local governments, they oftentimes will only drop oblique hints and leave it to local officials (as well as researchers) to figure out what they mean exactly. Even when specific policy targets are announced, the measures to be employed in order to meet these will usually be left unspecified. Alternatively, the documents may mention several concrete measures alongside each other, leaving it up to local governments to choose the right ones.

Party-state-related discourses are also affected indirectly by this phenomenon of following the leader. Even in less politicized fields and when no *tifa* has been issued, Chinese authors (academics, journalist, and other writers) are highly attentive to the terminology being used by political leaders or authoritative publications — meaning those carrying the opinions of the leadership, such as the flagship newspaper *People's Daily*. Again, following fashions in using concepts or expressions is certainly not a behavior unique to China. The difference lies in the scale of this phenomenon, the monocentric nature of hierarchy implied in the process, and the uniformity that it engenders: once a certain formulation has an official imprimatur, it is eagerly taken up by all kinds of authors who use it to publish their own take on the concept — within the limits of the permissible, of course. Many politically tinged concepts are at first deliberately left unspecified (or at least underspecified), which leads to an outpouring of publications all trying to give meaning to this phrase, though rarely agreeing on its content. In many instances, political leaders use this process to farm out the meaning-making to academics and later pick the interpretations they like the most and standardize them — rendering all other readings void (Holbig 2018). At times, earlier formulations are even dropped or replaced altogether; Chinese authors will quickly fall in line. Most often, this process of farming out the meaning-making for official slogans is conducted within academia, for instance via think tanks or specific project tenders (Holbig 2014).

Bloated discourses: The bandwagon effect

A third peculiarity we want to elaborate on here pertains to the volume and nature of discourse statements in China. The sheer quantity of discourse materials encountered can be intimidating, but often much of that is produced by simple reduplication. We see several reasons for this being the case. First, and related to the follow the leader imperative, in politicized discourses repeating what the leadership

has said serves to signal allegiance: what counts here is not the content (much less the originality) of what is being said, but rather the exact repetition of the phrases adopted by the leadership to demonstrate that one toes the Party line. To quote Schoenhals, "formalized language [serves] as a form of power" (1992: 1–29).

Second, we argue that through the deeply entrenched practice of following *tifa* noted above, such a "bandwagon effect" has expanded even to less politicized fields like academic discourses. This explains why the pattern of policy documents — praise for successes so far, listing of remaining problems, proposals for policy solutions — is also followed by many, if not most, Chinese academic articles. The bandwagon effect occurs when a topic is introduced as a new political priority, or when subject matters or concepts previously considered taboo are suddenly rendered safe by their receiving of official backing. Once a topic has been officially opened up, it becomes safe to explore — as long as one does not stray (too far) from the authorized reading and phraseology. But it also means that as a researcher using discourse analysis, one must find out where the clues come from that everyone else is following, in order to discover what these discursive strategies ultimately aim at.

We see yet another set of rules at work here: officials and scholars all have their own incentives to produce numerous articles and even book publications (Holbig 2018: 350). Chinese academics are under extreme pressure to publish (Fischer 2014: 42). Like in the West, they are often given incentives linked to high-ranking journal publications; unlike international practices, however, their institutions may even stipulate specific word (character) counts for monographs to be written. Beyond these material incentives, scholars may also strive for symbolic recognition, e.g. by being appointed by a (local) government to an expert panel, which in turn lends credibility to the claim to "scientific" policymaking: "Since scholars and governments representatives both strive to secure legitimacy and power, they form highly symbiotic networks, and their claims mutually reinforce each other" (Maags and Holbig 2016: 85).

Furthermore, in another deviation from practices abroad, higher-up officials are also expected to publish in what are considered academic journals (Meinhof 2018: 331). In a country where the scholar-official used to be the idealized elite during imperial times and where technocrats constitute a large part of the contemporary leadership, it is seen as desirable for politicians to have a few publications under their belts. To achieve publication, both groups of authors often jump on an already-rolling bandwagon by taking up what is considered a "hot topic" — even though they may not be able to add any new insights to it at all. In the case of officials, in fact, their contributions may simply rehash public policy. For the researcher using discourse analysis, this means that the discourse is bloated by repetitions, easily creating a frustrating feeling of déjà-vu all over again. We hold that the extent of this reduplication goes far beyond what is to be found in other societies — occasionally the very same article is published twice by an author, just with some cosmetic

changes made to the title second time around — and consequently can only be understood by keeping the above-described structures, rules, and incentives in mind.

Pragmatic research strategies for discourse analysis in the Chinese context

Discourse analysis in action 1: Researching green consumption and eco-motivated diets

Here we turn to our own research to discuss how we ourselves dealt with the challenges outlined in the previous section. In her project, Franziska Fröhlich is interested in the persuasive interventions directed at Chinese eaters convincing them to reorient their food consumption practices in light of ecological concerns. The project looks at discourses on sustainable "green" consumption and ecologically motivated forms of food intake, with a particular focus on statements that address dietary practices. It asks how food and diet are ecologically problematized, whether and how consumers are responsibilized to answer to ecological problems through their food consumption practices, and what eco-motivated practices are proposed to eaters. To address these questions, the project draws on a sample that mainly consists of guidebook and lifestyle literature, but these sources are also complemented by informational and advertising materials published by civil society and economic actors.

As the research question is framed in a very open fashion, the author relies on thematic references, key terms, and speaking positions to sample materials. The initial thematic orientation was toward "eco-friendliness" (环保 *huan bao*) and "sustainable consumption" (可持续消费 *ke chixu xiaofei*) of food. However, more key terms accrued as the author became more familiar with the research field: ones such as "green consumption" (绿色消费 *lüse xiaofei*), "organic food" (有机食品 *youji shipin*), "natural food" (自然/天然食品 *ziran/ tianran shipin*), "ecological food" (生态食品 s*hengtai shipin*), "LOHAS" (乐活 *lehuo*) or "low carbon" (低碳 *ditan*) all indicate in some way the eco-relatedness of food products and dietary practices.

At this point, the top-down structure of discourse fields in China was taken into account. Although policy documents are not the primary focus of this research project, the first in-depth analysis consisted of a survey of the party-state's discourse on green consumption. The term has steadily gained currency in the context of China's integration into the global sustainable consumption and production regime and has increasingly been placed into the orbit of China's drive to build an "eco-civilization" (生态文明 *shengtai wenming*). A large part of the Chinese government's understanding of what eaters' ecological responsibilities with regard to their food-consumption practices are is encapsulated by this term. Similarly, the government's concern with a "low-carbon economy" (低碳经济 *ditan jingji*)

explains why an idea such as "low-carbon eating and drinking" (低碳饮食 *ditan yinshi*) might ultimately catch on. Understanding the party-state discourse thus helps elucidate why China's guidebook and lifestyle literature is awash with works on green and low-carbon consumption and living. This example demonstrates that the origins of certain terms, and especially whether they can be considered to have official backing, is crucial for understanding the dynamics witnessed in a given discursive field.

However much of the discussion would be lost if only state-endorsed terms were used to search for material, since the relationship between eco-motivated consumer responsibility and food intake may well be framed differently. This consideration highlights the crucial importance of theoretical "sensitivity" (Corbin and Strauss 2008: 32–35), which is best acquired by combining ethnographic immersion in the field with the reading of secondary literature. Research stays in China were used to visit places important to discourse production, so that the author could acquaint herself with the discursive settings, the social actors and social practices involved in discourse production. She visited and participated in farmers' markets and urban gardens, their community centers as well as talks and events hosted there, ecological farms, events and activities of vegetarian organizations, supermarkets and specialty stores, and in trade fairs for organic, natural, and vegetarian food. This helped her understand why a different part of the guidebook and lifestyle literature was much more focused on naturalness and returning to the land, as well as on a "natural state" (返璞归真 *fanpuguizhen*) of being. Looking at the differences between official and more popular framings of particular issues — and, more importantly, differences in the usage of the same terms — can thus showcase how even state-propagated discourses may face resistance or appropriation by other actors who reshape the meanings conveyed by the relevant terms. Therefore, it is always helpful to at least heuristically distinguish between official (state-endorsed) discourses and popular (societal) ones by looking at the actors associated with a particular discourse (cf. Hsu 2007).

The relatively large number of publications on green and low-carbon living and consumption also evinces the bandwagon effect we explained earlier. To deal with this, the following strategy was applied: using the terms that the author had learnt about through her policy-document analysis and ethnographic immersion, she browsed bookshops, magazine stalls, online sales platforms, as well as public and university libraries. Looking through the blurbs, summaries, and tables of contents — and, if possible, leafing through the books — helped decide whether an item was relevant to the research. Sometimes availability was an issue: Books that answer to faddishly popular political slogans such as "low-carbon lifestyle" might be published in small editions because the publishing house wanted a book with that title or the author wished to make a notch in that specific field vis-à-vis their publications list. These books can go out of stock quickly and will not be reprinted.

For more in-depth analysis, two alternative criteria were relied upon: the popularity of a book as well as it having a distinguished speaking position. Publications were included in the sample that were displayed more prominently in bookshops and on magazine stalls, that went into renewed editions, and that had a longer-lasting availability in stores and on online platforms. Additionally, the authors of the books were looked up to determine their institutional backing; thus, for example, works enjoying support from ministries or municipal governments were included in the sample to see how the government discourse plays out in concrete advice addressed at consumers.

One strategy to deal with the soft steering of discourses in China was drawn from Adele Clarke (2005). The latter suggests that it is necessary to not only scrutinize the material for the positions that are represented, but to always ask for those that are not present too. She offers a heuristic tool that she calls "position maps" to increase sensitivity toward "empty positions" in the material, achieved by making the researcher think outside the box and compare the situation encountered in China to that found in other countries. Ecological-related food consumption practices are not among the most sensitive topics in China, which is why no overt censorship happens to the best of the author's knowledge. Drawing on the idea of soft steering, it becomes clear that non-state actors might not directly refer to those they want to distance themselves from and criticize should they be state agencies. A smaller study on discourses of alternative food networks, for example, showed that official agricultural policy and state support for large agribusinesses were not addressed, even though the discourses clearly constituted themselves in contrast to those two things (Fröhlich 2018). Having considered potential constraints on the discourses under investigation, the follow-up questions will then be: Why are those positions missing? What are the rules at work here?

Discourse analysis in action 2: Researching population policy

In his project on population policy, Björn Alpermann compares official and academic discourses to examine how policy thinking has evolved from a focus on restricting to encouraging births, and furthermore from birth-control to aging-related policies in general (Alpermann and Zhan 2019; Alpermann and Yang, 2020). In contrast to what was the case in previous decades, official texts (such as policy documents, leadership speeches, and similar) are nowadays relatively easy to find over the internet — except for internal documents of course. This does not mean that availability has completely ceased to be an issue, but the websites of official administrations these days usually do have a section for the downloading of "important documents" (called 文库 *wenku* or 政务公开 *zhengwu gongkai*).

However, the nature of political documents — especially those that have been issued regularly, such as action plans in specific policy fields — creates some challenges of its own. As noted above, official documents are often quite bland. In cases where differences do exist beneath the surface between various bureaucratic or political

actors, these may be papered over with vague statements. Alternatively, they may lead to official documents that seem contradictory or contain goals that are hard to reconcile. In order to understand these intricacies, it is important to go beyond studying individual documents. Only through comparison across various dimensions can one make sense of these texts.

In this project, for instance, policy documents on two different population issues, birth control and aging, are compared. So, first, there is the dimension of comparison between different subfields of population policy. This enables the researcher to trace how conceptualizations of population issues vary from one subfield to the next, but also to grasp how these understandings influence each other too. Whereas the National Health and Family Planning Commission[1] is in charge of birth control and traditionally places its focus on restricting population growth, the main bureaucratic actors behind aging-related societal problems are other ministries — specifically the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. Their prime worries relate to providing eldercare and paying for pensioners, meaning that they have a different idea about what China's most pressing demographic challenges are: namely rapid aging and a shrinking labor force. Therefore, this comparison can provide glimpses of contrasting policy stances within the central government itself.

The second dimension of comparison is shifts over time. As official documents never highlight policy reversals and the same measures may be "recycled" as "new" strategies to solve the same problem a number of times, it is only by looking at similar documents from earlier years (or, in fact, decades) that one can one really appreciate shifts in emphasis. Only by reading the previous documents would one see that these are not new ideas; instead they seem to have been tried before, and apparently failed to effectively deal with the issue in question.

This kind of analysis also demonstrates how certain political interpretive patterns and narratives on population developments have become entrenched over time, and travel from one subfield to the other. Thus the idea that certain segments of the population that are excessively large are a "burden" on the state gained currency in the policy debates of the late 1970s to the early 1980s (Greenhalgh 2008: 115). At that time, this burden perspective referred to children; since the mid-1990s / early years of the new century the same perspective has been applied to the elderly, however. In a similar vein, the Chinese discourse of the earlier period placed the country's population problem in a global perspective ("overpopulation") and suggested that it was acting responsibly in the face of an global crisis by restricting birth numbers (Greenhalgh 2008: 154). Nowadays, an analogous interpretive pattern of a global population problem is invoked to contextualize China's issues vis-à-vis an aging society.

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1   There have been several name changes for this and other administrative organizations. The last one, in March 2018, saw it drop the term "family planning."

> Xi Jinping gave a speech during the [Politburo] study session he chaired. He emphasized that the problem of population aging is a global one that produces deep-going and long-term impacts on human society. Our country is one of those where the level of population aging is relatively high, [our] elderly population is the largest, [our] speed of aging is the fastest, [our] responsibility of facing population aging is the heaviest. To satisfy the manifold demands of the enormously large group of elderly masses, to mitigate and solve the social problems brought about by population aging, these tasks impact on overall national development, on the happiness of common people, and require us to confront the issues with great vigor. (CNCAPRC 2016)

This deflects any criticism of China's previous birth-control policies because other countries without birth limits face the same challenge, and shows that China's leaders' frame of reference is the developed world — since, actually, far from all countries suffer from aging societies — which is another parallel to earlier official discourses on population (Greenhalgh 2008: 111). In addition, defining the solution of population problems as the cardinal task on which the attainment of all larger goals of state and society depends also has a long tradition. Thus, the "open letter" of the Central Committee sent to all members of the Party and its Communist Youth League on September 25, 1980, that signaled the start of the harsh "one child" campaign explained:

> This is an important measure that impacts on the speed and direction of constructing the four modernizations [of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology], on the health and happiness of generations of children and grandchildren, and that is in accordance with the long-term and current interests of the people nationwide. (Central Committee 1980)

The third dimension of comparison is to expand the sample by moving downward in the administrative hierarchy, and outward from the party center and central government, to other bureaucratic actors such as ministries and commissions. Usually, whenever the central government publishes a circular or action plan then regional administrations (province, cities, etc.) will follow suit with their own. But China has 31 provincial-level units, so that by extending the scope even one level downward from the center might soon lead one to end up with a sample that turns out to be too large. Depending on the research question, it may be more sensible to intentionally select a few localities for more in-depth study. Following the logic of creating maximum contrast, the current project chose for comparison provinces with different demographic profiles.

A fourth dimension of comparison is that of official and academic discourses on the subject matter at hand. This can be employed to fathom what impacts advisors and scientists might have had in related policymaking. To be sure, the exact processes of how ideas are incorporated into policies — or conversely, how policy ideas are "scientized" (Greenhalgh 2008) — is extremely hard to track in a polity as opaque as the Chinese one (Scharping 2019). But at the very least, such an extension of the analysis to academic discourses can show what other policy options to select from

might have been readily available for decision makers. It is also striking to see how at least some of China's academics use scathing irony to express their frustration at official policy intransigence. Consider the following example by a leading demographer and critic of China's one-child policy, Mu Guangzhong (and his co-authors). In order to propagate the new universal two-child policy they "propose to take the issue date of the 'Open Letter of the Central Committee to all Party and Youth League Members Regarding the Problem of Controlling the Population Increase in China,' September 25, 1980, and turn it into a day of remembrance, an 'anti-abortion day'" (Mu, Mao, and Zhou 2016: 120).

Ostensibly, they stay within the official speech space since they present suggestions for improving the implementation of official policy. But any reader will understand the subtext of their acerbic suggestion: that a cruel policy has been enforced far too long, leading to millions of abortions and exacerbating today's aging problems. Notably, this criticism is much more forthright today than the more veiled attacks on the one-child policy before its eventual lifting — though there are some exceptions to be found in the less academic literature (see Scharping 2019).

Given that the body of work on this — indeed, on virtually any — topic in Chinese is so large due to the mechanisms described in the previous section, another source of information is called on so that the outside researcher can find his way forward: namely expert interviews. These can serve to identify diverging positions on policy issues that are often only hinted at rather than expressed openly in Chinese academic discourses (remember that citing sources is not done in the same way as in international academic publications, which usually reference the positions within the literature that they want to challenge or contradict). Like ethnographic immersion in the previously described project, these interviews serve to familiarize the outside researcher with the "lay of the land" in a given discursive field and can also be used to identify prospective cases for the conducting of in-depth analysis (such as which provinces to select for expanding the sample of official documents downward). In addition, they can be used to discuss preliminary interpretations of discourse elements. Some issues that will not be spelled out in public writing due to political constraints may be clarified in an interview setting meanwhile.

So, we propose that discourse analysis in the Chinese case can benefit greatly from incorporating this data source (cf. Zhang and McGhee 2014). But there are two caveats to add. First, it is prudent to conduct interviews with quite different experts (those more versus less aligned with the party-state, those located in its upper echelons versus in more local academic institutions, and so on). It is not possible to take a shortcut by understanding discourses only through the lens of interviewees, since one may easily be led astray or become biased. Second, interview material is to be treated as a discourse statement itself (not as something existing outside the discursive field). Chinese researchers may not even be aware of some of the narratives or discursive strategies they regularly use. For this reason alone interviews cannot replace documentary analysis, but they can usefully complement it.

Conclusion

Discourse analysis plays an increasingly important role in the methodological arsenal of Social Science Chinese studies. The ways in which the context of contemporary China structures discourse fields presents some challenges for doing discourse research. In this article, we highlighted the political constraints and incentives of public discourse, the top-down structuring of many discourse fields, and the tendency toward reduplication of (redundant) content. We explained this bloating of discourses as a bandwagon effect of the follow the leader imperative, and as a result of other incentives pertaining to publications in China. In addition we presented how we ourselves have tried to deal with these research challenges, and attempted in the process to derive some general advice from our experiences.

First, due to the political constraints inherent in China's system it is particularly important to pay attention to positions not taken and voices quickly sidelined or silenced within the discursive field in question. Second, due to the follow the leader imperative even in discourses that are not heavily politicized it is worthwhile to pay attention to official (state-endorsed) discourses, since these often (pre)structure the field in a top-down manner. Third, combining fieldwork or expert interviews with discourse analysis can be effective strategies via which to learn more about the context at hand and for discerning the main arteries along which discourses develop. This helps in dealing with the phenomenon of bloated discourses, which are otherwise hard to grasp.

Since we are concerned in our respective projects with specific questions, not all of the above may be applicable to the full range of possible research inquiries in Chinese studies. We do hope, however, that this contribution can serve as a starting point to deepen methodological discussion on discourse research in Chinese studies more broadly. At the same time, we believe it can help discourse researchers working in other areas to reflect upon the contextual contingencies of their own approaches too.

Acknowledgments

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Refereed article

On the Institutional Quality of the Belt and Road Initiative as a Hybrid International Public Good

Ibrahim Öztürk

Summary

In the emerging world of multipolarity, which is characterized by political and economic oligopolistic spheres of influence, the creation of international public goods (IPGs) involves different sets of hybrid regimes. The term "hybridity" refers to the need for balanced and virtuous cross-fertilization between the newly emerging and the established systemic considerations such as openness versus autonomy/sovereignty and the market versus the state to cope with their spatial/supranational and intergenerational spillovers. Chinese authorities presented the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as such an endeavour to serve as a hybrid governance platform for bringing cooperative solutions to existing infrastructure deficits, mainly in Asia and Africa. This article questions the governance quality of the BRI in bringing cooperative and win-win solutions through the lenses of the comparative institutional economic perspective. The paper concludes that despite its striking quantitative achievements, BRI's weak institutional structure has already caused several managerial-coordination problems, geopolitical rivalries, and global tensions that might prevent its evolution with the qualities of a needed hybrid IPG. The article suggests that for BRI to adequately address both the conflicting and overlapping demand and supply conditions of a needed hybrid public good, it should effectively align with the existing rules-based and structured multilateral cooperation architecture.

Keywords: Public goods, governance, Belt and Road Initiative, cooperation

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Introduction

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was announced in 2013–2014 when the world was still deeply struggling with the negative repercussions of the global economic crisis during 2007–2010 period, both having far-reaching implications. Among others, the global economic crisis highlighted not only the urgent need for new sources of sustainable growth but also the creation of international public goods (IPGs) to bring collaborative solutions to the existing infrastructure gap in the broader Eurasian landscape. However, the rise of the multiplex world, which is characterized by the incompatible paradigm of competition/conflict versus cooperation/compromise, has constrained the surrounding for taking the required leadership initiatives (Acharya 2017, 2018; Allison 2017, 2018; Mearsheimer 2019).

On the demand side, according to a recent Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report (2018: 4–6), globally the annual investment needs range from between USD 2.9 trillion to USD 6.3 trillion. At current investment trends, this is expected to translate into a cumulative investment gap of between USD 5.2 trillion by 2030, or as high as USD 14.9 trillion by 2040 —to reach the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations (UN). Globally, by sector, the most substantial investment needs lie in transport and energy infrastructure, which are expected to comprise around 60 percent thereof. However, on the supply side, rising multipolarity, tendencies toward bilateralism, strategic competition, as well as protectionism have all added new dimensions to the necessity of cooperation in the provision of IPGs.

Among other things, intensifying tensions between the current and rising powers have undermined the hegemonic leadership capacity to find solutions to global challenges. Before the current fragmentation and potential deadlock go further in undermining the ideals of multilateralism — a vision of international law-based cooperation and an open world economy—, intensifying challenges must be met by developing new and relevant institutions. To that end, China's endeavor to lead the creation of infrastructure-oriented IPGs such as the BRI represents a decisive step taken in fulfilling such rising demands. Not only did China add the BRI to the state constitution in March 2018 to make it an absolute priority in its diplomatic intercourse with full state support but also the UN mentioned it in its February 2017 resolution to endorse the initiative too. Likewise, several other prominent multilateral institutions such as the OECD, World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were quick to announce their full support as well as their partnerships. That means Chinese leadership to lead a needed IPG with the BRI came at the right time and in the right area. The BRI Progress Report (April 23, 2019) confirms that, since its launch in 2013, China has forged closer trade ties worldwide, signing cooperative documents with 126 countries and 29 international organizations to counter the mentioned deficit.

Notwithstanding huge expectations and significant quantitative achievements, in the last five years of its full implementation after 2015 several criticisms have been directed at the BRI so far. The initiative is now subject to severe hurdles and challenges due to its lack of institutionalization and multilateralization. This is particularly true with regard to solving multifaceted participation constraints and collective-action problems, namely through the proper addressing of the principal-agent relations (PARs).

It is hypothesized in this paper that in the absence of an overarching political authority, any act of global cooperation reflects a mismatch between the scope of the problems faced and the authority of the decision-making bodies attempting to address them; and thus goes beyond the policy endeavors of any single state. Based upon this hypothesis, it is recommended that the full multilateralization of the BRI with regard to its governance and coordination platforms would serve as a crucial IPG for the regulation of the interdependencies between the major stakeholders. This would be achieved by structuring the authority and collaboration to allocate resources and coordinate economic activities, so that agency issues and collective-action problems are minimized. Such a hybrid form of governance, which harmonizes approaches between Chinese system1 and Western approach and also balances their experiences in institution-building and IPG creation, can mobilize global cooperation in across-the-board infrastructure development.

The organization of the paper is as follows: After briefly discussing the nature of public goods (PGs) in the newly emerging global environment and the latter's potential impact on PG provision in the article's second part, the third section then deals with the nature of the needed hybrid governance structures with the properties of IPGs. The fourth and fifth sections focus directly on the governance structure of the BRI, and through the emerging empirical evidence on the quality of its implementation so far. The concluding part offers key policy recommendations.

On IPGs

Conceptual clarifications

Compared to private goods, which are both excludable and rivalrous, PGs are subject to a complicated and imperfect market environment. According to Samuelson's (1954) classic definition, goods that are nonrivalrous in use, and nonexcludable for potential users, are called PGs. That means nobody can be excluded from their use, nor does their use make them unavailable or less available for further use by others. PGs are created through collective choices, paid for collectively, and supplied without charge (or below cost) to recipients; as such, they result in extensive free-riding. As Olson (1971) argues, these are the key

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1 Officially, it is described as: "Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想).

reason for the market failure and collective-action problems in their provision — whether national or international. Nonexcludability constitutes the source of coordination and financing problems, whereas nonrivalry creates complications in providing the optimal quantity of goods to be produced. Apart from private and public goods, there are "club goods" that are nonrivalrous but excludable, and therefore serve only the members of the club. Finally, there are also "common goods" that are nonexcludable but rivalrous, and therefore the use of these resources exhausts them at the expense of other potential beneficiaries.

By considering the spillover effects of PGs, Kanbur et al. (1999) envision a range thereof on a spectrum from the global to the local, with the international, regional, and national in between. National PGs acquire global dimensions when their benefits cross the borders of a single state to cover several countries, social groups, and generations and therefore possess IPG assets. When the benefits or costs of a good are of nearly universal reach, so that it could potentially affect anyone anywhere, it is called a global public good (GPG). In the current world of "contagious connectivity" and interdependency, even some local PGs can potentially turn out to be GPGs (or sometimes vice versa). In that sense, through the provision of local and national PGs, countries can positively contribute to the provision of IPGs (Morrissey et al. 2002). Overall speaking, as these differences are mostly semantic; local and national PGs aside, the remainder can be categorized and used in this paper as IPGs (Barrett 2002).

As the last pandemic (COVD-19) of 2019-2020 has shown, when emerging common global "bads" such as climate change, the spread of epidemic disease, international terrorism, migration, and financial contagion, are not adequately addressed through proper IPGs and linger in a state of under-provision; they can potentially escalate into a global crisis. In contrast, their provision would serve in reducing risk, enhancing capacity, and directing the offer of utility. To that end, PGs are composed of core and complementary (intermediate) activities. Core activities aim to provide IPGs whose benefits spill over to other users beyond national borders, whereas complementary activities are mostly national but assist countries to consume the services or benefits of IPGs. Moreover, core activities can be neither confined solely to the economic field nor reduced to their immediate direct benefits, in the form of material utilities and services.

Kaul et al. (1999) underline three categories of IPG that might be relevant to our discussion here. First, the natural global commons such as the oceans or the ozone layer; second, the global policy outcomes such as financial stability, or global peace; and third, the global human-made commons such as international networks, regimes, and norms (trade/financial regulations, human rights). By concentrating on the third category, this article deals with the establishment of global or regional institutions or governance platforms aiming to coordinate and guide the provision of, rather than directly providing, different varieties of infrastructure connectivity. In other words, rather than the services that IPGs directly provide, particular

concern is on their governance quality in stimulating global cooperation with the final aim of providing the mentioned services.

Although governance platforms are no silver bullet for all problems, they can be seen as the medium for — if not the key to — effective and efficient governance modes creating the right incentives for various actor groups to contribute their fair share to the attainment of agreed-upon goals. The Bretton Woods Conference (1944), for instance, represented such a profound and across-the-board answer to the long-lasting global stalemate toward the end of World War II, when the United States (US) assumed leadership through international cooperation and united efforts in the provision of several IPGs for the achievement of common goals (Jin 2019).

However, the world is now subject to radically different surroundings. Particularly in the post–Cold War era, the shifting wealth of nations, the speed of technology and digitalization, and the intensification of global flows of people, goods and services, money, data, and ideas have quickly reshaped the world with unpredictable consequences. Not only have most of the global challenges begun to share the same characteristics as PGs but their negative consequences or effects have transcended national borders and also achieved intergenerational reach. The most significant progress from the viewpoint of our current topic is that, with the unintended results of the intended globalization over the last 20 to 30 years, the conventional conception of PGs has changed, and the provision of core activities for IPGs has become a matter of urgency. Because of such a radically shifting global conjuncture, China has become a candidate to lead the next stage of globalization under the terms and conditions of its own civilization — the BRI being a novel tool of implementing such diplomacy.

New constraints on public good creation

With their evolutionary characteristics, social construction, globality, and publicity, IPGs exhibit not only strong interdependencies and national policy frameworks but also, as compared to the Cold War era, are subject to several new challenges in the emerging multiplex world. The latter is described by Acharya as follows:

> [It refers] broadly to formal and informal interactions among states and other actors, at global and regional levels, based on common principles and institutions that are not dominated by a single power or group of powers. Instead, leadership is diffuse and shared among actors that are not bound into a hierarchical relationship linked to differential material capabilities (2017: 7).

At such a juncture, one of the appropriate but perhaps still limited technical terms to describe the evolving international environment is the rise of oligopolistic economic and political markets as a form of systemic competition between different powers and the economic spheres that they either directly or indirectly control (Pascha 2019a). Such a market with diversified factors, geographies, and profound interdependencies is potentially open to various cooperative as well as

collusive behaviors. As Allison (2017) notes, an extra complicating factor coming at the expense of wide-range collaboration is not only the withdrawal of the US from the existing IPGs that it has pioneered thus far but also its resistance to the rise of any other alternative powers and their legitimate demands for reforming current international organizations (including the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization). That resistance also explains why China, rather than becoming more compatible with the international system, has tended to set up alternative institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and, more recently, the BRI (Subramanian 2011).

Within the conceptualization of the multiplex world and in the specific context of the Eurasian heartland, China is also not alone in these efforts to decouple from the post-war statuesque. Major alternative initiatives include Japan's operations in South and Southeast Asia under the banner of the Japan Partnership for Quality Infrastructure; the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, on which US-Japan and India-Australia-New Zealand are actively cooperating; and, the EU's strategy for Connecting Europe and Asia (19 September 2018). These each offer different degrees of cooperative as well as competing solutions. All such progress makes the situation quite complicated and unpredictable, in the sense that, on the one hand, systemic competition in an era of significant power transition might hamper cooperation. On the other, the return on cooperation can also be so enormous that even geopolitical rivalries might not prevent it (Bodansky 2012). This represents a situation describable as "coopetition" in the language of game theory. For instance, the existing trade conflicts between China and the US notwithstanding, the active participation and cooperation of several US companies in BRI projects as well as several high-level representatives from the State of California at the Second BRI Forum held in Beijing (April 25–27, 2019) underline the idiosyncrasies of the mentioned consent-conflict paradigm standing between the rising and current powers.

In the outlined context, the United Nations Development Program's (Honghui and Ting 2016; Kaul et al. 1999; UNDP 2017) approach to infrastructure connectivity underlines the three qualities of IPGs: First, the provision of an up-to-date knowledge platform for infrastructure investments (e.g. energy, transportation, and communications) so that countries can absorb and incorporate them in their development planning. Second, the setting of common standards pertaining to sustainability criteria in environmental, societal, and governance terms, such as accountability, transparency, local inclusion, information provision, social-responsibility disclosure, and multifactor assessments of the projects at the stage of tendering, funding, and construction (as well as at the operational stages too). Third, helping developing countries in their multidimensional capacity-building so that they can derive benefits from the connectivity projects offered and developed by IPGs. The analysis given above provides a sufficient toolkit to evaluate the

quality of the needed hybrid governance models (HGMs) that address the requirements of the rising global geopolitics.

Hybrid governance as PG

A HGM is defined as a set of cooperative arrangements between different national, international, private, public, and for-profit/nonprofit stakeholders to facilitate the functioning of both private- as well as public-good markets (Khanna 2012; Post et al. 2017). It is self-evident that in the multiplex world of PG creation, there is no "one size fits all" template that can guide the process of constructing an ideal governance mechanism that fulfills the quality of an IPG. As there is no central authority to police the actions of self-interested actors such as superpowers, nation-states, businesses, and individuals, different forms of governance platforms would enable them to avoid noncooperative outcomes (i.e. the prisoner's dilemma) or prevent collective-action failures in their repeated interactions by constraining, structuring, and defining their motivational payoff matrix (Axelrod 1984).

In other words, in the choice of a governance structure the existence, breadth, and quality of the surrounding institutions of governance — such as the norms and laws regarding private property, courts, enforcement units, and markets — have a crucial role to play (Rangan et al. 2006). The emergent global context which complicates the supply of IPG and requires more pluralistic and diversified governance structures is described by Jessop as follows:

> [They] are characterized by different and changing degrees of hegemony and hierarchy, overlapping spheres of influence, national components and transnational influences, interdependences and pockets of self-containment, embryonic and dying regions, marginal spheres and areas of confrontation. (2013a: 8)

Given the stock of literature, there are several issues to be addressed in the provision of HGMs that might also be applicable to the BRI, which is presented by the Chinese authorities as a new generation hybrid IPG (Hongcai 2017). That situation calls for different institutional responses to cooperation strategies to reflect the proliferation of transnational challenges, the diffusion of new ideas, and the expansion of actors and processes envisioned. It seems that the currently heightened competition between the Western and the Asian (and increasingly Chinese) paradigms of governance will determine the future course of the global and regional governance models. Former one supports structured, centralized organized, and rigid cooperation to properly structure PARs by defining the rules of the game and enforcing contracts . For instance, in the European Union(EU)'s style of governance, the delegation of sovereign power to a supranational or transnational body has been the main rule (Berkofsky 2005). However, a number of recent cases, such as the reaction of the EU member states to the global economic crisis, the so-called China offer, and crisis-prone situations — as the case

of Brexit have shown, such rigid, top-down, and static governance is subject to considerable weaknesses in adapting to external challenges (de Grauwe 2016).

On other hand, the Asian models promote nonstructured, contingency, and flexible models. Grimmel and Li (2018) contend that because of existing contextual or path dependencies — such as heterogeneous and diverse civilizational, cultural, and political-economy systems, as well as different development levels — the EU model of governance is neither necessary nor indeed feasible in the hardcore geography of the BRI meanwhile. The situation in Asia weakens mutual trust, and prevents the setting of standard rules and the maintaining of them across such a vast geography. Considering these facts, located in China's geopolitical proximity to Asia, the BRI reflects various facets of the Chinese style of regionalization, governance and cooperation based on seemingly legitimate reasons for existence. More specifically, it prefers institutional minimalism — such as small secretaries, informal structures, nonbinding decisions, and pragmatic, loose, flexible, and dynamic integration models. As compared to EU, the BRI limits its sphere of influence to broad-based economic integration without any political repercussions, such as the delegation of sovereignty to a centralized authority. As compared to the EU, with these propensities, in a continuously changing external environment the BRI seems to be more adaptable and functional (Esteban and Lee 2017).

Be it less Western and more Asian/Chinese in style, in principle, a HGM develops if there are cooperation rents to capture, and if the benefits of coordination outweigh costs (Menard 2004, 2010). In the absence of hegemonic powers and automatic processes that lead to cooperation, emerging national and global divergences call for measures of incentive tipping in order to align countries' willingness to engage in international cooperation and to agree on taking corrective action (Kindleberger 1981). In that, the chosen strategic perspective — and the way it is disseminated through numerous networking activities — are quite decisive. One such approach in the emergent multiplex world would be the offer and design of HGMs with the capacity to address topics such as openness, autonomy/sovereignty, and market orientation on the regulatory agenda, as well as to handle distributional implications (Huylenbroeck et al. 2009).

For instance, unlike the past, when sovereign nation-states pursued policies within relatively closed national borders and organized their affairs mainly along geographic and sectoral lines, many of the current national PGs like trade-investment regimes, human rights norms, the provision of law and order, health, education, and taxation have in our time achieved IPG characteristics (Kanbur et al. 1999). Therefore, the challenges in the creation and sustaining of IPGs go beyond only free-riding considerations and also extend to the management of the spatial/supranational and intergenerational spillovers of IPGs. That is because they reflect the three property of excludability, rivalry, and aggregation (summation) technologies. With these features, they further complicate the enhanced cross-border management of externalities. Relatedly, the emerging trade-offs such as

openness versus autonomy/sovereignty and market versus state — reflecting what Rodrik (2011) refers to as the globalization trilemma, according to which national sovereignty, globalization, and democracy cannot coexist — also lead to collective-action problems (Barrett 2002; Pascha 2019b).

For example, financial-market integration has allowed the contagion effects of related crises to spread more quickly and widely. On the other hand, developing countries that are still in the process of building up their national policymaking capacity want to retain their right to national self-determination in a meaningful way while at the same time fulfilling the requirements for further opening and cross-border policy harmonization (Kaul 2012, 2013). As a principle, a country should exercise its sovereign rights in such a way not to infringe upon the self-determination of other nations by creating direct or indirect adverse effects on them, which are not part of its decisions made. Khanna and Khanna, for instance, argue at this point that HGMs have evolved "to respond to such constraints and demands of globalization, which requires faster-paced bodies that are more responsive and more technocratic to harness capital flows while asserting national political control"(2012:3).

Moreover, in terms of market versus state constraints, the design of the HGM should also be concomitant with the fundamental principles of the market economy (such as competition and efficiency) both domestically as well as internationally to preserve reciprocity and to avoid retaliatory measures (Mair et al. 2019). As discussed before, with its peculiar characteristics the PG market is an action arena occupied by a public body demanding services and private agents able to provide them, and it requires different approaches to organizing economic activity (North 1990). For instance, in the absence of "benevolent" hegemonic leadership in the supply of IPGs and the way the emerging trade-offs mentioned above are managed might lead either to competition or collusion, cooperation or conflict, or multilateralism or bilateralism. Against all odds, when individual actors lack the necessary resources or assets for that, and when uncertainty about the likely outcomes dominates, a well-designed HGM would help not only to fill the leadership gap and lower transaction costs but also to create the required transaction itself (Cerna 2013; Milner 1997).

Regarding the issues of decentralization related to the HGMs and funding of the PGs, Huylenbroeck et al. (2009) offer the following demarcation criterion: When the amount of the required specific assets to be pooled and uncertainty and safeguards are all low (high), relatively loose or flexible (rigid, centralized) coordination or information centers are sufficient (necessary). The issue is also related to fairness in the creation of PGs, as there are crucial distributional implications. The fair contribution of finance involves the issue of measuring the both current and future streams of the costs as well as the intangible benefits of a particular PG so as to determine the payment amounts beneficiaries should contribute. Some empirical studies, such as Sandler (1998, 2014), show that in the

removal of the mentioned constraints and uncertainties a high share of nation-specific benefits, a limited number of essential participants, and the presence of an influential leader-nation all are of decisive importance (Morrissey et al. 2002: 40). Also, through a balanced approach between fairness and efficiency, the real contribution should come not only from the beneficiaries of the PGs under consideration but also from a rich, responsible, idealistic, and benevolent hegemon (Kindleberger 1986).

To sum up, notwithstanding these constraints, when properly designed HGMs would play a crucial role in preventing loose, selective, pragmatic, and ideological interpretations of international agreements by nation-states that may not necessarily be compatible with global exigencies and goals — those triggering the necessary incentive scheme for cooperation.

Evidence on the BRI as a HGM

The conclusions reached above can be a helpful guide in the following discussion of the BRI's governance mechanism and of its institutional quality from the viewpoint of hybrid IPGs. First, emphasized has been the need for pluralism in the design of the desired HGM, in order to solve participation constraints by providing strong-enough incentive schemes. Second and relatedly, the foremost responsibility of an IPG is to provide a meeting and negotiating platform, venue, and secretariat where large groups of major stakeholders who are facing collective-action problems can gather for the purpose of engaging in cooperative behavior. Third, among other things, the contribution of the major IPG providers to institutionalized governance mechanisms is quite crucial, including via their financial support. Such leadership contributions would provide the initial incentive for all stakeholders to reach a *modus vivendi* for the final form of a governance model that defines the rules of the game, such as strengthening property rights, regulatory institutions, and conflict-resolution mechanisms for better contracts. Fourth, and to be discussed in this section, is the structures of coordination and flexibility/rigidity in the way international negotiation fora are set up, the capacity to pool resources, and the ability to direct them toward the most efficient production of IPGs.

By focusing on functionality and also on adaptability to the continuously changing external environment, the BRI aims, first, to secure the conditions for the flow of goods, services, technologies, and capital; second, to achieve new divisions of labor across different territories such as networks of cities and interdependent centers of production; third, to form different center-periphery relations and scales of social organization that may not coincide with territorial boundaries; and fourth, to form different sets of social bonds based on mutual trust (Xi 2018a, 2018b). To satisfy these priorities, first, the BRI relies on institutional minimalism, which requires high-level flexibility, small secretariats, rather informal structures, and nonbinding joint decisions. Second, it also refrain from delegating sovereign rights to a higher authority (Jessop 2013b: 5). Third, it is more flexible and contingent in

reacting to dynamically changing situations. By these features, it is also open to learning by doing and to trial-and-error processes (for further analysis see also Chen 2014; Berkofsky 2005; de Grauwe 2016).

By considering its structure as well as implementation so far, there are both optimistic and pessimistic outlooks on the BRI's governance quality as an IPG. Briefly put, the optimistic view (Grimmel and Li 2018; Wong 2018) — reflecting mainly the Chinese perspective — argues that by its very nature multilateralism is always a work in progress, and that the BRI is a dynamically evolving process and living entity in continuous flux. The final form of it will be determined through constant communication and consultation with other stakeholders, as well as via the constructive criticism / contributions they might put forward. Optimists also take the ever-rising number of members and the volume of the commercial and financial business as the tipping point for the BRI to become a multilateral public-cooperation platform (BRI Progress Report, BRI Forum, April 29, 2019).

On the other hand, the pessimistic view (Avdaliani 2019; Hillman 2018; Horsley 2017; Parameswaran 2019) reflects the Western perspective on the governance of PGs, focusing more on qualitative factors than on quantitative data. By noting that the soft and positive tone of the BRI's official texts and speeches are just tactical maneuvers to fend off the ever-increasing hostile international reactions, proponents of this view go on to argue that, in fact, since 2014 no precise permanent institutional mechanisms or modalities have been implemented to make the BRI a more open, participatory, rules-based, and multilateral initiative — in the real sense of these terms. There is also no convincing evidence so far about how Chinese collaborative and shared values are efficiently put into practice via measurable and sustainable models. On the contrary, the BRI does not have a governance model; China uses uncertainties and contingencies as a tactical maneuver to turn the emerging asymmetric dependencies on the Chinese system into strategic benefits through its bilateral diplomacy, memorandums of understanding (MoUs), and opaque contracts. In that regard, the BRI should be seen more like a multidimensional strategy to meet the needs of China and to reduce its own risks in the coming period.

Finally, other than these criticisms concerning governance issues, there are also several managerial ones reflective of the initiative's weak governance. The BRI's sectoral as well as geographic focus and coverage are so broad that existing gaps created by its institutional minimalism only complicate effective contracting. With these features, it is subject to an "elephant syndrome" with its ever-growing body (qualitative growth) but only small brain (governance) to control it. An OECD (2017) work states that when the number of countries increases, management of these contingencies created by China's bilateral diplomacy between theoretically equal but asymmetric partners will become even more complicated and unsustainable. To conclude this part, earlier experiences in the creation of IPGs recommend that overcrowded platforms without clear territorial boundaries,

focused areas of interest, and narrowly defined goals may not fulfill their role in the longer term; thus, more focused and narrowly defined geographic coverage should be the priority.

Early evidence on the BRI

Available evidence on the implementations since its announcement paints a bleak picture on the progress of the BRI: it has exhibited striking achievements in terms of quantitative criteria but not so much regarding its institutional quality. Several institutional loopholes can be listed here. The first such issue is the lack of an information platform for data collection, compilation, monitoring, and classification. Existing BRI statistics are based not on centralized, transparent, reliable, and scientifically standardized and classified sources. Rather the contrary: data are published via various state-controlled or -owned media channels.[2] With these features rhetoric prevails over substance, and the BRI is full of self-fulfilling aggregations.[3]

As such, there appear to be many different comments and evaluations made regarding the performance of the BRI. Such an emerging measurement and assessment crisis is the result of China's deliberately fostered uncertainty that comes with opaque contracts and contingency-based management preferences, which is the first key criticism to note here. Unlike the Western governance models, where formal contracts are legally binding and enforceable in a court of law, in the Chinese approach — besides conventional and contemporary contracts that are open to court decisions — contracts are also maintained through several informal institutions such as networks or connections (*guanxi*). These were the linchpin of socioeconomic and political life for centuries, opening the door to their discreet or ad hoc management (Gilmore 1977).

In terms of concrete evidence, the first criticism is, as noted, the lack of inclusion and openness. In that, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating under China's central government had almost 10,800 overseas companies in 185 countries and regions at the end of 2018, and they carried out a total of 3,116 investment projects in the regions of the BRI. With that performance, SOEs account for half of the infrastructure projects and more than 70 percent of the combined value of contracts launched under the initiative — with total overseas assets exceeding USD 1 trillion and combined annual profits of USD 15.3 billion (*Global Times*, October 31, 2018; *Xinhuanet*, October 30, 2018). Some alternative calculations show that a significant share (ranging from between 55 to 89 percent) of Chinese-funded

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2   Main state media channels are *Global Times*, Xinhua News, Chinese Central TV (CCTV), and *People's Daily*.

3   Ultimately these problems have motivated several research institutions such as MERICS in Berlin, Germany, REFINITIV BRI Tracker in China, and jointly the American Enterprise Institute and The Heritage Foundation (as China Global Investment Trackers in the US) to calculate alternative statistics.

projects are carried out by native companies. Only 7.6 percent are undertaken by local companies (meaning ones headquartered in the same country where the project is taking place), and 3.4 percent by foreign companies (non-Chinese ones from a country other than the one where the project is taking place). In comparison, out of the contractors participating in projects funded by multilateral development banks, 29 percent are Chinese, 40.8 percent are local, and 30.2 percent are foreign (Hillman 2018a; Horsley 2018: 5).

The second key criticism is about the broad-based sustainability of the projects. Although under mounting international pressure and with domestic disasters the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) was included in Chinese corporate law in 2006, with the number of CRS disclosures since then having significantly increased, China has already localized global norms with Chinese characteristics in this field as well (Mullins 2020). In the absence of robust control mechanisms, not only do almost 75 percent of the companies involved not disclose CSR matters but also their quality is somewhat weaker too — mainly in terms of localizing their impacts, because Chinese companies and the Chinese state do not disclose the details of the many contracts concluded and prefer behind-closed-doors bargaining (Hillman 2018b). China calls them a bilateral, interstate negotiation or MoU,[4] but in reality they shield the process from public criticism, expert discussion, and the cross-checking of international arbitration mechanisms. In the absence of a clearly defined set of rules, guidance, and cross-checks, therefore, several small and vulnerable countries have failed to perform reliable feasibility studies to estimate the growth, trade, employment, income, debt, and environmental effects of the BRI projects in the long term.

China's debt-book or debt-trap diplomacy has ended up as opaque contracts, predatory loan practices, corrupt deals, and unsustainable levels of money owed. As a result, several projects have seen not only higher overall costs but also even witnessed cancellations, political backlashes, and the transferring of strategic national assets to China when the involved countries failed to meet their scheduled debt repayments (Chatzky and McBride 2020). It has been calculated that about 270 of the 1,814 BRI projects undertaken since 2013 — representing roughly 32 percent of total project value — were in trouble over unsustainable debt, labor policies, performance delays, and national-security concerns (Kong et al. 2019; *The Economist Intelligent Unit*, April 29 2019; *Financial Times*, May 20, 2019). For instance, in a sampling of 95 large Chinese road- and rail-transportation projects over the last three decades, project completion was by and large on time or ahead of schedule; however, actual construction costs averaged 30.6 percent higher

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4   On the one hand it is stated in China's MoUs that countries are subject to domestic laws and their responsibilities under international law, while on the other China would establish an international-trade arbitration court under strict state control. In principle, countries are free to choose either international or Chinese-led international arbitration; however, it remains to be seen how this functions in practice.

than estimated, with three-quarters of transportation projects in China coming in over budget (Higgins 2019; Meyer and Zhao 2019).

Venezuela in Latin America, Montenegro and Ukraine on the periphery of Europe, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Pakistan in Asia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Zimbabwe in Africa — countries that have all sought Chinese help in the recent past — have since requested the renegotiation of contracts with reduced project sizes and financial outlays. However, that has come at the price of the continuation of overdependence. Moreover, China's responses to these different debtors have been quite inconsistent and also have not followed the best practices adopted by international lenders when working with developing countries. Sometimes, the debt has been forgiven; other times, disputed territory or control of infrastructure or the transfer of a strategic asset to China has been demanded as recompense (*Financial Times*, April 15, 2019, June 25, 2020; *Nikkei Asian Review*, May 23, 2019) In Sri Lanka, the port of Hambantota (*The New York Times*, June 25, 2018), in Tajikistan the strategically important Wakhan Corridor (plus several mining sites with gold and uranium deposits) were transfer to China in return for debt relief, therefore creating massive political turbulences in these countries (*The National Interest*, August 23, 2018; *Financial Times*, May 2, 2019). With these characteristics, obviously, the BRI undercuts the sovereignty principle in many developing countries, denying them their long-term, self-sustaining growth (Chandran 2019). In that sense, arguments for the so-called model of bilateral bargaining, dialogue, and broad consultation — or the motto of "one BRI, many recipes" — fail to address the previously discussed issues of collective-action and agency problems. Not only competition but also envisaged cooperation have so far remained premature expectations (Brombal 2018).

In terms of environment sustainability, its accumulated expertise and growing domestic needs have motivated China — both before and after the inception of the BRI in 2013 — to concentrate on energy and transportation projects, with shares in such endeavors of 44 and 30 percent respectively (de Soyres 2018; Pérez and Scissors 2018). The Silk Road Fund, which was set up to finance BRI projects, has made over 90 percent of its energy-sector investments in fossil fuel-related initiatives (Hillman 2019). However, the failure of Chinese companies to comply with the best practices of multilateral development banks and international organizations vis-à-vis sustainability criteria would result in the mounting criticism that Chinese projects negatively impact the local environment and also serve to crowd out low-carbon power-generation alternatives.

To counter these criticisms abroad and promote domestic sustainability, China focused on the recalibration of its projects before the launch of the BRI in 2013 — and has stepped that up particularly since 2017. In the latter year, several Chinese governmental departments published critical documents regarding the greening of the BRI, such as the "Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road," and participated in the International Green Development Coalition to streamline

international cooperation on green development along the BRI (being officially launched during the Second BRI Forum). That 2019 Forum also oversaw the signing of the "Green Investment Principles" regarding the BRI by 27 financial institutions from Asia and Europe, dealing specifically with low-carbon projects. Finally, the Chinese organizers also broadcast the Everbright "Belt & Road" Green Fund as one of the Forum's deliverables. This Fund aims at investment in green energy, manufacturing, and living in countries and regions situated along the BRI (Rolland 2019).

Despite its commitment to the Paris Agreement on climate change and the aforementioned green-finance commitments and initiatives pursued between 2014 and 2017, the post-2017 push for green finance has not brought about any significant progress. Because of its top-down and multilayered structure that involves numerous different actors, the BRI has faced coordination issues; furthermore, most Chinese foreign loans and outward direct investments in the energy and transportation sectors have resulted in the financing of unsustainable projects that run counter to sustainability principles. The officially announced recalibration is resisted on the ground by powerful vested interests that benefit from continued involvement in unsustainable (high-carbon) projects, such as Chinese state-owned coal, oil, and gas companies. In other words, "greenwashing" is made more real by the lack of rigid, unified green-finance compliance or commitment mechanisms adhering to binding environmental standards. Green finance in the context of the BRI, being voluntary in nature, still only has to adhere then to recipient countries' less strict environmental standards.

These pieces of evidence show quite convincingly that in the absence of a multilateral negotiation forum and governance platform, the BRI — with its so-called HGM — cannot manage emerging differences through bilateral relations, reciprocity, or different combinations of negotiations within the paradigm of repeated "give-and-take bargains." This is mainly because of the rising transaction costs associated with wasted time, repeated contract renewals, and a weakened trust and image among stakeholders. That is why emerging trade patterns such as import penetration that are occurring at the expense of local enterprise, and coming with technological and financial dependency — as coupled with environmental, political, and social instabilities too — have triggered a wave of opposition to the BRI as well as increased tensions internationally (Meyer and Zhao 2019).

Conclusions

The creation of a needed hybrid IPG requires a balanced, inclusive, and comprehensive approach in the interactions between the current rules-based liberal world order and the state capitalism of China. This is so in order to bridge the core and complementary activities in such a way as to create a smart, interactive, open, and responsive setting in which to provide the necessary data, expertise, consultation, and exchange of ideas. Thereby, so doing would help achieve a

satisfactory convergence between the competing interests of the various stakeholders and thus minimize collective-action and agency problems. To that end, the transformative or game-setting capacity of the BRI is primarily conditional upon, first, its capacity to mitigate the evolving systemic differences between the liberal/multilateral status quo and the state capitalism of China and, second, its capacity for shared, diffuse, and networked leadership in synchronizing the demand and supply conditions on the basis of innovative ideas, technologies, and organizing principles (e.g. governance structure).

Depending on the fulfilling of these conditions, the BRI could incorporate ex ante rules-based contracting, for instance at the stages of tendering, funding, construction, and operation, and ex post performance-based analysis so as to accurately measure the costs and benefits of the services it provides. These are key to marshalling the required resources, preventing free-riding, and eradicating collective-action problems. Although absorbing transferable institutional lessons from the Western experience of PG provision would make the BRI less Chinese and more multilateral, so as to become more local in terms of integrating the so-called connectivity projects into the national development plans of the host countries, any simplified binary approaches such as the West (US)-East (China) divide in institution-building should be avoided.

However, China's insistence on an institution-less and a contingency model of governance prevents the rise of a BRI possessing the aforementioned characteristics. The BRI's fragmented, multicentric, multilayered, and multipivotal subnetworks of interconnected, interwoven regional and international contact as well as diplomacy have not allowed the participation of third parties wielding the credibility and experience of international best practices that could engage Chinese companies in a rules-based, win-win game. Therefore it has thus far failed to fulfill the propensities displayed by a needed IPG, at least in providing the conditions of "non-excludability" — and so still resembles a "club good." The mentioned institutional loopholes that allow China to export its systemic aspects through the BRI has triggered dangerous retaliatory acts from the US, increased requests from the European Council (2019) for further reciprocity on a wide range of economic activities, and opposition in many developing countries.

In order to overcome these and many other potential problems, the BRI's governance mechanisms should adequately deal with the impact on decision-making and the implementation process presented by the diverse political, economic, and social factors, regulatory regimes, and unfamiliar on-the-ground circumstances involved in cross-border infrastructure projects — and with the long funding cycles, opaque contracts, and the potential for waste and corruption all marking infrastructure development. The accomplishment of these Herculean tasks requires addressing several agency issues in ways that the provision of an incentive-compatible payoff matrix could facilitate, through the fixation of fairness

and efficiency issues as well as regarding the net benefits of the BRI as a hybrid IPG.

To that end, institutionalized flexibility and dynamism would prevent not only contingent and ad hoc negotiations and enhances long-term decision-making capacity at the expense of short-term and self-interested behavior but would also help the accumulation of social capital such as trust over time. The visions of participants might thereby converge vis-à-vis the creation of common goods. Only then can the BRI hope to cross-fertilize, nurture, and balance China's formative strength in complementary activities (mostly national) with its weaker recorded experience of across-the-board core activities having PG characteristics. Thereby, voluntary cooperation that eliminates participation constraints would be the consequence.

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Kickoff-Event of the Momoya Okura Memorial Symposium-Series: The Languages and Cultures of Asia in Inter-Cultural Dialogue/ Auftaktveranstaltung der Momoya Okura Memorial Symposien-Reihe: Sprachen und Kulturen im interkulturellen Dialog

Mainz, August 29, 2019

Report by Sonja Wengoborski

The focus of the symposium-series' opening event was on different aspects of the notion of 'culture', which has been under review and discussion in various fields of research in recent years. It was opened by Sonja Wengoborski with a greeting from the Vice Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and Philology of Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz, Rainer Emig, a greeting from the Director of the Foundation Yoko Okura Project 360, delivered by Masako Sato, and a short report by Professor Li Wei on a series of three annual conferences that have taken place at the Buddhist Academy in Hangzhou (China) since 2016.

The notion of culture is currently under critical discussion in Germany and Europe as well as internationally. In her keynote lecture moderated by Ajit Singh Sikand (Frankfurt), Marion Grein (Mainz) advocated sticking to the term 'culture'. In her plea for a transcultural concept, she combined the concept of multi-collectivity with a discourse-analytical approach.

In the section moderated by Baijayanti Roy (Frankfurt), Natalia Blum-Barth (Mainz) highlighted examples of techniques of translating culture as seen with Yoko Tawada, who writes in both Japanese and German. As a wanderer between the two linguistic and cultural worlds, the author analyses the phonetic components of words and reassembles them: For example, the word *Übersetzungen* (translations) becomes *Übersee-Zungen* (overseas-tongues). In her contribution on the transfer of literary texts from Hindi to German, Sonja Wengoborski examined problems of cultural translation using a few examples of semantic gaps in which terminology in the source language either has no or no connotative equivalence in the target language.

In the part chaired by Almuth Degener (Mainz), Christina Ersch (Mainz) and Katharina Hirt (Koblenz) analyzed the culturally influenced image perception in the context of German as a foreign or second language. Ersch emphasized the need to sensitize prospective teachers to this topic, since the description of pictures is part of standardized procedures of language proficiency tests. However, the perception of images and the resulting description often run counter to the expectations of the teacher. Hirt presented results from her research with German and Chinese native speakers. In accordance with the multi-collectivity-concept of culture, the interpretation of picture stories showed not only culturally shaped differences but also cross-cultural similarities. Masako Sato examined the interplay between poetry and pictorial representation in Japan that had developed over a

millennium starting from the eminent poem anthology Manyoshu (8th century) up to the end of the Tokugawa period (also known as Edo period). During this time attention turned again towards these poems in Japan and the well-known master Utagawa Hiroshige depicted the life described in them in multicolored woodcuts.

In the section moderated by Lisa Scholz (Mainz), Almuth Degener (Mainz) gave an insight into the complex system of morphemes to express position and direction in the Nuristani languages of Afghanistan. In her ethnolinguistic contribution, Svenja Völkel (Mainz) considered the often not clearly recognizable interactions of language, culture and cognition. She illustrated this complex interplay using examples from Tongan.

Marion Grein summarized the results of the contributions and moderated the final discussion, in which suggestions for topics of future symposia were collected and discussed. The next Momoyo Okura Memorial Symposium will take place on Friday, February 28, 2020 in Mainz.

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Modernizing Rural China
Freiburg, September 27–29, 2019

Report by Daniel R. Kroth

This year's Modernizing Rural China workshop, organized by René Trappel, Elena Meyer-Clement, and Jesper Zeuthen, took place at Studienhaus Wiesneck in the Black Forest near Freiburg. This workshop, the second event organized by the Modernizing Rural China Research Network, sought to further explore the effects of state led rural modernization in a format that would allow for substantive feedback, productive discussion, and future collaboration. To this end, a diverse group of American, Asian, and European academics presented and discussed works relating to agrarian change, urbanization, and changes in state–society relations in a rapidly changing Chinese countryside. Paper presentations ranged from qualitative studies of political economy to thorough historically based investigations and in-progress theorizations based on recent fieldwork. The workshop consisted of eight paper presentations and discussion sessions in four thematically related panels. Each discussion session began with prepared feedback by a designated discussant, followed by an open floor discussion.

The first panel centered on collective land ownership and its legacy. Karita Kan (Hong Kong Polytechnic University) opened the workshop with "Remaking Collective Land Ownership: Property Rights Reform and Social Relations in a Chinese village," a case study of the effects of the formalization and clarification of land rights in Zuhai. The effects of the clarification of land rights through the distribution of shares, she argues, are not limited to state–village relations, but also impact intra-village and family relations as questions of belonging become financially as well as socially relevant. This was followed by Burak Gürel's (Koç University) "Collectivist Legacy and Agrarian Development in China (1978–2019)," an exploration of the temporal bounds of collectivization in rural China. Gürel suggests that the legacy of the collective era, manifested in early infrastructure investments, village administrative structures, labor mobilization, and similar factors, continued to impact Chinese agricultural development well beyond the collectivist era. This collectivist legacy, he argues, should be seriously considered in studies of Chinese agriculture in the reform era and in comparison with the rest of the Global South.

The second panel began with a presentation by Christopher Heurlin (Bowdoin College). In his presentation "The Political Economy of Land Taking Compensation Arrears in China: Asset Mobility, Land Leasing Strategies and Protests," Dr. Heurlin discussed land compensation arrears, and explored possible causes for unexpectedly disparate and counterintuitively correlated land compensation standards. He suggests that variances in land use and asset mobility might contribute to this disparity. Jesper Zeuthen (Aalborg University), joined

remotely by co-author Tomas Skov Lauridsen, then presented "Trading China's Authority: Credit Ratings – Putting a Price Tag on Political Trust in a Chinese Development Zone." Intrigued by a particularly ambitious proposed megaproject in Tianfu, Zeuthen and Lauridsen discuss the role of political endorsement of investment zones on investor confidence and eventual real value.

The third panel began with John Donaldson's (Singapore Management University) presentation "Who Gets What in Rural Modernization: The Winners and Losers of Guizhou's Indebted Investments." In this presentation, based on a forthcoming paper authored by Zhanping Hu, Michelle Ng and Nabil Bin Jasmani, he notes that Guizhou's development strategy has shifted from creating opportunities for the poor to a developmentalist approach that favors investment in wealthier areas. These investments do not appear to be effective from poverty alleviation or even development perspectives. In her presentation, "The Costs of Institutional Underdevelopment: China's Farmers' Professional Cooperatives in Comparative Perspective," Kristen Looney of Georgetown University juxtaposes the developmental role of Chinese farmers' organizations with that of other East Asian farmer's organizations.

The final panel began with Elena Meyer-Clement and René Trappel's "Optimizing Rural China: New Peasants, New Villagers and New Cadres?", which used a Foucaultian framework to analyze attempts to "optimize" segments of rural society in China. They showed how the state tries to promote new identities for peasants, villagers and cadres, pointed to counter conduct of the population and local cadres, and speculated about the effects of this "optimization." Departing from the contemporary, Kyonghee Lee (University of Heidelberg) concluded this final panel with her presentation "Tracing the Village-Compact of Old onto Self-Governance: Uses of the Past by Interwar-Period Rural Reconstructionists of the Cunzhi Group." In this presentation, she provided historical perspective based in the conservative rural reform of the 1920s and '30s.

The workshop concluded with an open discussion in which participants discussed the workshop's proceedings, organized future work, and planned upcoming events. The participants' diverse approaches to the narrow focus of Chinese rural modernization led to productive and active discussion, and yielded actionable feedback and avenues for future collaboration. The Modernizing Rural China Research Network will convene for a similar event in February 2020.

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Reviving the Ancient Silk Road – Concepts, Actors and Perspectives
Confucius-Institute at the Free University Berlin, June 28–29, 2019

Report by Lara Hammersen, Carolin Rosenberg, Christian Schneider and Marie Welling

China has its own ideas and perspectives about how the world works and how it is structured. Chinese policy tries to shape these structures and processes through the establishment of a world encompassing plan: the Silk Road Initiative. Its different dimensions were addressed at the workshop "China's Silkroad Initiative – Concepts and Actors" at the Confucius-Institute Berlin on June 28th and 29th, 2019, hosted by Prof. Dr. Nele Noesselt (University Duisburg-Essen) and Prof. Dr. Katja Levy (Free University Berlin).

The first panel dealt with the social and ecological dimensions of the Silk Road Initiative, also known as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Prof. Dr. Bettina Gransow's (Free University Berlin) contribution described the role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) regarding the social and ecological standards. Projects of the AIIB, Gransow concluded, offer the potential of sustainability but require certain prerequisites. In the following talk, Prof. Tang Xiaoyang (Tsinghua University) showed that international sustainability standards are increasingly accepted by Chinese players within overseas projects, who simultaneously maintain a unique position towards these topics.

In the second panel, young researchers covered various subjects, including civil society, digitalization and security policy. Anja Ketels (Free University Berlin) discussed the role of NGOs in the BRI with regard to China's aim of expanding its soft power. Towards this goal, Chinese NGOs are increasingly internationalizing and cooperating with foreign counterparts. Marianna Levtov (University of Zurich) followed with a presentation of digital aspects of the BRI, taking into account various ways of process enhancement towards the goal of technical global leadership. Chinese conflict interventions were the topic of the talk held by Tanja Walter (University Duisburg-Essen). By looking at different dimensions, Walter explained why the principle of non-intervention appears to receive a more flexible interpretation in recent years.

The afternoon session started with a roundtable on political instability in Africa and the BRI. Prof. Dr. Christof Hartmann (University Duisburg-Essen), Prof. Dr. Nele Noesselt (University Duisburg-Essen) and Prof. Liu Haifang (Peking University) discussed the readjustment and diversification of China's approach to the African continent from various perspectives. In recent years, Chinese political leaders have become increasingly concerned about Africa's stability and security, potentially triggering spill-over effects.

The second day's discussions started with Prof. Liu Tao's (University Duisburg-Essen) presentation on social policy diffusion in the BRI. Increasing international

migration raises the demand for new social protection institutions. Using the example of Mekong river countries, Liu showed how China has moved from being a knowledge-receiver towards a knowledge-sender, proving that diffusion no longer progresses only from North to South. Dr. Giulia Romano's (University Duisburg-Essen) talk looked at the concrete challenges of policy diffusion by focusing on the urban conservation and urban renewal plan, implemented in Yangzhou in the early 2000s. According to Prof. Markus Taube (University Duisburg-Essen), who closed the 3rd panel, the BRI can potentially enable the promotion of norms and values – however, the effects are too diverse and remain uncertain.

The 4th and last panel dealt with the economic aspects of the BRI. The challenges and opportunities posed by the BRI towards deeper European integration were at the centre of Dr. Margot Schüller's (GIGA Institute for Asian Studies) talk. According to her argumentation, especially Central, Eastern and Southern European countries can profit through greater participation in global trade and increased levels of investment. Schüller's lecture was followed by Prof. Yang Leike (Free University Berlin) questioning whether the BRI has increased levels of trade and investment in officially declared partner countries, using a country and sectoral analysis. All in all, his results showed no clear signs that joining the BRI will boost Chinese investments in the country. Moving towards Central Asia, Oyuna Baldakova looked at Chinese financial flows under the BRI in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, showing that local agency matters. As a stable authoritarian regime with strong institutions, Kazakhstan can follow a coherent strategy towards China and subsequently has an enhanced bargaining position. Marked by internal power struggles and a frequent change of key players in the government, Kyrgyzstan fails to find a clear strategy towards China, resulting in a weaker bargaining position.

Is China's image declining? This overarching workshop question was highlighted in Prof. Noesselt's wrap-up. The different panels linked domestic development to the global outreach of the BRI which renews trade corridors and infrastructure, connecting China and the world. Seeking a new balance and to become a new centre of innovation, the Silkroad Initiative is a response to the "Opening Up and Reform" of 1987 and the following transformation. However, contrary to China's stated goals, the BRI is often perceived as a challenge to the Liberal World Order. Looking at the different dimensions, the panels and discussions displayed a diverse and multi-level perspective on the BRI, although at times uncritical. The workshop "China's Silk Road Initiative – Concepts and Actors" offered many different and interesting takeaways going far beyond the public media coverage.

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10. Jahrestagung des AK Südasien in Freiburg
Pädagogische Hochschule Freiburg, 24.–25. Januar 2020

Bericht von Markus Keck und Carsten Butsch

Der Arbeitskreis „Südasien" in der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Geographie versteht sich als Forum für den Austausch von Geograph*innen, die in der Region Südasien arbeiten. Er wurde 2011 ins Leben gerufen, um über die Grenzen der geographischen Teildisziplinen hinweg einen Austausch über aktuelle gesellschaftliche und naturräumliche Prozesse und Herausforderungen zu ermöglichen. Die diesjährige Tagung fand am Institut für Geographie und ihrer Didaktik der Pädagogischen Hochschule Freiburg statt und wurde von Gregor Falk und seinen Mitarbeiter*innen organisiert. Insgesamt nahmen 32 Personen an der Tagung teil und es wurden 13 Fachvorträge gehalten, die ein breites Spektrum an Themen aus der Humangeographie sowie aus Fernerkundung und Physischer Geographie abbildeten.

Bereits zum sechsten Mal wurde eine herausragende Abschlussarbeit mit dem Forschungspreis „Geographien Südasiens" prämiert. Eine dreiköpfige Jury aus Hochschullehrer*innen stimmte in diesem Jahr für die Masterarbeit von Dagmar Brombierstäudl (Heidelberg) mit dem Titel „Zeitreihen zur Abschätzung von Vegetationsdynamiken: Eine fernerkundliche Analyse am Beispiel des Langtang-Tals (Nepal)". Mit ihrer Forschung zeigte die Laureatin, wie mithilfe frei verfügbarer Fernerkundungsdaten eine Detektion von Schadensereignissen durch gravitative Massebewegungen durchgeführt werden kann. Die Analyse konzentrierte sich auf die Folgen des Ghorka-Erdbebens 2015 für das Langtang-Tal (Nepal), im Zuge dessen eine Schlammlawine eine Siedlung sowie die Vegetation eines ganzen Hanges zerstörte. Als Preis erhielt Frau Brombierstäudl einen Buchgutschein des Franz Steiner Verlags und ein Jahresabonnement der Geographischen Rundschau des Westermann-Verlags. Der Arbeitskreis übernahm die Kosten für Anreise und Unterkunft in Freiburg.

Der erste Konferenztag begann mit einem Vortrag von Mehwish Zuberi (Eberswalde), die ihre laufende Forschung zu Transformationsprozessen in der Landwirtschaft Pakistans vorstellte. Mit Hilfe eines Assemblage-Ansatzes untersuchte sie, welche Akteur*innen, Technologien, Institutionen und Prozesse die landwirtschaftliche Produktion in der pakistanischen Provinz Punjab verändern.

Daran anschließend berichtete der Nachwuchsgruppenleiter Michael Spies (Eberswalde) über chinesische Investitionen im „China-Pakistan Economic Corridor". Die damit finanzierten Projekte, die innerhalb Pakistans zum Teil sehr umstritten sind, beeinflussen die Wirtschaftsstruktur des Landes zunehmend.

Shantonu Abe (Köln) stellte Ergebnisse seines kurz vor dem Abschluss stehenden Promotionsprojektes zu biologischer Landwirtschaft im indischen Bundesstaat Westbengalen vor. Dabei zeigt er, dass das Konzept der biologischen

Landwirtschaft von den Akteur*innen im lokalen Kontext mit eigenen Bedeutungen aufgeladen wird, die nicht zwangsläufig dem international gängigen Verständnis entsprechen.

Das Versagen gentechnisch veränderter Organismen in der indischen Landwirtschaft war das Thema des Vortrags von Katharina Najork (Göttingen), die sich mit den sozioökonomischen Auswirkungen des Schädlingsbefalls von Baumwolle im indischen Bundesstaat Telangana befasste. Die ursprünglich gegen diesen Schädling resistente, biotechnologisch erzeugte Baumwollvariante Bt-Cotton wird inzwischen wieder großflächig durch Mottenlarven zerstört.

Im Anschluss daran stellte Amelie Bernzen (Vechta) Ergebnisse ihrer Untersuchung zur Ernährungssituation von Bäuer*innen in Bangladesch vor. Sie zeigte, welche Faktoren die Ernährungssicherung der ländlichen Bevölkerung beeinflussen, wobei sich die Art der angebauten Produkte, das Vorhandensein sozialer Netzwerke und die Qualität des bestellten Bodens als zentral herausstellten.

Als letzte Referentin des ersten Konferenztages schließlich zeigte Judith Müller (Heidelberg) am Beispiel der Stadt Leh in Ladakh auf, welche Herausforderungen sich für die Wasserversorgung durch die Urbanisierung in einem Hochgebirgsraum ergeben. Aufgrund der zunehmenden Bedeutung des Tourismus erfährt die Stadt derzeit ein rapides Wachstum, dem die Wasserver- und -entsorgung kaum gewachsen ist. Dies resultiert in zum Teil gravierenden sozioökonomischen Ungleichheiten bezüglich des Zugangs zu Wasser.

Am Abend wurde dann im Rahmen der Mitgliederversammlung über die zukünftig geplanten Aktivitäten des AKs diskutiert und anschließend das Sprecher*innenteam, bestehend aus Judith Müller (Heidelberg), Carsten Butsch (Köln), Alexander Follmann (Köln) und Markus Keck (Göttingen), in seinem Amt bestätigt. Von Seiten des Arbeitskreises sind als nächstes die Herausgabe eines Themenheftes der Zeitschrift ASIEN sowie zwei neue Ausgaben der eigenen Schriftenreihe geplant.

Der zweite Konferenztag wurde mit einem Vortrag von Theresa Zimmermann (Berlin) zum Risiko- und Katastrophenmanagement in Mumbai eröffnet. In ihrem Promotionsprojekt stehen insbesondere die Veränderungen von Governance-Strukturen und -Prozessen im Fokus, die sich seit der Überschwemmung 2005 ergeben haben.

Anschließend stellte Carsten Butsch (Köln) erste Ergebnisse seiner laufenden Feldarbeiten im Rahmen des Projekts „H2O – Transformation to Sustainability" vor, das sich am Beispiel von Pune, Hyderabad und Kolkata mit veränderten Wasserzugangsregimen in periurbanen Räumen Indiens beschäftigt. Ausgelöst durch gegenwärtige Transformationen sind in der Landwirtschaft gegensätzliche Strategien wie Aufgabe oder Intensivierung zu finden. Zusätzlich entstehen neue Einkommensquellen.

In einem gemeinsamen Vortrag zeigten Martin Maier und Charlotte Stirn (Heidelberg), welche physischen und sozialen Prozesse bedacht werden müssen, wenn es um die Bekämpfung von mit Arsen angereichertem Trinkwasser in Bangladesch geht. Im Rahmen eines anwendungsbezogenen Projekts soll geprüft werden, mit Hilfe welcher kostengünstiger Methoden sich die seit Jahrzehnten bekannte Arsenvergiftung der Bevölkerung Bangladeschs eindämmen lässt.

Tobias Kuttler (München) untersuchte die Veränderungen für Taxi- und Riksha-Fahrer*innen in Mumbai, die durch den Markteintritt von „Uber" und „Ola" ausgelöst werden. Er zeigte Transformationen des Nahverkehrs auf und diskutierte die damit einhergehenden Folgen für die Fahrer*innen.

Miriam Wenner (Göttingen) berichtete im Anschluss von ihrer Forschung zur Entstehung von Teekooperativen in Nepal und stellte diese in einen moralökonomischen Kontext. An unterschiedlichen Beispielen ging sie dabei der Frage nach, welche Werte für das Funktionieren von Genossenschaften von Bedeutung sind.

Suanne Schultz (Frankfurt) präsentierte sodann die Ergebnisse ihrer Untersuchung zu Street-Food-Verkäufer*innen in Hyderabad. Durch eine gesetzliche Neuregelung im Jahr 2014 sollten die Händler*innen eigentlich mehr Sicherheit erhalten, wenngleich ihre Anzahl reduziert werden sollte. Wie Schultz deutlich machte, zeigte die Neuregelung bisher jedoch kaum Wirkung, sodass es weiterhin einen großen informellen Sektor in diesem Bereich gibt.

Zum Abschluss der Tagung erörterte Nicolas Schlitz (Graz) das Funktionieren von Wertschöpfungsketten im Plastikrecyclingsektor Kolkatas. Dabei zeigte sich, dass die informell beschäftigten Akteur*innen der Wertschöpfungskette hohen gesundheitlichen Belastungen bei gleichzeitig geringem Lohn ausgesetzt sind, während die Produkte am Ende der Wertschöpfungskette von hoher Qualität sind und beachtliche Preise erzielen.

Zur nächsten Jahrestagung, die am 15. und 16. Januar 2021 stattfinden wird, laden Christoph Dittrich und Miriam Wenner nach Göttingen ein.

Wie auch in den vergangenen Jahren können nähere Informationen zu den einzelnen Fachvorträgen den Extended Abstracts entnommen werden, die frei zugänglich in einem Sammelband der Schriftenreihe Geographien Südasiens erscheinen werden. Auch die prämierte Masterarbeit von Dagmar Brombierstäudl wird in der Schriftreihe des Arbeitskreises veröffentlicht. Alle bisher erschienen Bände sind unter http://crossasia-books.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/xasia/catalog/ series/gsa abrufbar. Alle weiteren Informationen zum AK Südasien finden sich unter www.geographien-suedasiens.de. Für Fragen steht Ihnen Carsten Butsch (butschc@uni-koeln.de) aus dem Sprecher*innenteam gern zur Verfügung. Bei ihm können sich Interessierte auch in den Mailverteiler des Arbeitskreises eintragen lassen.

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Heike Berner: ISE. Erzählungen von koreanischen Deutschen der zweiten Generation

München: Iudicium Verlag, 2018. 198 S., 24 EUR

Rezension von Sebastian Tobginski

In „ISE. Erzählungen von koreanischen Deutschen der zweiten Generation" bündelt Heike Berner zehn Erzählungen, die sie aus Oral-History-Interviews gewonnen hat. Da die Migrationsgeschichte von Koreanern in Deutschland immer noch ein stark vernachlässigtes Thema ist, bildet das Buch von Heike Berner einen wichtigen und wertvollen Anhaltspunkt. In den 1960er- und 1970er-Jahren sind Koreanerinnen und Koreaner hauptsächlich als Krankenschwestern und Bergarbeiter nach Deutschland gekommen. Grundlage hierfür war das „Anwerbeabkommen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Südkorea", das dieses Jahr sein 55. Jubiläum feierte. Die Gruppe der koreanischen Arbeitsmigranten weist, im Vergleich zu anderen Gastarbeitern, einige Besonderheiten auf. Zum einen war Korea für die in Deutschland tätigen Gastarbeiter aufgrund mangelnder direkter Flugverbindungen nahezu unerreichbar. Existierende Flugverbindungen nahmen sehr viel Zeit in Anspruch und waren unerschwinglich. Dies bedeutete, dass koreanische Gastarbeiter meist die ganze Zeit während ihrer Tätigkeit in Deutschland bleiben mussten. Kontakt zu den in Korea verbliebenen Verwandten war so meist nur schriftlich möglich. Zum anderen führte die Tatsache, dass zeitgleich Krankenschwestern und Bergarbeiter in Deutschland angeheuert haben, dazu, dass es häufig zu koreanischen Liebesbeziehungen kam.

Das vorliegende Buch behandelt die zweite Generation, auf Koreanisch 이세 (Ise). Nach einer kurzen Einleitung lässt die Autorin die Erzählungen für sich sprechen. Sie gibt dem Leser allerdings vier Denkanstöße / Thesen mit auf den Weg: Erstens, Kindheit und Jugend der zweiten Generation sei hauptsächlich „deutsch" geprägt und ein größeres Interesse an Korea entwickelte sich erst im Laufe des Erwachsenwerdens. Zweitens, Sprache ist ein wichtiges Merkmal für die Ise-Identität. Drittens, vielen Angehörigen der zweiten Generation fällt eine emotionale Integration schwer, da es zu einer unterschiedlichen Selbst- und Fremdwahrnehmung kommt. Letztens, Transnationalismus spielt in der zweiten Generation eine andere Rolle als in der ersten.

Die Auswahl der zehn Erzählungen traf sie nach eigenen Angaben willkürlich. Nichtsdestotrotz habe sie darauf geachtet, dass die interviewten Personen in verschiedenen Regionen in Deutschland verortet waren, sich nicht kannten und unterschiedliche Berufswege eingeschlagen haben. Außerdem sind die interviewten Personen zwischen 1970 und 1990 geboren, woraus sich weitere Besonderheiten ergeben.

Da Literatur zu Koreanern in Deutschland leider sehr rar ist, wäre es nicht nur für den eher koreafernen Leser sehr hilfreich, eine geschichtliche Einordnung voranzustellen. Darüber hinaus wäre auch eine theoretische Bearbeitung der Interviews aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht sehr spannend. Nach eigener Darstellung der Autorin soll diese in Zukunft auch noch erfolgen. Nicht zuletzt ist die Bearbeitung des Themas in der ehemaligen DDR, sprich Kinder nordkoreanischer Abstammung ein Aspekt, der durchaus Relevanz besitzt. Dies ist letztlich aber kein Mangel des vorliegenden Buches, sondern zeigt nur auf, wie viel Forschungspotenzial und -bedarf dieses Thema noch hat.

Ebenso wichtig und interessant ist das Buch in der aktuell stattfindenden Debatte über Einwanderung in Deutschland. Neben der Bearbeitung von Gastarbeitern aus der Türkei und Südeuropa kann auch die koreanische Migrationsgeschichte wichtige Erkenntnisse liefern. Das Buch lässt sich aufgrund des erzählerischen Stils sehr leicht lesen und ist auch für koreafremde Leser durchaus lesenswert.

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Catherine Earl (ed.): Mythbusting Vietnam: Facts, Fictions, Fantasies

NIAS Press, 2018. 254 pp., 65 GBP (Hardback); 22.50 GBP (Paperback)

Review by Friederike Trotier

The collected volume "Mythbusting Vietnam: Facts, Fictions, Fantasies" aims to discuss problematic axiomatic knowledge and to raise alternative possibilities in knowledge production processes and practices in Vietnam Studies through interdisciplinary and methodologically diverse approaches. The book is based on the idea of "mythbusting", which derives from a postmodern approach to knowledge production and encourages the reader to actively engage with the processes of knowledge (de-)construction. Following the subtitle of the book "Facts, Fictions, Fantasies", the volume is organized into three thematic themes. The editor, Catherine Earl, introduces each section with a short discussion to situate it in the context of the themes of mythbusting and knowledge production about Vietnam. Together with the introduction and conclusion, these essays form a thread to link the different chapters with their various themes and disciplinary and methodological approaches.

In this collected volume, each chapter has a value of its own because of the new perspectives or new findings that the authors discuss. What makes this book unique, however, is the overall discussion of Vietnam Studies as a field and the explicit incorporation of the how and why in the expansion of ways of knowing Vietnam. This makes the book a valuable contribution for readers who are interested in Vietnam but also in the discussion of knowledge production and practices more generally.

In the first section, the authors of the three contributions rethink and reread existing "facts" – which are considered as "social facts" – and thus engage in multiplying ideas and knowledges about Vietnam. Marie Gibert reconsiders the use and conceptualization of public space in Ho Chi Minh City in the first chapter. Her focus is on urban interstices, such as alleyways and shopping malls as small-scale but vibrant urban spaces that contrast state-controlled official public spaces. The perspective from Vietnam's "underside" helps to capture the vibrant urban collective life of Ho Chi Minh City and beyond.

The second and the third chapter both seek to multiply the understanding of gender in the framework of Confucianism. In the second chapter, Minna Hakkarainen critically revisits three of the four Confucian classics to provide alternative interpretations of Confucian doctrine with regard to gender. She identifies a significant gap between later Confucianism, which has shaped the idea of an ideal Vietnamese woman and has influenced academic knowledge on gender in Vietnam, and the focus on men in the early Confucian texts when referring to gendered norms. Hakkarainen's arguments offer the possibility to challenge state

discourse based on later Confucian doctrine that regulates Vietnamese women. Philipp Martin's field research on young men and their life stories in Hanoi provides new understanding of Vietnamese masculinities. He questions the "myth" that Vietnamese men struggle to cope with changing gender practices in the setting of transition, in particular during Doi Moi. Instead, Martin suggests acknowledging the ambivalence about ideas and practices of masculinity in Vietnam.

Based on empirical research, the three co-authored chapters of Section Two engage in knowledge production while dealing with competing "fictions" – understood as socially constructed reality – surrounding the topics. Vladimir Mazyrin and Adam Fforde challenge myths about Vietnamese pre-Doi Moi dependency on Soviet development assistance that are persistent outside of English academia and provide new insights from interview material with three retired Soviet experts. The authors conclude that in spite of Soviet influence, the Vietnamese followed their own strategies. In the fifth chapter, Nguyen Thi Hong-Xoan and Catherine Earl explore the myths about undocumented labour migrants in Ho Chi Minh City and detail their situation of risks. They address the myth of modernization and industrialization employed by the Vietnamese state to stigmatize and exclude undocumented labour migrants despite their positive impacts on Vietnam's economic development. In the following chapter, Ashley Carruthers and Dang Dinh Trung give voice to usually unheard rural people to challenge the myths about "uncivilized" rural-urban migrants. The rural perspective unmasks knowledge production about village life and rural-urban migration as stereotypical perspective of the urbanite and stresses different views on the village, "social remittances" and returnees.

In Chapter Seven, Adam Fforde critically examines the "fantasies" that shape interests in knowledge production with regard to the process of Doi Moi. He reveals the processes of academic and aid-donor scholarship that lead to the production and repetition of myths instead of encouraging to challenge taken-for-granted knowledge about Doi Moi, in particular, and processes of transition and change, more generally.

The different contributions of this volume underline the value of rethinking and questioning knowledge and knowledge production. The reader feels encouraged to sharpen his or her view on mythmaking and to engage in interdisciplinary research to gain analytical richness. Following Catherine Earls suggestions in the conclusion to increase "interactions … across languages, disciplines and particularized field contexts" (p. 229), this agenda could enrich research and discussions in other disciplines and fields in Southeast Asia and beyond.

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Bo Gao: China's Economic Engagement in North Korea

Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. 176 pp. 71,49 EUR; eBook: 54,99 EUR

Rezension von Sabine Burghart

In der vergangenen Dekade wurden einige Studien über die Bedeutung chinesischer Akteure für Nordkoreas Außenhandel und Wirtschaftsentwicklung veröffentlicht (u.a. Cathcart, A und Green, C (2017) Xi's Belt: China-North Korea Relations, In: Hoo, TB (Hg.) *Chinese Foreign Policy Under Xi*, Routledge; Gray, K und Lee, JW (2018) The Rescaling of the Chinese State and Sino-North Korean Relations: Beyond State-Centrism*, Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 48:1, 113–132; Haggard, S, Lee J und Noland, M (2012) Integration in the absence of institutions: China–North Korea cross-border exchange, *Journal of Asian Economics* 23, 130-145; Hastings, J.V. (2016) *A Most Enterprising Country: North Korea in the Global Economy*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Kim, SJ (2013) Main causes of expansion of economic cooperation between North Korea and China and effects on the North Korean economy, *KDI Review of the North Korean Economy* 15:1; sowie Yoon, SH und Lee, SO (2013) From old comrades to new partnerships: dynamic development of economic relations between China and North Korea, *The Geographical Journal* 179:1, 19–31). Das vorliegende Buch leistet einen weiteren, kleinen Beitrag zur wissenschaftlichen Auseinandersetzung aus chinesischer Perspektive. Im Mittelpunkt der Studie stehen wirtschaftliche Aktivitäten unterschiedlicher chinesischer Akteure in Nordkorea seit 2003. Hierfür werden einige Wirtschaftssektoren näher beleuchtet: der Rohstoffsektor, die Fischindustrie und die vom Autor als „grenzüberschreitende Aktivitäten" zusammengefassten Bereiche Infrastruktur, Tourismus, Leichtindustrie und Landwirtschaft.

Gaos Analyse basiert auf Dokumenten (u.a. offizielle Erklärungen, bilaterale Vereinbarungen, Jahresberichte der Kommunalregierungen und Geschäftsberichte chinesischer Unternehmen) und Medienberichten sowie auf mehr als zwanzig qualitativen Experteninterviews, die im Zeitraum von 2012 bis 2014 mit Wissenschaftlern, Unternehmern und Regierungsvertretern in China und Südkorea geführt wurden. Nordkoreanische Quellen wurden für die Studie nicht herangezogen.

Die Studie bestätigt, was andere WissenschaftlerInnen bereits aufgezeigt haben: von wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen, spielen große chinesische Staatsbetriebe (*zhong yang qi ye*) keine nennenswerte Rolle in Nordkorea. Zentrale Akteure sind vielmehr klein- und mittelständische Unternehmen (KMU) aus verschiedenen Provinzen Chinas, insbesondere den Grenzregionen zu Nordkorea. Die wenigen Zitate, die den Interviews entnommen sind, bestätigen Berichte über die nicht ganz reibungslosen (Geschäfts-)Beziehungen der beiden Länder und geben weitere Einblicke in die Herausforderungen und Chancen für Investoren in Nordkorea.

Die Tatsache, dass chinesische KMU in erster Linie profitorientiert agieren und sich weniger an den geopolitischen und strategischen Überlegungen der Zentralregierung orientieren, überrascht kaum. Jedoch wirkt sich Chinas „dezentrales" wirtschaftliches Engagement in Nordkorea negativ auf die internationalen Verhandlungen über die Entnuklearisierung Nordkoreas aus. Angesichts der signifikanten Bedeutung chinesischer Investitionen, Technologietransfers etc. würden wirtschaftliche Anreize der USA und anderer Parteien kaum mehr ins Gewicht fallen. Hierbei bleibt anzumerken, dass die Auswirkungen der gegen die DVR Korea zusätzlich in den Jahren 2016 und 2017 verhängten Sanktionen des UN-Sicherheitsrates in der Studie nicht berücksichtigt werden.

Allerdings weist die Studie auch Schwächen auf. Die zentralen Forschungsfragen – Beziehungen zwischen der chinesischen Zentralregierung und nachgeordneten Ebenen in den wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten mit Nordkorea, Anreize für lokale Akteure und die Frage ob diese im nationalen Interesse agieren, die Auswirkungen chinesischer Aktivitäten in Nordkorea auf die regionale Sicherheit und ihre Bedeutung für die Außenpolitik der Volksrepublik China – sind interessant und relevant, aber auch – angesichts der Komplexität der Themen – ambitiös für ein Buch dieses Umfangs. Der vom Autor gewählte Ansatz der nicht-traditionellen Sicherheit, beispielsweise, drängt die Aspekte Profitorientierung, Erschließung neuer Märkte und komparative Kostenvorteile zu sehr in den Hintergrund. Aussagen über die institutionellen und strukturellen Rahmenbedingungen in Nordkorea sind oft stark reduziert und teilweise auch nicht fundiert. Hinzu kommen unpräzise und fehlerhafte Angaben zu Entwicklungen und Ereignissen in Nordkorea (insb. in Kapitel 5).

Insgesamt betrachtet geben die ausgewählten Fallstudien ein paar interessante Einblicke in die Thematik aus chinesischer Perspektive und mit dem Thema vertraute LeserInnen werden über die fehlerhaften Aussagen hinweglesen. Für „EinsteigerInnen" und Studierende mit geringen Vorkenntnissen könnte ein kurzer Begleitkommentar bzw. Korrigenda hilfreich sein.

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Thomas Kalinowski: Why International Cooperation is Failing. How the Clash of Capitalisms Undermines the Regulation of Finance

Oxford University Press, 2019. 279 S.

Rezension von Werner Pfennig

Sachkundige Schelme meinen, Kapitalismus ohne Krise sei wie Katholizismus ohne Sünde. Reuigen Sündern, so sie Buße tun, wird vergeben. Kapitalistische Übeltäter, so sie systemrelevant sind, brauchen nicht einmal bußfertig zu sein, sie werden gerettet, mit dem Steuergeld der Opfer. Das sind klobige Verallgemeinerungen, es bedarf der Differenzierung und die leistet Thomas Kalinowski, Professor an einer sehr renommierten Universität in Seoul, in großartiger Weise in seinem neuen Buch.

Branko Milanovic unterscheidet zwischen liberal-leistungsgesellschaftlichem *(meritocratic)* und politischem Kapitalismus (Branko Milanovic: Capitalism, Alone. The Future of the System that Rules the World. Harvard UP, 2019). Kalinowski dringt tiefer in die Materie ein, er untersucht hauptsächlich drei Arten mit ihren unterschiedlichen Ausformungen und deren Pfadabhängigkeit: den finanzgeleiteten Kapitalismus der USA, den integrationsgeführten der EU und den staatsgesteuerten in Ostasien, d. h. in Japan, Korea und der VR China. Ein Hauptanliegen des Autors ist, dass bei Gründen für internationale Konflikte weniger der *clash of culture*, sondern mehr der *clash of capitalism* Berücksichtigung finden sollte sowie dessen nationale und regionale Ebenen und dass dabei der ostasiatische Kapitalismus ernst genommen wird. Internationale ökonomische Konflikte seien nur zu verstehen, wenn Interdependenz und Komplementarität der unterschiedlichen Kapitalismusspielarten umfassend in Betracht gezogen werden. Der ostasiatische Kapitalismus ist keine unterentwickelte Version des US- oder EU-Kapitalismus, sondern er entfaltet sich, konvergiert aber nicht mit den anderen Modellen. (S. 223) Der Verfasser meint, diese Art von Kapitalismus habe bisher nicht die ihr gebührende Aufmerksamkeit erhalten, obwohl sie in ihrer Bedeutung den beiden anderen Arten durchaus ähnlich sei; es ist die Region mit dem größten Handelsüberschuss und den größten Währungsreserven.

Das Buch ist in überzeugender Weise in sechs Großkapitel gegliedert, vielfach gibt es Querverweise. Es enthält 30 Schaubilder bzw. Tabellen, die die jeweiligen Schritte und Strategien der drei Kapitalismen veranschaulichen, so z. B. deren Unterschiede. (S. 241) In den Tabellen konnten Angaben bis 2016 berücksichtigt werden, bei der Literatur bis zum Frühjahr 2019. Der Index ist etwas spärlich geraten.

Der Verfasser schreibt, in gewissem Sinne könne seine Studie als „neo-strukturalistisch" bezeichnet werden. (S. 246) Praktiziert wird ein „Sowohl-als-auch-Ansatz." Professor Kalinowski ist nicht dogmatisch, aber auch nicht beliebig, gar meinungsscheu. Seine Art das Thema zu behandeln stellt viele Fragen, gibt viele Antworten und regt zu weiterem Nachdenken an. Er macht Einflüsse und Durchsetzungsmöglichkeiten der unterschiedlichen Kapitalismen sowie deren Finanzsysteme deutlich und führt sie auf ihre wesentlichen, hauptsächlich inneren, Bestimmungsfaktoren zurück.

Den ostasiatischen Kapitalismus kennzeichnen große Konglomerate mit direktem Zugang zur Regierung und schwache Gewerkschaften, er ist ein autoritärer Korporatismus mit politisierten Zentralbanken. (S. 187) Der Staat, in der VR China die Partei, hat hier die Rolle, die anderswo der Markt ausübt. Diese Art von Autonomie isoliert den Staat gegen gesellschaftliche Interessengruppen. Im Gegensatz zum Westen sei es der Staat, der in Ostasien eine Kapitalistenklasse geschaffen habe. (S. 227) In Ostasien werden Krisen als vom Ausland verursachte Schocks angesehen, gegen die mobilisiert werden muss, um die Nation zu retten und neu zu beleben. (S. 232) Eine Sichtweise, die der von Donald Trump ähnlich zu sein scheint. In den USA und Europa, so der Verfasser, werde die Autorität des Staates schwächer, nicht so in Ostasien.

Was die VR China anbelangt, so sind das Zusammenwirken von Einfluss der Partei, Nationalismus und internationalem Netzwerk von Bedeutung. Es hätte erwähnt werden können, dass der Aufstieg der Wirtschaft des Landes einen großen Schub durch Investitionen und Technologietransfers aus dem Ausland, in der Anfangsphase besonders aus Taiwan, erhielt. Letztlich fördert er Eigenständigkeit. Außerdem kooperiert der chinesische Kapitalismus mit einem Netzwerk von ethnischen Chinesen, die in der Wirtschaft Ost- und Südostasiens eine große Rolle spielen, so z. B. die „Fünf Familien" in Thailand.

Das Buch enthält eine sehr informative Analyse der Entwicklung des ostasiatischen Kapitalismus, seiner Eigeninitiativen und Reaktionen auf äußere Entwicklungen, primär der USA. „*Rebalancing*" wurde das Codewort dafür, was die USA wollten. (S. 88)

Südkoreas Präsident Kim Dae-jung wollte die Macht der Großkonzerne seines Landes begrenzen, brauchte sie aber für seine „Sonnenscheinpolitik." Die enge Verknüpfung von Staat und Wirtschaft in Ostasien wird in dem Buch anschaulich herausgearbeitet. Krisen des ostasiatischen Modells und Interventionen des IWF führten nicht zu dessen grundlegender Veränderung, sondern nach einer Talfahrt und Anpassungen zum Ausbau von dessen traditionellen Stärken. Der Verfasser verweist darauf, dass Hyundai und Samsung erst nach 1998 zu tatsächlichen *global players* wurden. (S. 198)

Früher war oft vom „Spätkapitalismus" die Rede, aber er wuchert und gedeiht; wir werden sein Ende nicht erleben. Kapitalismus braucht Profit und Wachstum, der Staat aber sollte bzw. muss für Gerechtigkeit sorgen und Auswüchse reduzieren.

Das Buch trägt zum Verständnis dieses Spannungsverhältnisses bei. Thomas Kalinowski zeigt in seinem sehr lesenswerten Band auch eine „utopische Alternative" auf. (S. 88ff und 251f) Er beschreibt, was eigentlich möglich wäre, denn Instrumente sowie Verfahren sind bekannt und Institutionen bereits vorhanden, aber politischer Wille sowie internationale Koordinierung sind zu schwach, nationale Eigeninteressen zu groß. Das sich verändernde Bewusstsein über die Klimakrise auch in höchsten Kapitalistenkreisen, gerade wegen ökonomischer Gründe, könnte "externe Schocks" bewirken, die Veränderungen möglich machen, die bisher undenkbar waren.

(Leider folgt auch Oxford University Press der seit einiger Zeit grassierenden Unsitte, Vornamen nur mit dem Anfangsbuchstaben zu nennen. Sollte dadurch Papier gespart und die Umweltbelastung reduziert werden, ergebe es vielleicht dennoch einen Sinn.)

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Andreas Marks: Japanese Woodblock Prints (1680–1938)

TASCHEN, 2019. 622 pp., 150 EUR

Review by Uta Lauer

Certainly a big splash and yes, the iconic „Great Wave (Under the Great Wave of Kanagawa / Kanagawa-oki nami-ura)" by Hokusai (1760–1849) is also in the book (catalog number 111, pages 352–354). As a highly readable book review is already available (Laflamme 2020), I will here focus on a few points perhaps a bit off the beaten track but nevertheless noteworthy.

Of course a bibliography on the topic of Japanese woodblock prints can not be exaustive but it would have been an added benefit for the European, especially the German reader, if important collections and publications such as (Kozyreff et al. 1989) for Brussels, (Schulze et al. 2016) for Hamburg, (Schulenburg 2009) for Frankfurt am Main or (Mayr et al. 2003) for Heidelberg and again (Mayr et al. 2004) for Frankfurt am Main to name just a few would have been included in the bibliography. Japanese technical terms listed separately in an appendix would have been useful. The quality of the reproductions of the prints does not live up to expectation.

Each print is set in historical, cultural and artistic context. Inscriptions on the prints are either translated or if too long, paraphrased.

Utagawa Toyoharu (1735–1814) is credited as the first Japanese artist to use Western one-point perspective to depict outdoor scenes. This he did very successfully in the unique print, „Picture of Watônai Sankan" (cat.nr. 36, pp. 146–147). Unique, because it seems to be the only extant print from a series called „Perspective Pictures of Foreign Lands". Perspective pictures in Japanese are uki-e 浮絵. The knowledge of one-point perspective was initially gained through Chinese translations of European books. Watônai is the main character in a kabuki play based on the life and adventures of Coxinga (1624–1662), who at some stage had proclaimed himself king of Taiwan. Coxinga was well known in Japan because his mother Tagawa Matsu was Japanese and the famous Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653–1723) had written a very popular bunraku puppet-play about Coxinga.

Japanese craftsmen and artisans were quick to adept foreign things to Japanese sensibilities like the beautifully red-laquered telescope with sprinkeled-on gold powder through which a young lady looks into the distance in Hokusai's (yes, the very same) luxury print „Women with Parasol and Telescope" (cat.nr. 86, pp. 282–283).

Money and marketing played a vital role in the business of making and publishing ukyio-e prints. Around 1824 the relatively unknown artist Eisen (1790–1848) desigend „Woman putting on Face Powder" (cat.nr. 102, pp. 324–325). The text next to the cartouche advertises white, fragrant facepowder for women made by a

certain Mr. Sakamoto. This is perhaps the earliest case of product placement known in the world.

Chinese novels like „Watermargin (Shuihuzhuan)" were bestsellers in Japan and illustrations of the fearsome warriors were in high demand. Kuniyoshi (1798–1861) who was a specialist in images of heroes designed „Flea on a Drum – Shi Qian" (cat. nr. 107, pp. 336–337) as part of a series depicting „108 Heroes of the Popular Watermargin".

In eighteenth-century Prussia, men of exceptional hight (above 1.88 meters) often recruited into special battalions of the army, were nick-named „Lange Kerle". In Japan Ikezuki Geitazaemon (1827–1850) who reached a towering hight of 2.27 meters and weighed 169 kilograms became a sumo wrestler. He almost never won a tournament and was always regarded as an anomaly. A very touching print by Kunisada (1786–1865) shows a portrait of the wrestler superimposed on an imprint of Ikezukis's right hand. To this day, the print of a sumo wrestler's hand is a kind of autograph.

The Chinese Confucian concept of 24 paragons of filial piety (ershisi xiao) received some quite strange adaptations in Japan, among them „Biographies of Heroic Generals of Kai and Echigo Province: Takeda Clan, Twenty-Four Generals". Kuniyoshi (1798–1861) dramatically put the gruesome suicide of „General Morozumi Bungo-no-kami Masakiyo (died 1561) of the Takeda clan" (cat.nr. 144, pp. 434–435) in print. His sword directed towards himself, Masakiyo deliberately steps on a landmine and is blown to pieces. Landmines already used in 16th century Japanese warfare, still a threat to life in many parts of the world today.

Disputed islands in the South China Sea have long been an issue between the contending countries. During the Sino-Japanese of 1894/95 war photographs were still relatively rare. Since the ban on illustrating contemporary incidents had been repealed in 1869, print designers took the opportunity to depict current events. Kobayashi Kiyochika's (1847–1915) „Picture of Our Elite Forces Occupying the Taiwanese Pescadores Islands" (p. 456) shows soldiers fighting in the dark of the night, their reflections visible in a stretch of water owing to raging flames in the background consuming a city gate.

Kawanabe Kyôsai's print „ Kyôsai's One Hundred Lunacies: Infinite Prayers" (cat. nr. 163, pp. 300–303) at first glance seems to depict just an octopus encircled by a Buddhist string of prayer surrounded by various people and demons. A closer look reveals this complex image to be a satirical image of the five Western powers that forced Japan into unfavourable trade treaties (the United States, the Netherlands, Russia, England and France).

Today, the print-designer Ogata Gekkô (1859–1920) is almost forgotten but in his time, he was among the chosen few to attend the Chicago World Fair in 1893 and show his prints and the art of making ukyio-e at the Japanese Pavilion, a replica of the Hôden-Hall of Byôdôyin temple in Uji near Kyoto. One of the thousands of

visitors to the fair was the young architect Frank Lloyd-Wright (1867-1959) whose work subsequently was imbued with Japanese aesthetics and designs. An English guidebook written by Okakura Kakuzô (1862–1913), the later Asian Arts curator at the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston and author of „The Book of Tea", introduced the various arts and crafts of Japan. In 1895, Gekkô made a print of „Yokosuka Naval Base, Picture of People Watching the Warship Zhenyuan" (cat. nr. 177, pp. 538–540). The „Zhenyuan", equipped with Krupp guns, had been built by the AG Vulcan shipyard in Stettin, then Germany, between 1882 and 1884 for the Chinese Beiyang fleet. After the battle of Weihaiwei in 1895, Japan seized the ship as war booty. At the naval base of Yokosuka the iron-clad turrent ship was repaired and henceforth served the Japanese Navy.

Gekkô's disciple Kôka (Yamamura Kôka/ Toyonari,1886–1942) who was also a painter in the „Nihon-ga style (a modernized form of traditional Japanese painting)" literally carved a name for himself by reviving the classical actor print. His „The Actor Morita Kan'ya XIII as Jean Valjean" (cat. 187, pp. 578–579) portrays the villain from Victor Hugo's novel „Les Misérables. The print was based on a bromide photo, black and white photos of celebrities called „buromaido ブロマイド in Japanese.

When the Second World War broke out in 1939 the art of making ukyio-e prints collapsed almost completely. Only a few print-designers continued with shin hanga (new prints) after the war.

„Japanese Woodblock Prints (1680–1938)" covers the whole period of ukyio-e from its beginning to its demise and takes the reader on a fascinating, cross-cultural and international journey.

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Marty Natalegawa: Does ASEAN Matter? A View from Within

ISEAS Publishing, 2018. 258 pp., S$39.90

Review by Lukas Maximilian Müller

Former Indonesian Foreign Minister (2009–2014) and former Director General for ASEAN Cooperation (2002–2005) Marty Natalegawa's book "Does ASEAN Matter?" adds to a long line of memoirs by Indonesian politicians seeking to influence public perceptions of their achievements while in office. Serving during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's second term as President, Natalegawa prominently guided Indonesia's eventful 2011 ASEAN chairmanship. Publically, Yudhoyono's second term is remembered as a relatively outward-looking period in terms of foreign policy. With this book, Natalegawa attempts to cement the perception of Indonesia as a regional leader within ASEAN.

The book lays out an ambitious scope, aiming to deviate from the history-focused ASEAN literature by concentrating on the organization's relevance with a view towards the future. What makes the book worth reading is Natalegawa's perspective on diplomatic choices as the primary driver of regional policy, rather than great power rivalries. This view, certainly influenced by Indonesia's self-perception as a regional power, separates the book from other ASEAN memoirs, particularly those published by Singaporean diplomats.

On seven pages, chapter 1 somewhat briefly lays out Natalegawa's view of diplomatic history from 1967 until 2018. Natalegawa's key argument appears to be that regional dynamics now have a place in global diplomacy. His ideas regarding other crucial diplomatic developments remain less clear, as the chapter veers across a range of topics, such as digitalization, connectivity, multipolarity, populism, and the cultural clash between East and West.

Chapter 2 focuses on ASEAN's intra-institutional dynamics, covering Southeast Asia's pre-ASEAN institutional history, its early treaties as well as its membership expansion. After this preliminary section, the chapter provides interesting anecdotes of Indonesia's maritime agreement negotiations with Malaysia and the Philippines in 2012 and 2014, respectively. The centerpieces of the chapter are retellings of Timor Leste's attempted admission to ASEAN and the negotiations surrounding the 2011 Preah Vihear Temple conflict between Thailand and Cambodia. Both stories provide an Indonesian counterpoint to previous public discussions, all the while illuminating how ASEAN's often frustratingly vague public statements are drafted.

Chapter 3 widens the focus towards ASEAN's external relations. After some introductory remarks on its early external treaties, the ASEAN Plus Three as well as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the chapter concentrates on ASEAN's external relations during Natalegawa's time as DG of ASEAN Cooperation and as Foreign

Minister. Major sections address the emergence and growth of the East Asia Summit as well as the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the corresponding Code of Conduct. A rather brief section discusses but fails to add novel insight on ASEAN's Bali Concord III and the organization's emerging role in disaster response after Cyclone Nargis.

Chapter 4 seeks to address ASEAN's transition from a state-centered to a people-centered organization. This presumed focus is somewhat misleading, as the chapter rather covers topics that seem to not have neatly fitted into the previous sections. This includes the developmental aspects of the ASEAN Economic Community, the establishment of the Political-Security and Socio-Cultural pillars of the organization, a brief section on Indonesia's mediation role in the Philippines' armed insurgencies, and a lengthy section on how ASEAN has dealt with Myanmar over the years. While this chapter exchanges retellings of shuttle diplomacy for discussions of how certain ASEAN characteristics relate to its citizens, it lacks a thorough analysis of ASEAN's people-centeredness. However, Natalegawa's deliberations in the final paragraph clearly reveal that he has given extensive thought to what a people-centered ASEAN could look like. It leaves the reader wondering to which degree Indonesia (and by association, this book) continues to sweep internal disagreements regarding people-centeredness within ASEAN under the proverbial rug.

Chapter 5 provides a sort of personal manifesto on how ASEAN should proceed in order to sustain its relevance in the future. At this point, I asked myself: Does the book fulfill the expectation of tackling the question of whether ASEAN will continue to matter in the future? In truth, I believe the book should be seen rather as a trove of anecdotes and viewpoints rather than a clearly argued position on ASEAN as an organization.

Given its specialist subject, this book is only recommended for the most avid of ASEAN watchers. A good knowledge of ASEAN's internal dynamics from 2000 onwards is required to appreciate the empirical insights provided by Natalegawa. The author dedicates several pages at the end of each chapter to discussing ASEAN's institutional shortcomings, such as a lack of invocation of legal clauses, the weakness of the Secretariat, limitations of ASEAN's dialogue partnerships, and the lack of organizational unity at the UN-level. Natalegawa's honesty is often refreshing. Still, some of his arguments are difficult to follow, as they tend to rely on insufficient conceptual elaboration. The concept of strategic trust in chapter 2, for instance, remains opaque. Likewise, the discussion of ASEAN centrality in chapter 3 is perfunctory. Still, many of the book's themes remain relevant, as the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea remains hotly debated, the EAS continues to be a key venue in the Indo-Pacific institutional architecture, and ASEAN's people-centeredness appears as questionable as ever.

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Elizabeth Lominska Johnson, Graham E. Johnson: A Chinese Melting Pot – Original People and Immigrants in Hong Kong's First "New Town"

Hong Kong University Press, 2019. 218 S., 60 Abb., 70 USD

Rezension von Johannes Küchler

Kurzzeitbesucher von Hongkong kommen höchstens auf dem Weg zwischen Flughafen und Innenstadt in Kontakt mit Tsuen Wan, einem Vorort im Nordwesten von Kowloon mit mittlerweile fast 1 Million Einwohnern. „A Chinese Melting Pot" ist zu lesen als eine Sozialgeschichte dieses einst peripheren Teilraums der Metropole Hongkong/Kowloon. Mit dem Zustrom von Flüchtlingen ab 1947 stellte sich die Frage nach der zukünftigen ökonomischen Basis der Kolonie. Die strategische Entscheidung fiel, politisch ungelenkt, durch Shanghaier Textilunternehmer. Deren Maschinen, bestellt im Vereinigten Königreich, wurden nicht mehr nach Shanghai, sondern nach Hongkong geliefert und bildeten im damaligen Fischerdorf Tsuen Wan den Grundstein für die folgende Industrialisierung.

Die Johnsons verfolgen diesen Wandel über den Zeitraum von mehr als einem Jahrhundert. Als Absolventen der Cornell University verfügten sie über solide Kenntnisse des Kantonesischen, als sie jung verheiratet mit ihrem vier Monate alten Sohn 1968 in Hongkong eintrafen. Graham als Soziologe interessierte sich für den Strukturwandel des expandierenden Industriestandorts, der sich zunächst spontan, später teilweise geplant zur ersten *new town* der Kronkolonie mauserte. Elizabeth als *social anthropologist* konzentrierte sich innerhalb von Tsuen Wan auf das Hakka-Dorf Kwan Mun Hau als Relikt der vorindustriellen Agrargesellschaft. Die junge Familie fand eine Wohnung in diesem Dorf. So ergab sich – erleichtert durch den kleinen Sohn – nicht nur ein vertrauensvoller Kontakt als Grundlage für die Feldforschung, sondern eine bis heute andauernde persönliche und wissenschaftliche Verbindung mit Tsuen Wan. Das vorliegende Buch liefert so ein halbes Jahrhundert nach der ursprünglichen Untersuchung und nach wiederholten Aufenthalten vor Ort in den Folgejahren eine vielschichtige Retrospektive.

Als in der Qing-Zeit die Wiederbesiedlung der Küste Chinas erlaubt wurde, waren es vor allem Hakka-Familien, die hier kleine Dörfer auf *lineage*-Basis gründeten und mit Feldbau und Fischerei ein karges Leben fristeten. Vor allem auf der Grundlage von Interviews mit alten Dorfbewohnerinnen kann Elizabeth die schweren Lebensbedingungen vor dem Krieg und während der japanischen Besatzung nachzeichnen. Anschaulich schildert sie den dann folgenden Einschnitt im Leben der Frauen, der sich mit dem Umstieg auf Lohnarbeit, Alphabetisierung und verbesserter Gesundheitsvorsorge ergab. Schlagartig sank die Geburtenrate und die Sterblichkeit der Mütter und Säuglinge. Die bisher eher marginalisierten Hakka-Familien befanden sich mit der Industrialisierung plötzlich in einer

privilegierten Position dank ihres Anteils am Grundeigentum. Als „Ureinwohner" werden sie zwar mehr und mehr zur Minderheit unter der wachsenden Zahl der zuziehenden Industriearbeiter, bleiben aber materiell gut abgesichert. Es begegnet uns hier ein Vorläufer der später im Perlflussdelta häufigen „urban villages".

Die Analyse von Elizabeth beschränkt sich aber nicht auf demografische Aspekte, sondern umfasst auch die ganze kulturelle Dimension, wie sie sich im Jahresgang der Feste, in der Wahrnehmung wichtiger familiärer Ereignisse wie Geburt, Hochzeit, Tod äußert. Der Bezug auf den gemeinsamen Ahnenschrein ist Grundlage solidarischen Handelns bei Notfällen, Krankheit und Tod. Die *lineage* bildet die erweiterte Familie.

Die staatlich unbeeinflusste Selbstorganisation der Gesellschaft in Vereinen (sog. *voluntary associations*) dient auf der nächst höheren Ebene, der jungen Industriestadt, dem gleichen Wunsch nach gemeinsamer Interessenvertretung und solidarischer Hilfe. Graham untersuchte 1968–1970 durch Interviews, teilnehmende Beobachtung und Aktenstudium 91 Vereine, die sich nach sozialem und ökonomischem Status, Berufszugehörigkeit, politischer Orientierung, Sprachgruppe und/ oder Herkunftsgebiet konstituierten. Ihre Bedeutung ergab sich aus der anfangs sprachlich-kulturellen Isoliertheit der Einwanderer, aber auch aus der Tatsache, dass die Kolonialregierung politisch, institutionell und mental nicht auf den plötzlichen Zustrom von Migranten vorbereitet war und erst zögerlich soziale Aufgaben im Bildungs- und Gesundheits- und Wohnungswesen übernahm.

So kommt das Autoren-Paar mit seinem Zwei-Ebenen-Ansatz – hier der ethnologische Blick auf die Familie(n) und ihre Mitglieder, dort der soziologische auf die Vielfalt der Einwanderergesellschaft – zu einem differenzierten Bild des Nebeneinanders von „Eingesessenen" und Zugezogenen. Dem Wandel dieses Nebeneinanders widmen die Johnsons den letzten Teil ihres Buches: Eingebettet in eine Darstellung der jüngsten politischen Geschichte Hongkongs schildern sie den Übergang des einstigen Industriestandorts in ein attraktives Mittelklasse-Wohnquartier und die Herausbildung einer Hongkong-Identität unter den Nachgeborenen mit dem Kantonesischen als lingua franca. Unbeabsichtigt erweist sich das Buch als lesenswerte zeitgeschichtliche Analyse für das Verständnis der überraschenden Kraft, mit der die Gesellschaft Hongkongs ihre politischen Errungenschaften in der aktuellen Krise verteidigte. Zudem ist „A Chinese Melting Pot" mit seiner ungewöhnlich persönlichen Note anregend für Nachwuchs-Wissenschaftlerinnen, die sich auf ihre eigene Feldforschung vorbereiten.

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Daniel Koss: Where the Party Rules – The Rank and File of China's Communist State

Cambridge University Press, 2018. XVI + 391p.
74.99 GBP (hardback), 26.99 GBP (paperback), 28.00 USD (ebook)

Review by Carolin Kautz

With his recently published monograph, Daniel Koss offers an important contribution to the study of authoritarianism. By using China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a case study, Koss analyses "the party's role in the information architecture of the authoritarian state, with implications for state capacity and ultimately for regime durability as well" (p. 6). Koss wants to go beyond existing approaches in the literature that focus on the role of authoritarian parties as institutions of patronage, for mediating leadership conflicts and as democratic concessions in an authoritarian context (p. 6). Instead, he suggests the use of an authoritarian lens for the study of authoritarian regime parties in order to understand how they function and how they serve to empower the state. In order to do this, Koss uses his case study of the CCP to move beyond analyses either of the top-level leadership or of making comparisons on a cross-national scale and instead, with the help of a sub-national comparative approach, analyses the distribution of the CCP's rank and file and their contributions to empowering the state. Koss argues that rank-and-file party members of the CCP help to empower the state by fulfilling the function of providing information crucial for political tasks.

In order to analyse the influence of the presence of rank-and-file party members on the implementation of important state policies, Koss conducts mostly quantitative analyses of two exemplary policy areas, i.e. the implementation of the one-child policy and the collection of taxes throughout the country. With the help of existent as well as newly available statistical data, he first tests the hypothesis of whether a higher presence of party members in a given locality has a positive effect on the implementation of the one-child policy, namely the prevention of a high-ratio of gender-imbalanced birth. Because he argues that this is the more difficult task to implement compared to the task of simply lowering birth rates, Koss concludes that this is a task for the party to implement with the help of its extensive grassroots networks. He finds that a higher number of party members in a given locality indeed correlates with a less significant gender-imbalance at birth and concludes that a higher party presence allows for better implementation of difficult policies. Similarly, with regard to tax collection Koss argues that the presence of rank-and-file party members in a given locality allows for improved revenue collection so that party members do not only extract rents from the state, but also help with the collection of state income, thereby empowering the state.

Since Koss argues that rank-and-file party members support policy implementation and thereby empower the state and concludes that a higher number of party members present in a given locality leads to better results in policy implementation and revenue raising, he attempts to trace the reasons for the divergence in the density of party members across localities. Looking at the divergence in the density of party representation in different areas of the People's Republic of China, Koss proposes that this divergence can be traced back to the Japanese occupation during the Sino-Japanese War. He suggests that due to Japanese occupation, the CCP was able to build a strong Party organisation because it provided a shield from Guomindang attacks and helped with the mobilisation of peasants on xenophobic and nationalist grounds. Additionally, the CCP was able to rapidly move into the power vacuum left by the retreating Japanese troops after the end of World War II. Koss shows that patterns of current-day party membership can be linked to these effects of occupation and during the past 70 years have been waning only slowly. According to him, early party membership patterns still have a visible effect on how party membership is distributed geographically now and he identifies an, albeit weakening, effect of path-dependency between historical and current patterns of party membership.

Following his argument of state empowerment by rank-and-file Party members at the grassroots level whose spatially diverse presence he traces back to patterns of Japanese occupation during World War II, Koss still analyses the question of whether the Party can also function as a self-corrective device in times of crisis. He takes into consideration the two cases of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution and based on mostly qualitative document analysis, concludes that an, albeit weak, self-corrective effect can be observed in both cases. Areas that were strongly contested during the anti-Japanese war and therefore had party members more strongly committed to the Communist cause tended to have lower death tolls during the famine following the Great Leap Forward and areas with a better developed party network did undergo less turmoil during the Cultural Revolution or returned to order more easily.

Summing up, based on his case study of the CCP Koss argues that authoritarian regime parties help to empower the state and thereby make authoritarian regimes more resilient by supporting policy implementation, revenue collection and by serving as a self-corrective device in times of crisis. He traces back the patterns of party membership in China helping with these tasks to patterns of Japanese occupation during World War II and identifies a path dependency of these patterns that is still influential today. Koss makes an important contribution to the study of the functioning of the CCP and of authoritarian parties more generally, not only because he makes use of newly available resources and innovative methodology. Even more importantly, he analyses an authoritarian party from an authoritarian standpoint, trying to understand how it works and how it helps to empower an authoritarian state instead of looking for democratic or reform potential. As such,

Koss's book is not only interesting for students of Chinese politics and the CCP, but for studying authoritarian regime parties more broadly.

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NEUERE LITERATUR ÜBER ASIEN

Zusammengestellt von Uwe Kotzel

Die Mitglieder der DGA sind herzlich aufgefordert, ihre neuesten Veröffentlichungen der Redaktion zu melden.

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